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This thesis develops a cognitive linguistic approach to language comprehension.
The cognitive approach differs from traditional linguistic approaches in that lin¬
guistic description is seen as an integral part of the description of cognition, and
that the object of description is the nature of conceptual structures, the processes
which relate these conceptual structures, and the effect of context upon these
processes. As a cognitive description within cognitive science, a computational
approach is adopted: language comprehension is described in terms of two mod¬
ules, a linguistic processing module and a discourse processing module. Within
these modules, conceptual structures and processes are given a uniform charac¬
terization: structures are characterized as partial objects which are extended by
processes into (potentially) less partial objects.
In the linguistic processing module, linguistic expressions are characterized
as signs which combine as head and modifier. The conceptual structure in signs
for lexical expressions is related to the conceptual structure in signs for phrasal
expressions by means of two extensional processes: a specification process which
unifies a modifier sign with part of the head sign; and a linking process which
extends the head sign by unifying the specified part with its own conceptual
structure. Thus combination yields a result sign with a linguistic conceptual
structure for the phrase.
The discourse processing module characterizes the interpretation of linguistic
conceptual structure by means of two extensional processes. The first process,
anchoring, relates the linguistic conceptual structure to concepts in a model of
the discourse by either unifying it with an existing concept, or creating a new
concept. The second process, elaboration, extends concepts in the discourse
model by means of background knowledge, or theories, which specify relations
between and within concepts. This can result in the creation of concepts in the
discourse model which are not directly referenced by linguistic expressions.
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Finally, the cognitive linguistic approach maintains that the discourse context,
in particular a portion of the discourse model, affects both discourse and linguistic
processing. With discourse processing, this context can guide the anchoring of
conceptual structures so that, for example, the contextually appropriate sense of
ambiguous and polysemous expressions can be selected. The discourse context
can also affect linguistic processing: a sufficiently specific context can result in
the selection of the contextually appropriate sense of a lexical expression prior to
combination and interpretation. Both these effects of context are motivated by
empirical evidence, and the later effect supports the contention that there is an
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check by sticking your finger into the
compost, a lot of people don't like sticking their
finger into the compost i don't know if they expect
something to come out and bite them or
something, but that really is the very best water
meter you've got and it is already installed all
ready to use no batteries or anything ()
The topic of this thesis is the description of language as illustrated in the quo¬
tation above1. Obviously, the description of language is a large topic to which
many approaches can be adopted. Each approach has the ability to highlight and
hide different aspects of language. For example, a sociological analysis of language
emphasizes the role language plays in revealing the social relations between par¬
ticipants in the discourse. Literary analysis emphasizes the stylistic techniques
which writers employ in order to achieve particular literary effects. Each of these
approaches then emphasizes different aspect of language at the expense of other
aspects.
xThe extract is lines 137 to 142 in the transcription of Gardener's Question Time
given in appendix A.
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In this thesis, a linguistic approach to language is adopted. The goal of this
introductory chapter is to elucidate what is traditionally meant by a linguistic
approach (section 1.1), where this approach seems to falter by hiding, rather than
highlighting, fundamental aspects of language (section 1.2) and sketch some basic
tenets on which an alternative approach might be based (section 1.3). This alter¬
native approach characterizes language in terms of cognitive representations and
processes, and emphasizes the role of 'context' in its interpretation. Section 1.4
provides an overview of how the approach is developed in this thesis.
1.1 The Linguistic Approach
The foundation of the modern linguistic approach to language can be attributed
to Noam Chomsky (cf. Chomsky 1957; Chomsky 1965; Chomsky 1981). While
other grammarians before him, most notably Boas, Sapir and Bloomfield, pro¬
vided a basic framework which emphasizes linguistic structure — i.e. the treat¬
ment of language in terms of structures, or categories, which are manifest in
language behaviour — and the subordination of meaning to structure, it was
Chomsky who transformed their notions into the modern linguistic approach.
Chomsky's approach is built upon three basic tenets of linguistic description:
universality, creativity and systematicity.
Whereas traditional grammarians, such as Boas, suggested that each lan¬
guage had its own unique grammatical structure, Chomsky promoted the notion
that linguistic structure was universal: all languages have the same underlying
structure even although particular languages admitted properties which were not
manifest in other languages. This notion had a profound impact upon the de¬
scription of language: languages could, in principle, be described using the same
categories and rules. Furthermore, in emphasizing the creativity of language, the
object of description was not the structure of language independent of the lan¬
guage users, but the ability of speakers to produce, and listeners to understand,
an indefinitely large number of utterances. The passage above illustrates one
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aspect of this creativity: our ability to understand a phrase such as water meter
which, in the context of this discourse, refers to using fingers to test whether
a plant needs watering. Finally, in emphasizing the systematicity in language,
Chomsky highlighted the systematic basis of our linguistic abilities.
The result of emphasizing these aspects of language was the development of
generative grammar in the late fifties and early sixties. In essence, generative
grammar provided a formal description, CQUched in terms of putatively universal
categories and rules, of our abilities to produce and understand language. In
addition, it provided both a limit on what aspects of our language ability were to
be described as well as a methodology for developing this description. In the first
place, description was restricted to our abilities pertaining to the production and
understanding of sentences: utterances larger than the sentence were excluded
from linguistic description. Moreover, great emphasis was placed on our ability
to produce and comprehend not just any sentence, but grammatical sentences as
opposed to ungrammatical sentences:
The fundamental aim in the linguistic analysis of a language L is
to separate the grammatical sequences which are the sentence of L
from the ungrammatical sequences which are not sentences of L and
to study the structure of the grammatical sequences (Chomsky 1957:
13; original emphasis)
In other words, grammar was intended to provide a description of our ability to
produce and comprehend grammatical sentences; ungrammatica.1 sentences were
to be excluded from the description. In Chomsky's terms, the grammar must
generate, or enumerate, all and only the well-formed sentences in a language. If,
however, the scope of grammar is to be fundamentally restricted on the basis of
this distinction, it is essential that the basis for the distinction is made explicit.
Four potential bases for the distinction have been rejected by Chomsky. The
first is intuition. While we may have an intuitive grasp of the distinction so that,
for example, the plants grow in the garden is grammatical, or well-formed, and
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in grow plants in garden the in is ungrammatical, or ill-formed, that intuition is
part of language, not independent of it, and so the grammar must give an ac¬
count of it (cf. Miller 1962). The second is empirical: we cannot equate the set of
grammatical sentences with the set of sentences actually produced and recorded
as linguistic corpora. One reason for this concerns creativity (cf. Chomsky 1957:
15): the set of actual utterances is finite whereas the set of grammatical utter¬
ances is infinite since it includes sentences which we have not yet come across.
Another concerns the distinction between competence and performance: compe¬
tence concerns our ability to understand and produce sentences and performance
the application of this ability ('ability in action'). Chomsky argues that many
sentences which we actually produce will be ungrammatical on account of non-
linguistic factors such as memory lapses, hesitations, interruptions, and so on.
As a consequence of this, observation of actual linguistic behaviour must be 'ide¬
alized' so as to remove the 'extraneous' aspects of the phenomena responsible for
ungrammatically. In other words, grammaticality cannot be sourced in actual
performance: it is part of competence.
The third potential basis is statistical approximation: i.e. that sentences are
grammatical on the basis of the transitional probability of words occurring in
a sequence. As Chomsky demonstrates, two words may have equal probability
of occurrence in a given linguistic context on the basis of past experience; for
example, whale and of may have zero probability in the context I saw a fragile
, yet the sequence I saw a fragile whale is grammatical whereas I saw a fragile
of is not.
A fourth potential basis for the distinction is semantics: grammatical sen¬
tences are 'meaningful' sentences. What differentiates this account from the
others is that it is a distinction which is internal to the grammar. For part of the
structuralist tradition has been to describe language in terms of different levels of
structure (cf. Bach 1986 on the 'divide and conquer' strategy in linguistics). Tra¬
ditionally, three levels have been recognized in grammar and each is associated
with related, but independent, regularities in language:
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phonology provides a description of the regularities which govern the combina¬
tion of sounds;
syntax provides a description of the regularities which govern the combination
of words;
semantics provides a description of the regularities which govern the combina¬
tion of the meaning of words.
Chomsky claims that grammatically is not defined at the levels of semantics. He
makes this claim on the basis of the well-known examples in (1.1) and (1.2):
(1.1) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously
(1.2) 'Furiously sleep ideas green colorless
Both examples, he claims, are "equally nonsensical, but any speaker of English
will recognize that only the former is grammatical" (Chomsky 1957: 15).
If grammaticality is not to be defined in terms of actual occurrence, statistical
regularity or semantics, then what is it to be defined in terms of? Chomsky's
answer is that grammar itself defines grammaticality: the sequences a gram¬
mar generates, i.e. assigns a structural description to, are grammatical sentences
independent of whether or not they have actually occurred, are semantically well-
formed or statistically probable. This may seem anomalous given that semantics
is part of grammar: surely, in order for a sentence to be grammatical, it needs
to be assigned a wellformed semantic structure, just as it must be assigned well-
formed syntactic and phonological structures. However, while semantics is part
of the description assigned by grammar, these levels of description are indepen¬
dent levels of descriptions and are assigned different priorities. In particular, the
syntactic level of description has priority in grammar: semantic and phonological
structure are interpretations of syntactic structure. Thus, grammaticality is to
be equated with syntactic wellformedness and semantic and phonological well-
formedness are secondary considerations independent of grammaticality. This
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then allows for the possibility of a grammatical sequences being either semanti-
cally well-formed or illformed. What it forbids are grammatical sequences which
are syntactically illformed.
1.2 Points Of Departure
The linguistic approach developed in this thesis diverges from the traditional
approach in that linguistic description is seen as an integral part of the description
of cognitive abilities, and the focus of the description is not grammaticality, but
the nature of conceptual structure, the processes by which it is constructed and
the effect of context on these processes.
One basic tenet of Chomsky's approach to the description of language is its
independence from the description of other cognitive abilities. This independence
is manifest in two ways. The first is a theoretical commitment to the study of
language independent of its use in our everyday activity. For rather than at¬
tempt to describe language within the context of everyday activity, grammatical
description is based upon a highly idealized notion of language. Language, how¬
ever, is not an object in its own right: it is a tool which we use to communicate
and its description should respect this (cf. Lewis 1960: 8). This should not be
seen as a rejection of the modern linguistic tradition, but as a commitment to
treating language description from a multi-disciplinary perspective rather than
from a single perspective. As we shall see, viewing language in this way, high¬
lights aspects of language which are amenable to a linguistic treatment but which
have been ignored due to this traditionally insular perspective. Secondly, but
closely related, are methodological considerations. Linguistics has developed a
methodology which diverges from the methodology employed in other disciplines
which study cognitive abilities. In psychology, for example, great emphasis is
placed upon the use of experiments to both explore and validate hypotheses
about cognitive descriptions. Likewise, in sociology, as demonstrated in conver¬
sation analysis, the preferred method of developing and validating hypotheses
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is through detailed observation and analysis of everyday language (cf. Levinson
1983; Atkinson and Heritage 1984; Wooffitt 1992). In linguistics, however, es¬
pecially where the development of grammar is concerned, hypotheses are rarely
subjected to detailed empirical validation, of either the experimental or obser¬
vational variety. One consequence is that this makes it difficult to provide an
account of how our linguistic abilities interact with both psychological and social
abilities.
A second divergence from the traditional linguistic approach concerns the sta¬
tus of semantics. By focusing on grammaticality and equating it with syntactic
well-formedness, semantics has not played a significant role in the development
of grammar. The emphasis has been on the development of syntactic frameworks
which are capable of assigning descriptions to an increasingly complex set of ut¬
terance types with the minimum of syntactic representations and rules. More re¬
cently, however, grammars have begun to develop more sophisticated approaches
to semantics by importing theories from philosophy. These theories, such as
those developed by Montague (1974), Kamp (1981), Barwise and Perry (1983)
and Landman (1986), have subtly moved the emphasis of linguistic description
away from grammaticality towards interpretability: i.e. the purpose of providing
a linguistic description of utterances is not simply to determine their grammat¬
icality, but to yield a semantic representation which can be assigned a semantic
interpretation. In addition, since these models are typically discourse models,
the emphasis is increasingly on what sentences, or parts of sentences, contribute
to an evolving model of the discourse. With these semantics approaches, then,
the emphasis is on semantic wellformedness conditions not just of sentences, but
of sentences within a discourse. This takes grammar beyond the sentence.
These discourse-based approaches, however, are not generally well developed
when it comes to characterizing the representation of lexical semantics (concepts
associated with words) and the linguistic and discourse processes by which these
representations are combined and related to our background knowledge and cur¬
rent knowledge about discourse. In part, this deficiency stems from a failure to
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adopt a cognitive approach to semantics: i.e. an approach which locates these
representations and processes within a cognitive agent. This in turn leads to
a failure to consider restrictions on representations and processes which we, as
cognitive agents, are faced with, restrictions which experimental evidence from
cognitive psychology can provide. For example, the construction of a semantic
interpretation may be restricted by the discourse context in which it is embedded.
Consider the extract in (1.3) (lines 74 to 83 in appendix A):
(1.3) like to use things like green nicosheanna and
heally orison and other annual plants () and if you
cannot live without them, then i would suggest
that you make yourself a raised bed, perhaps
eighteen inches high which is a convenient height
you can sit on the edge of it and work from a
comfortable seated position () and grow them very
intensively, fill the bed with a very good quality
compost and grow the plants reasonably close
together, because they have got a deep root run in
good compost
In (1.3), bed is not ambiguous: only the 'plant-sense' is appropriate in a gardening
discourse. However, as an ambiguous expression, it has a number of potential
senses, such as 'mattress-bed', 'plant-bed' and 'river-bed', which can appear in
different contexts:
(1.4) John bought a new mattress for his futon bed.
(1.5) The diver collected clams from the bed of the Thames.
If these senses of bed are only apparent in different discourse contexts, then it is
possible that the semantic representation is constructed by processes sensitive to
context. The selection of different senses on the basis of context can then be seen
as a restriction on discourse well-formedness.
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The third divergence from the traditional approach concerns the indepen¬
dence of syntax and semantics. Traditionally, syntactic and semantic descrip¬
tions of sentences are viewed as systematically related but independent levels of
description where grammatically was defined exclusively at the syntactic level.
Increasingly, however, the priority of the syntactic level is diminishing: syntac¬
tic, semantic and phonological descriptions are seen as providing restrictions of
equal standing on the linguistic well-formedness of sentences (cf. Fenstad et al.
1987: 15-17). We not only endorse this position, but extend it by claiming that
discourse interpretation can affect the linguistic process which defines grammati-
cality. That is, linguistic well-formedness emerges from the satisfaction of syntax,
semantic and phonological restrictions on word combination. Discourse processes
likewise define discourse well-formedness through the satisfaction of restrictions
on semantic interpretation. However, the semantic representation constructed
by the latter processes can also restrict the representations constructed by the
linguistic process. For example, the meaning of bat can vary with the contexts
in (1-6) and (1.7):
(1.6) John was a keen naturalist. The bat he had been studying had unusually
large ears.
(1.7) John was a keen sportsman. The bat he was using in the cricket match
had an unusually large handle.
In (1.7) the discourse process can be seen as providing an interpretation of the
first sentence which implicitly involves the concept of 'sports equipment'. If the
linguistic process selects a lexical representation for bat not simply on the basis
of phonological, syntactic and semantic restrictions — which would not lead
to the selection of the appropriate sense — but also on the basis of discourse
restrictions, and, given that only the 'game-bat' sense is compatible with 'sports
equipment', then the contextually appropriate sense can be selected during the
linguistic process.
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1.3 Destinations
The destination of this thesis is a cognitive linguistic approach to language which
characterizes comprehension in terms of the incremental construction of concep¬
tual representations and their interpretation within a discourse model — i.e. a
set of concepts, and relations between concepts, which have emerged during the
discourse2. The conceptual representation itself is constructed by a linguistic
process. This process combines linguistic representations, or signs, which have
phonological, syntactic and semantic descriptions associated with lexical expres¬
sions. For example, the process combine the lexical representations for pink and
elephants to produce a phonological, syntactic and conceptual representation for
pink elephants. The interpretation of the conceptual representation is character¬
ized by two discourse processes: anchoring and elaboration. Anchoring a concep¬
tual representation involves its integration in the discourse model: the conceptual
representation can either be identified with a compatible, existing concept; or it
can be added as a. new concept. Once anchored, the concept is elaborated by
background knowledge, or a theory. A theory specifies relations of a concept;
for example, the theory for elephants specifies internal relations such that they
necessarily have a trunk and are typically grey in colour, as well as external re¬
lations to other concepts such as location. When a conceptual representation is
elaborated by a theory, these relations are then defined for the anchored represen¬
tation. This results in either the confirmation of existing relations of the concept
or the creation of new relations and concepts in the discourse model.
Furthermore, this approach treats the discourse model as a context which can
affect both linguistic and discourse processes. The discourse model plays a role
in determining the appropriate sense of ambiguous and polysemous expressions.
In discourse processing, conceptual representations for these expressions may be
2Conceptual structure and semantic structure are thus treated as synonymous terms.
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disjunctive: they describe two or more incompatible concepts. Accordingly, they
could be elaborated by theories appropriate to any of these concepts. However,
the anchoring process will attempt to identify one of these concepts with a com¬
patible concept in a portion of the discourse model. If there is such a concept, the
other concepts in the conceptual representation are neither anchored nor elabo¬
rated. If there is no compatible concept, then two 'virtual' concepts are created.
If no further conceptual representations are identified with one of these concepts
by the end of the sentence, then the default sense is selected. The discourse
model also acts as a context for sense selection in the linguistic process. For after
a conceptual representation is anchored and elaborated in the discourse model,
a portion of the discourse model is made available to the linguistic process. This
'discourse context' is then used to refine upcoming disjunctive signs. That is,
if one semantic disjunct, but not the other, is compatible with a concept in the
discourse context, then only this sense is retained in the sign. In this way, selec¬
tion of contextually appropriate senses can occur at two points in comprehension:
during linguistic combination so as to yield a less disjunctive sign3; and during
the anchoring and elaboration of disjunctive conceptual representations.
1.4 Structure Of the Thesis
Chapter 2 addresses two general issues in the cognitive linguistic approach. The
first of these is methodology: if language comprehension is to be characterized
in terms of cognitive representations and processes, then how can we support
or validate particular characterizations? A mixed approach is advocated: both
observational and experimental evidence can be used to support a cognitive lin¬
guistic characterization. The second issue concerns the treatment of cognitive
description as computational description of the cognitive agent. Three aspects
3The result signs may still retain disjunctions since disjuncts may be nested.
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are discussed: the level of computational description appropriate to a linguistic
characterization; the existence of, and relationship between, modules; and the na¬
ture of symbols and rules within these modules. Our characterization is treated
as a computational theory level description positing two modules, a linguistic
processing module and a discourse processing module, which interact with each
other: linguistic descriptions are passed from the linguistic processing module to
the discourse processing module and a discourse context is passed in the opposite
direction. An information-theoretic approach is adopted toward the symbols and
rules in these modules: global invariance is characterized in terms of processes
while local invariance is characterized in terms of constraints inside symbols;
constraints, which when satisfied, yield further information about the symbol.
Chapter 3 addresses two empirical issues central to this approach. The first is
the nature and structure of concepts. Two approaches to concepts, the classical
approach and the prototype approach, are discussed with respect to categoriza¬
tion. It is argued while the prototype approach is capable of accounting for many
empirical shortcomings of the classical approach, such as variation in the typical¬
ity (or centrality) of concepts, it is not able to account for the effects of context on
this variation. The second issue concerns the relationship between linguistic and
discourse processing. Empirical studies on the accessing of lexical representations
are taken to show not only that the contextually appropriate sense of ambigu¬
ous and polysemous expressions can be selected during discourse processing, but
that discourse restrictions can lead to the selection of an appropriate sense within
linguistic processing.
Chapter 4 develops the cognitive linguistic approach by discussing two ap¬
proaches to semantic interpretation. In the correspondence approach, the dis¬
tinction between semantic representation and interpretation is based upon an
ontological distinction between representation and the world itself. The construc¬
tive approach rejects the ontological basis for this distinction and focuses instead
on how cognitive agents construct conceptual structures. These structures are
characterized as dynamic partial objects structured in terms of criterial neces-
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sity and symptomatic default relations, and extended on the basis of a dynamic
discourse model and static background knowledge.
Chapter 5 describes the discourse processing module. Three levels in the pro¬
cessing of conceptual structures are identified: linguistic conceptual structures
as constructed by the linguistic process; conceptual structures anchored in the
discourse model; and conceptual structures elaborated through application of con¬
straints defined by background knowledge or theories. The nature and structure
of conceptual structures and theories are then characterized in terms of struc¬
tured objects. The anchoring process is characterized as a extensional relation
between a linguistic conceptual structure and a discourse model ordered in terms
of accessibility. And the elaboration process as an extensional relation between
concepts anchored in the model and theories. As a result of these processes, a lin¬
guistic conceptual structure may become a specific, stable and coherent concept
in the model. However, this may not always arise initially: concept construction
may involve sense correction. This arises when there is a conflict between prop¬
erties of concepts, a conflict which is resolved through the 'defeat' of one of these
concepts. These cognitive representations and processes are then used to account
for sense selection and correction at the discourse processing level.
Chapter 6 discusses combination in the linguistic processing module. Two
issues are identified. The first is that combination can be characterized in terms
of the unification of linguistic categories, or signs. The second is that combina¬
tion is an asymmetrical process: one sign in a combination has priority over the
other sign. Two approaches to asymmetry are discussed and compared. The first
approach characterizes the asymmetry in terms of the priority of functor signs
over argument signs as in categorial grammar. The second characterizes asym¬
metry in terms of the priority of head signs over modifier signs as in dependency
grammar. It is argued that the head-modifier distinction provides a more eco¬
nomical account of combination than the functor-argument distinction. We also
introduce defeasibility phenomena where one sign 'defeats' semantic properties
of the other sign.
Chapter 1. Introduction 26
Chapter 7 describes the linguistic processing module where combination is
based upon the head-modifier distinction. Linguistic expressions are character¬
ized as signs structured in terms of head and modifier properties. Combination
is based upon two extensional processes: a specification process in which the
modifier sign specifies part of the head sign; and a linking process in which sub¬
structures in the head sign are related by constraints defined in the head sign.
It is then demonstrated how this approach, Unification Dependency Grammar,
can account for sense selection and correction at the linguistic processing level
through interaction with discourse processing module.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Linguistic Descriptions as Cognitive
Descriptions
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we address two issues which arise with a cognitive approach to
linguistic description.
The first concerns methodology: i.e. the methods we might employ to support,
test or validate whether a linguistic description of behaviour is a characterization
in terms of cognitive representations and processes. For while the traditional
linguistic approach claims that it is a description of our cognitive abilities, the
methods it employs, especially testing by example, contrasts with the methods
employed by other disciplines, such as cognitive psychology, which also claim to
offer cognitive descriptions.
The second issue concerns the manner in which cognition is to be described.
In the traditional linguistic approach, the description of representations and the
processes, are couched in terms of symbols and rules. This is not incompatible
with contemporary cognitive science, where cognition is described in computa¬
tional terms: i.e. both humans and computers are described as 'cognitive agents'
27
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capable of processing information. The processing within these agents can be de¬
scribed at a number of levels, levels which differ in their idealization of information
processing. In addition, the description at each level is typically structured in
terms of information processing modules consisting of representations and rules.
Accordingly, we need to established the appropriate level of computational de¬
scription for cognitive linguistic descriptions, its modularity and the nature of
symbols and rules within the modules.
The chapter is structured as follows. Methodology is discussed in section 2.2
where a distinction between direct and indirect observation is made. Within
indirect observation, the distinction between informal and experimental meth¬
ods is discussed. Section 2.3 discusses cognitive linguistic description within the
computational theory of mind. This encompasses a discussion of Marr's levels
of description (section 2.3.1), modularity (section 2.3.2) and symbol processing
(section 2.3.3). Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Methodology
If the cognitive linguistic approach is to be taken as a description of cognition,
then we must be clear about the methods by which evidence is gathered both for
the development and testing of cognitive descriptions. In cognitive science, de¬
velopment and testing of descriptions are based upon two observational methods.
The first method, the direct observation, develops and tests cognitive description
by direct observation of neural activity underlying human cognition. The second
method, the indirect observation, constructs and validates cognitive descriptions
on the basis of observation of the behaviour of human cognitive agents.
2.2.1 Direct Observation
Direct observation is used to construct and evaluate cognitive descriptions in neu-
roscience. Neuroscience constructs descriptions by directly monitoring, recording
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and analyzing neural activity (cf. Crick and Asanuma 1986). There are some
obvious advantages and disadvantages with this method. One advantage is that
it can furnish us with a very precise description, couched in terms of neural rep¬
resentations and processes, of sensory activity such as visual perception (cf. Marr
1982). A second advantage is that the techniques and terminology employed de¬
rives from the physical sciences, such as biology and chemistry, rather than the
social sciences to which cognitive science has traditionally been allied. This can,
and has, served to raise the 'scientific respectability' of cognitive science.
There are, however, a number of disadvantages in using this method for the
cognitive description of linguistic behaviour.
One of these is that the descriptions are hardware-specific: cognition is consti¬
tuted and delimited by the physical hardware which underpins human cognition.
This leaves no room for the possibility that other types of devices, such as com¬
puters, could display linguistic behaviour to which we may attribute cognitive
activity. Of course, some may see this as a proper restriction on what we wish to
term 'cognitive agent': only carbon-based devices with neural hardware should
be considered cognitive agents (cf. Searle 1984). However, at this early stage in
the development of cognitive science, it seems wise to allow for the possibility
that other devices, such as computers, could attain the status of cognitive agents
(cf. Woolgar 1987).
The main disadvantage, however, is that this methods fails to provide a de¬
scription of 'high-level' cognitive activity such as language understanding and
production. This is not to deny that at some point in the future neuroscience
might be able to furnish such a description of these cognitive activities, only that
it does not currently do so. One may speculate that it will be a considerable
time before such cognitive activities can be given neural descriptions. Further¬
more, just as most cognitive scientists and linguists have rejected Bloomfield's
pessimistic claim that a precise definition of the meaning of words requires a
complete scientific description of the objects and processes in the world which
they describe, so cognitive science has rejected the assumption that cognitive
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descriptions can only be constructed by observing the neural activity of human
cognitive agents (cf. Lyons 1977a: 33)1.
2.2.2 Indirect Observation
Within cognitive science, most cognitive descriptions are developed and tested
by means of indirect observation. This method can be seen as complementary to
direct observation. Rather than directly observe neuronal activity, descriptions
are constructed by observing the behaviour of human cognitive agents. Given
the gap between evidence obtained from observation of an agent's behaviour and
the neural activity upon which it might be based, the resulting cognitive de¬
scriptions naturally differ both in specificity and scope from those arrived at by
direct observation. In particular, cognitive descriptions are not committed to a
one-to-one correspondence between representations and processes in the descrip¬
tions, and specific neural representations and processes. They merely claim that,
at some level of description, neural activity can be appropriately described in
this way. Such descriptions are functional cognitive descriptions since evidence
derived from observed behaviour is only sufficiently specific to restrict the func¬
tions performed by a cognitive agent, not the hardware upon which it might be
executed. Of course, the corollary of this lack of specificity is that high level
cognitive abilities can be given a cognitive description, but low level ones cannot.
1 Even those developing connectionist descriptions of cognition have rejected this (cf.
Rumelhart and McClelland 1986). In addition, even though their descriptions are in¬
formed by neuroscience, the extent to which these descriptions are actually constrained
by neurological evidence is open to question:
As Jim Bower wrote: '... As a neurobiologist, however, I would assert that
even a cursory look at the brain reveals a structure having very little in
common with connectionist models.' (cf. Sloman 1991: 10)
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For the remainder of this thesis, it shall be assumed that cognitive descriptions
will be developed and tested by evidence obtained using indirect observation.
The cognitive linguistic approach, for example, is thus treated as a functional
description of cognition whose evidence is derived from observation of linguistic
behaviour. The neural activity taking place inside a cognitive agent is conse¬
quently irrelevant to the validity, or otherwise, of this type of description since
the method cannot access what actually happens inside the agent's head. The
neural basis of cognition in human agents is beyond its ken.
Having determined the evidential basis for cognitive linguistic descriptions,
let us now turn to how these descriptions can be tested and evaluated.
In cognitive science, as with any other empirical discipline, hypotheses should
be defeasible. That is, hypothesized cognitive descriptions should be couched in
such a way that their validity can be empirically tested: the evidential conditions
under which they are supported as well as these under which they are not sup¬
ported should be stated, or if not, obvious to infer. This much is uncontroversial.
What is controversial, however, is what counts as good evidence for cognitive
linguistic descriptions. The controversy stems from the work practices of the
disciplines forming cognitive science. Linguists, semanticians and philosophers
tend to test descriptions against informal observation of behaviour. Cognitive
psychologists, on the other hand, test their descriptions against observation of
behaviour under experimental conditions. These work practices give rise to two
senses of 'empirically testable': testing by informal observation and testing by
experimental observation.
Informal Observation
With the first sense of empirically testable, descriptions are tested against ob¬
servations of behaviour made in an informal setting. Typically, this involves
determining what behaviour is predicted, or not predicted, by the description
and consulting written texts to determine whether these predictions are valid.
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Consider, for example, how linguistic descriptions of 'control' phenomena
would be tested with this method. Suppose that the description involves the
claim that the covert 'subject' of an embedded infinitival clause is co-referential
with the object of the finite matrix clause. The prediction is then validated
by constructed test sentences, such as those given in (2.1), using reflexive pro¬
nouns to determine the co-referential expression (co-reference is indicated by
co-indexing):
(2.1) a. John told Peter1 to shave himself1
b. John asked Peter1 to shave himself1
c. John wanted Peter1 to shave himself1
The description would then be further tested by simply extending the set of test
sentences. This might include varying the matrix verb, changing its mood and
aspects as well as variations in the embedded clause. The prediction would not
be valid if a test sentence can be constructed which counters the claim. With
(2.2), the subject rather than the object is co-referential with the pronoun:
(2.2) John1 promised Peter to shave himself1
In this way, claims which form part of cognitive descriptions are tested, and then
revised, by informal observation.
This method of testing cognitive descriptions has some obvious advantages
and disadvantages. One advantage is that it is based upon easily accessible data:
data can either be found in existing texts or constructed. Another is that it
permits descriptions to be developed and tested relatively quickly: a theory can
be developed and, if necessary, data can be constructed to support it.
There are, however, a number of disadvantages. Firstly, gathering test data
in this way is not systematic: the data can be sentences constructed by the lin¬
guists themselves or randomly selected sentences actually used by non-linguists.
Secondly, test material tends to be self contextualizing: i.e. the context in which
the sentence occurred is not provided and the reader is required to construct
Chapter 2. Linguistic Descriptions as Cognitive Descriptions 33
one for themselves. Thirdly, interpretation of test data is not independent of
the observer's intuitions. Such a lack of independence would be justified on the
basis that the principles the observer brings to bear in analyzing data are the
same principles used to produce the behaviour in the first place. Even if the
same person produces and analyses the test data, then there is an assumption
that their account of their own behaviour can be equated with a description of
the (cognitive) activity which produced it in the first place. Consequently, this
method does not distinguish between descriptions of 'cognition-in-action' and
'cognition-in-account': i.e. between descriptions of the cognitive processes which
gives rise to the behaviour and descriptions of accounts of the behaviour. Finally,
informal observation is relatively blunt in that it tends to test sets of principles,
or predictions, constituting a description rather than individual principles. On
the available data, it can be shown that one description can account for more
data than another, but it is difficult to know which of the individual principles is
responsible. So unless descriptions differ with respect to a single principle, it is
difficult to use data to test their accuracy.
Experimental Observation
The second sense of empirically testable is that descriptions are tested and val¬
idated by means of psychological experiments. In such experiments, behaviour
is elicited from subjects by requesting them to perform a task, recording pre¬
determined aspects of their behaviour and then analyzing the results using stan¬
dard qualitative and quantative methods.
Consider how claims about the relationship between covert subjects and ma¬
trix clause might be tested with this method (cf. Chomsky 1969; Chomsky 1982).
Subjects are asked to read a text containing control expressions and select its co-
referential antecedent from a list as soon as they have found it. The text itself can
be systematically varied between and within subject groups so as to test whether,
for example, the surrounding linguistic context, such as the matrix verb or the
mood of the matrix clause, affects selection of an antecedent. The behaviour
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of subjects is then recorded in terms of experimental data concerning (correla¬
tions between) the type of control expression, type of matrix clause, accuracy
and speed in selecting antecedent2. Analysis of this data may, for example, es¬
tablish statistical correlations demonstrating that, for example, certain types of
syntactic context facilitate the determination of the 'missing' subject in certain
types of syntactic context since for these contexts the speed and/or accuracy is
significantly higher than in the other types of context.
The experimental method has three advantages over the informal method.
In the first place, there is a clear separation between the analysis of the data
and its subsequent interpretation in terms of theories and intuitions. For data
analysis is performed using a. set of explicit, well known techniques whose appli¬
cation is, in principle, not subject to interference from the intuitions and theories
of the experimenter. Of course, once data analysis has been completed, then the
experimenter can interpret the results in terms of their intuitions and theories.
The important point is that data analysis itself is independent of intuition and
yields results which can be replicated by others as well as being subject to dif¬
ferent interpretations. With the experimental method, cognitive science can be
aligned with other scientific disciplines, such as physics and chemistry, which rely
upon controlled experimentation and well-defined analytic methods to validate
descriptions.
In the second place, the experimental method is capable of testing more precise
claims than the informal method. The precision derives from two sources: the
behaviour of subjects can be controlled and manipulated within the experimental
laboratory; and differences in experimental conditions, such as task and context,
can be treated as variables which, by means of data analysis, can be correlated
and then interpreted so as to demonstrate the validity (or otherwise) of particular
theoretical principles. Of course, in order for this to be possible, these principles
2Where 'accuracy' can be determined prior to the experiment by a set of independent
judges.
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must be distinctive - i.e. they must contrast with alternative principles, including
the null hypothesis, in terms of their experimental correlates3. This allows the
individual principles in a theory, as well as their interactions, to be controlled for
and tested.
Furthermore, the experimental method is able to test descriptions at different
levels of detail. One advantage of this is that differences between subject's ac¬
counts of their behaviour and their actual behaviour become manifest (cf. Evans
1980). For example, in a series of experiments conducted by Armstrong et al.
(1983), the 'typicality' of concepts within superordinate concepts such as fruit,
vehicles and numbers, was investigated. Two tasks were used to measure typi¬
cality: rating concepts along a typicality scale; and simply asking subjects about
their typicality. They discovered a discrepancy between the ratings assigned by
subjects and the accounts of their own behaviour. For example, subjects reported
that all odd numbers were equally odd, yet behaved as if certain numbers were
more odd than others — 3, 7 and 9 for example. Accordingly, the experimental
method offers a way of assessing whether our reports of behaviour are accurate
(in terms of independent experimental correlates) as well as cautioning us against
the assumption that behaviour and accounts of that behaviour necessarily probe
the same cognitive activity — they may be probing different aspects of the same
activity or entirely different activities (cf. Johnson-Laird 1987).
Of course, the experimental method is not without its disadvantages. One of
these is that behaviour is elicited from subjects in experimental situations rather
than everyday situations. If there are dependencies between the elicited behaviour
and the experimental context, then clearly the results of the experiments cannot
be generalized to behaviour in everyday situations.
30f course, descriptions which lack empirically contrastive principles, as many theo¬
retical linguistic descriptions seem to, cannot be tested with the experimental method.
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Rather than simply accept one or other of these methods for developing and
testing cognitive linguistic descriptions, both methods are employed in this thesis.
The informal method is primarily used to demonstrated the plausibility of,
rather than test, claims of cognitive description. While little can be done to allevi¬
ate the lack of independence between data analysis and interpretation, the other
problems, non-systematicity in collection and self-contextualizing data, can be
alleviated through use of corpus material such as the transcription of an episode
of Gardener's Question Time given in appendix A.
The experimental method, on the other hand, is used to test specific claims
of the approach developed here. Four further points about this method should
be borne in mind.
Firstly, in using experimental data, we are not committed to accounting for
every effect observed in experiments. Experimental effects will be treated as clues
about cognition, clues which can either validate a hypothesis, undermine it or not
affect it. Experimental effects, then, will underdetermine description (cf. Carey
1982): they will provide us with clues as to the character of specific cognitive
activities rather like a photograph of a building may tell us about that building
- and we want a theory of buildings rather than a theory of photographs of
buildings.
Secondly, corroborative experimental evidence will be admitted in the absence
of direct evidence, although it will be significantly weaker evidence. Cognitive
descriptions may differ in purpose — for example, accounting for semantic phe¬
nomena and visual perception — and it is assumed that they are founded upon
the same set of principles unless there is evidence to the contrary. Obviously, cor¬
roborative evidence is not as reliable as direct evidence. For while experimentally
tested descriptions are always susceptible to subsequent disconfirmation, princi¬
ples established by analogy are doubly susceptible: by direct counter-evidence;
and by disconfirmation of the analogous principle. For example, linguistic repre-
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sentations have been given a prototypical structure on the basis of Rosch's evi¬
dence for prototype structure of concepts (cf. Jackendoff 1983). Unfortunately,
more recent work on concepts has undermined their prototypical structure, with
the result that the corroborative evidence for this sort of structure for linguistic
representations is no longer adequate (see section 3.2.2).
Finally, using the available experimental evidence is far from ideal, especially
where the experimental context — situation, task and goals — is far from 'natu¬
ral'. This problem has been recognized within cognitive psychology and this has
led to the development of 'naturalistic' experiments, experiments which probe
subject's behaviour in more natural contexts. For example, the 'maze' game
experiments allow subject to engage in goal-directed activity whilst providing
data on the use and resolution of referring expressions (cf. Garrod and Anderson
1987; Boyle 1990). Additionally, such experiments provide (more) 'natural' con¬
texts for these resolution tasks in contradistinction to the 'self-contextualizing'
tasks in other experiments.
2.3 Cognition as Computation
One of the foundational notions in cognitive science is the Computational Theory
of Mind (CTM) (cf. Kolers and Smythe 1984: 291). The CTM postulates that
cognition can be understood and described as a computation: i.e. cognitive
descriptions can be couched in terms of computational information processing4.
4That people can and do understand and reason about cognition in computational
terms is supported by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 27-28) who provide plentiful examples
of computational metaphors; for example, We're still trying to grind out the solution
to this equation, My mind just isn't operating today and He broke down.
Chapter 2. Linguistic Descriptions as Cognitive Descriptions
2.3.1 Levels of Description
38
Marr (1982) provides a basic descriptive framework in which to consider the
\
relation between information processing behaviour and levels of description. In
his framework, computation can be understood at three different, albeit related,
descriptive levels: the computational theory level, the algorithmic level and the
hardware implementation level.
The first level, the computational theory level, addresses questions such as
the goal of the computation, why it is appropriate and the logic of the strategy
by which it is carried out. The second level of description, the algorithmic level,
addresses questions dealing with how the function is carried out, i.e. the algo¬
rithm for transformation, and representations of the input and the output. So in
addition to dealing with what function is being computed it also deals with how
the function is computed and how its inputs and outputs are represented. Indeed,
this level of description attends to aspects of computation which are regarded as
irrelevant at the first descriptive level including time and space issues. The third
level, the hardware level, addresses how an algorithm, its inputs and outputs can
be physically realized.
Two points about these descriptive levels need to be emphasized.
Firstly, at each level we must make a distinction between theory and model. A
theory is a characterization of a phenomena given in words; a model is a charac¬
terization given in a formal language whose interpretation is highly constrained
- a computer program or a logic. Furthermore, these levels describe the com¬
putation in an increasing less abstract way: i.e. each level imposes more and
more restrictions on the computation. At the computational theory level, func¬
tional restrictions are imposed; at the algorithmic level, procedural restrictions
are added; and at the hardware implementational level the description is further
restricted by the nature of the hardware. Thus as we lower the degree of ide¬
alization we take on an increasing number of restrictions on the computational
description of behaviour. Paralleling these levels of idealization in theory, we
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can built computational models which likewise take on board different sets of
restrictions. Thus a model at the computational theory level need only compute
the relevant function — how it does it, as well as the hardware on which it is
computed, are irrelevant. But a model at the algorithmic level must not only
compute the relevant function, but do so in a way consistent with certain limita¬
tions and errors (again hardware is irrelevant). Only at the hardware level does
the model need to respect all restrictions.
The second point is that at each level of description, the theory provides an
appropriate interpretation for the model. Models interpreted by theories appro¬
priate to other descriptive levels will fail to provide the restrictions appropriate to
the theory level. For example, if the model is appropriate to the hardware level
of description, then it can also be described at the computational theory and
algorithmic levels although such descriptions will necessarily underdetermine the
properties of the model. That is, these descriptions will ignore hardware prop¬
erties. If the model is at the computational theory level, then it can only be
appropriately interpreted by a theory at that level: the manner in which the
function is computed as well as the hardware it is being computed on are under-
determined by the computing theory level of description. Likewise if the model
is of the algorithmic level, then it can appropriately be described at the algo¬
rithmic level. A description at the computing theory level will underdetermine
properties of the model: it will ignore certain properties of the model intended
as important. A description at hardware level will overdetermine the properties
of the model: certain properties, hardware properties, will be considered relevant
at this level of description although they were not intended to be relevant. Of
course it is possible to give a description of any model at a higher or lower level
of idealization than that for which it is intended but such descriptions are simply
inappropriate: to give a description at a higher degree of idealization would miss
out certain important constraints imposed on the model, while a description at
a lower level would attribute constraints to the model which were not intended.
Having described the levels of computational description, their degrees of
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idealization and the relationship between theories and models, we now consider
the level of description appropriate to a cognitive linguistic approach.
In the Chomskian approach, a fundamental distinction is made between two
levels of description, differing in their degree of idealization, namely competence
and performance. A competence description, or grammar, is about an (idealized)
individual's knowledge of language whereas a performance description is about
how this knowledge is put to work. These linguistic descriptions have been cor¬
related with Marr's level 1 and level 2, respectively. A competence description
is a declarative description of what function is computed, whereas a performance
description is a procedural description of how the function is computed (cf. Steed-
man 1985: 359).
One effect of this distinction concerns their characteristic method of testing
linguistic descriptions. Competence descriptions are tested by informal obser¬
vation, while performance descriptions are tested by observation of linguistic
behaviour under experimental conditions5.
This approach to testing is based on the view, although not exclusive, that
experimental evidence tests algorithmic descriptions of behaviour (cf. Broadbent
1985). That is, experimental evidence imposes empirical restrictions on cognitive
descriptions which make explicit not only what function is being computed, but
how the function is computed. Aspects of the description such as efficiency, time
and space considerations as well as degradation of performance can, in principle,
be tested through experimentation.
'Another way in which competence descriptions are validated is through modelling:
hence the proliferation of parsers. While parsers are inherently procedural, they are
not performance descriptions since they are interpreted as level 1 rather than level
2 models. This contrasts with other computational models, such as Hearsay, which
are claimed as models of algorithmic theories (cf. Erman et. al. 1980). Experimental
evidence does bear upon the claims made in these models.
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A traditional competence description of linguistic behaviour is a cognitive
description at Marr's computational theory level and, as such, is tested by infor¬
mal observation rather than experimental observation. In section 2.2.2, however,
it was proposed that cognitive linguistic descriptions are tested by the informal
method and the experimental method. The use of the experimental method to
test competence descriptions can be justified by rejecting the assumption that
Marr's levels of descriptions are autonomous. That is, rather than simply treat
descriptions given at one level as wholly independent of descriptions given at
another level, the descriptions can be seen as only partially independent. There
are two reasons for adopting this position. Firstly, as we have seen, the restric¬
tions applicable to one level are also applicable to lower levels; for example, the
restrictions applicable to level 1 descriptions are also applicable to level 2 and
3 descriptions. Secondly, evidence relevant to a lower level is also relevant to
a higher level given the lower level needs to respect restrictions imposed at the
higher level. For example, if experimental evidence concerns claims made about
the information relevant to the nature of some function, such as the combination
of words, then this evidence bears just as much on a level 1 description as on
lower level descriptions. Likewise, hardware evidence bearing upon how a func¬
tion is computed is relevant to both level 2 and 3 descriptions (cf. Chater and
Oaksford 1989). By rejecting the autonomy of levels, competence descriptions
can be tested by both informal and experimental methods.
To deny autonomy between levels is not to deny differences between them.
Competence and performance differ in degree of idealization. Performance de¬
scriptions offer detailed cognitive descriptions and this detail is apparent in how
the function is computed as well as the nature of the input/output represen¬
tations. Competence descriptions, on the other hand, offer descriptions which
are less detailed in two senses. Firstly, they are descriptions which aim to de¬
scribe a particular cognitive function, such as word combination, categorization,
learning, memory and so on. Accordingly, they do not need to account for restric¬
tions on a cognition function, only those appropriate to the computational theory
level. They can, then, ignore experimental evidence which may bear upon the be-
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haviour in question, but does not bear upon the aspect of behaviour they aim to
describe. Competence descriptions can be seen as descriptions whose principles
are contained within, or emerge from, performance descriptions (cf. Johnson-
Laird 1986). Secondly, since competence descriptions are effectively restricted
by experimental evidence, it follows that these descriptions may provide more
details about the nature of function, as well as the nature of the representations,
so long as they do not specify how the function is computed.
2.3.2 Modularity
Taking on board the computational theory of mind commits us to more than the
notion that cognition can be described at three levels of computational descrip¬
tion. It commits us to the notion that cognition has a functional architecture (cf.
Pylylshyn 1984; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Clark 1989). To say that cognition
has a functional architecture is to say that there are some aspects of cognition
which are fixed, i.e. are not subject to change through processing, while other
aspects are variable, i.e. aspects which can change through cognitive processing.
In general, the functional architecture determines structure of cognition as well as
interactions between its substructures; for example, the set of 'primitive' symbols
and rules, the control structure determining rule application, and how memory
is organized and accessed as well as the limitations on information transfer and
so on (cf. Pylylshyn 1984: 92). Here we restrict attention to two facets of func¬
tional architecture which bear upon a level 1 description of linguistic behaviour:
whether it is organized into modules and, if so, how the}' interact; and the nature
and structure of symbols and rules within the description.
Before discussing these aspects of cognition, we must be clear about how we
evaluate competing approaches. Given the emphasis placed upon informal and
experimental testing of cognitive descriptions, it might be expected that compet¬
ing approaches can be evaluated in this manner. However, as Pylylshyn (1984:
134) points out, functional architecture is cognitively impenetrable: neither in¬
formal nor experimental evidence can be used to test the validity of particular
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approaches. Having said this, different approaches can be evaluated in this way
given that we are prepared to make some assumptions about the functional archi¬
tecture and that the approaches which adopt these assumptions make different
claims about how information is actually processed within the functional archi¬
tecture. That is, while we cannot directly test the claims these approaches make
about the macro-structure and micro-structure of cognition, we can test them,
albeit indirectly, through the claims they make about information processing
within the architecture.
With regard to modularity, three approaches will be discussed: strong mod¬
ularity, non-modularity and weak modularity. In terms of Claxton's distinction
between the associative approach and the integrative approach, strong modular¬
ity corresponds to the first and non-modularity to the second (cf. Claxton 1980:
199-205). Weak modularity, like strong modularity, claims that cognition has
macro-structure, but differs from it in terms of the number of modules and the
relations between them.
Strong Modularity
The strong modularity approach claims that in our description of behaviour it
is appropriate to take as a working hypothesis that cognition has major struc¬
tural divisions (cf. Fodor 1983). These divisions give rise to modularization in
description: i.e. descriptions of particular cognitive functions is given in terms of
information processing which takes place within, and between, independent mod¬
ules. Each module has its own representation and processes. Modules are related
by means of associations which defines their connectivity. Interaction between
these modules derived directly from the von Neuman architecture: i.e. a digi¬
tal serial computer with a single central processor operating over registers with
typed data-structures. This characteristically resulted in serial, unidirectional
interactions between modules: i.e. only one module could be active at any time
and once a module has passed control over to the next module in the sequence,
it cannot become active again within that cycle.
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This approach characterizes language comprehension in the following way.
Cognition is partitioned into a number of modules, each of which describe part
of the comprehension process; for example, a phonology module, a syntax mod¬
ule, a semantics module, a context-independent semantic interpretation module
and context-dependent semantic interpretation module. Each module contains
representations and rules to carry out their part of the task; for example, the
syntactic module consisted of syntactic representations and rules for their com¬
bination. The activation cycle is determined by uni-directional relations between
modules so that an input utterance is first processed by the phonological module,
its output given to the syntactic module and so on. The modular architecture
underpinning this approach to language comprehension is illustrated in figure 2-1
(where the arrows indicate uni-directional relations). Allied with this approach to
Figure 2—1: A strong modularity architecture for language comprehension
cognition is a method for interpreting psychological experiments. The purpose of
conducting experiments was to accrue evidence for the structure and interaction
of modules and experimental results were interpreted in this light. Typically,
neither the context of the task, the nature of the material used nor the goals
of the task were seen as pertinent to interpretation. Claxton (1980: 6) gives a
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concise example of this type of methodology from Collins and Quillian (1969):
they proposed that semantic memory is organized as a hierarchy of concepts,
where only the features that distinguished each concept from its superordinate
class were represented, and their predictions were confirmed by their experiments.
More generally such an approach assumes that the different judgments elicited
by experiments were due to different modules in cognition; for example, certain
limitations, so called 'bottleneck' effects, on cognitive processing were due to the
existence of a short-term memory which connects perceptual input with long-term
memory. Accordingly, theories of linguistic processing couched in this framework
attribute the difficulty of centre-embedding sentences to a capacity limitation in
short term memory (cf. Kuno 1974; Frazier and Fodor 1978).
Non-Modularity
The foundational principle of the non-modular approach is that there are no
major structural divisions in cognition. Distinctions characteristic of the modular
approach, such as independent modules with their own representations and rules,
are not countenanced. Instead cognition is described in terms of the interaction
of a large number of 'means-specific' units: i.e. units sensitive to acquisitional
history, context, content, modality and goals. These units can be described as
both representational and processing units.
This approach is primarily informed by the connectionist models. These mod¬
els, in turn, were inspired by neuroscience, where there is considerable evidence
for specialized groups of neurons which responded to particular invariant proper¬
ties of sensory input. In the computational models, these neurological constraints
informed the functional descriptions of cognition.
With this approach, psychological experiments were seen not as offering gen¬
eral principles bearing upon cognitive organization, but rather as "ways of sep¬
arating out and analysising more deeply the complex underlying processes" (cf.
Baddley 1978 quoted in Claxton 1980: 230). This had repercussions for the in¬
terpretation of experiments. Instead of hypothesizing that different judgments
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would reveal aspects of different components of cognition, such as short term
memory and long term memory, it was hypothesized that different judgments
reveal different aspects of the same component. Accordingly, experimental ev¬
idence concerning, say, verbal recall was taken to reveal properties of specific
items rather than general structural principles. Finally such an approach re¬
garded limitations, such as bottleneck effects, as deriving from specific conflicts
rather than inherent capacity limitations. As Touretzsky and Hinton (1986: 31)
say of language interpretation:
Because the working memory for each item is distributed over many
units, thresholds, or weights, there will be interference if more than a
few items are stored at once, and the interference will be greater as
the items become more similar.
Weak Modularity
One advantage of both the strong modularity and non-modularity approaches is
that their descriptions have obvious computational models. Unsurprisingly, their
corresponding models tend to be good at accounting for phenomena highlighted
by their own approach, but not so good with phenomena highlighted by the other
approach. Models of the strong modularity approach are proficient in capturing
'non-interactive' aspects of behaviour, such as list processing, just as models of the
non-modular approach excel with 'interactive' aspects, such as context-sensitivity
and 'content-addressability' (cf. McClelland et al. 1986). On the other hand,
strong modularity models reveal their weaknesses with 'interactive' phenomena
such as context-sensitivity in semantic interpretation, whereas non-modularity
models reveal theirs in phenomena such as high level structure and 'on the fly'
rules (cf. Hadley 1990).
The disadvantage of these approaches is that the main difference between
them — whether or not cognition can be described in terms of modules — cannot
be empirically tested. For whether the distinction is countenanced depends more
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on modelling than experimental considerations. As Kolers and Smythe (1984)
point out, computational descriptions influenced by modelling considerations run
the risk of attributing to the functional architecture of cognition accidental prop¬
erties, properties which are not necessitated by independent evidence, but are
(solely) dependent upon considerations of how the description can be computa¬
tionally modelled. It is for this reason that we have emphasized so heavily the
distinction between description and model.
In this thesis, however, we shall assume a modular approach to cognition.
There are two reasons for this. The first is that this approach is well understood
and extensively used for the description of high level cognitive functions, such
as language comprehension and production, compared with the non-modular ap¬
proach. The second is that models based upon the non-modular approach are
increasing moving toward a modular approach in order to describe these high
level functions: i.e. many connectionist approaches now organize units into mod¬
ules (cf. Waltz and Pollack 1985; Miikkulainen and Dyer 1989). Although we
have accepted the modular approach for pragmatic reasons, the relationship be¬
tween modules in the strong modularity approach is rejected on the grounds that
modules are unable to interact since there is only a uni-directional relationship
between modules. Accordingly, modules in the strong modularity approach can
only pass information up to the next module in the hierarchy: they cannot receive
information from a module higher in the hierarchy.
Although we shall provide empirical evidence to support weak modularity in
section 3.3, the difference between strong and weak modularity can be illustrated
with interpretation of bat in (2.3):
(2.3) John was a keen naturalist. The bat he had been studying had unusually
large ears.
Here interpretation seems straightforward: only the 'animal-bat' sense is appro¬
priate in a nature discourse. If we assume language comprehension requires two
modules — a linguistic processing module which combines linguistic symbols and
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a discourse processing module which interprets them within a discourse model
— and these modules are related by bi-directional relations, then not only can
the linguistic processing module pass a linguistic description of expressions to
the discourse processing module, but the discourse processing module can pass
part of the discourse model to the linguistic processing module. The interaction
between these modules is illustrated in figure 2-2. In the case of (2.3), the dis-
LINGUISTIC DISCOURSE
PROCESSING PROCESSING
MODULE linguistic description MODULE
(semantics, (context-
syntax, discourse context based
phonology) semantic
interpretation)
Figure 2—2: A weak modularity architecture for language comprehension
course model can pass, as part of the discourse context, a representation of the
'animal-bat' sense to the linguistic processing module and this representation can
constrain selection of the sense of bat. With weak modularity, the selection of a
contextually appropriate sense can take place during linguistic processing.
With strong modularity, however, this account is not possible since interac¬
tion between modules is not permitted: the sense of bat could only be selected
after linguistic processing was completed (i.e. after syntactic and semantic rep¬
resentations have been constructed). The semantics module, for example, would
have to independently propose interpretations for bat and the context-dependent
semantic interpretation module would then dispose amongst them (cf. Crain and
Steedman 1985). The discourse context is only able to impose restrictions on the
sense of expressions after they have been linguistically processed. Furthermore,
such an approach runs the risk of a combinatorial explosion: if different senses
are associated with different syntactic categories and semantic interpretation only
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takes place at the end of the utterance, then multiple syntactic structures may
need to be constructed.
2.3.3 Symbol Processing
Let us now turn our attention to the third aspect of functional architecture, sym¬
bol processing. Symbol processing characterizes information processing in terms
of symbols, representing information, which are transformed or manipulated by
rules in a manner that is independent of, yet systematically appropriate to, their
semantic denotation (cf. Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Clark 1989: 12). Cognition,
when viewed as information processing, is predominantly described using symbols
and rules:
Language, commonsense reasoning and conscious problem solving can
all be described at this level in terms of structures, composed of sym¬
bols, that are manipulated by formal rules. (Touretsky 1987: 1)
Even within the connectionist approach to computation, cognition is seen as sym¬
bol processing. Of the three schools of connectionism, only the eliminative school
denies the validity of symbolic descriptions of cognitive behaviour and claims that
the appropriate level of description is sub-symbolic (cf. Pinker and Prince 1987;
Touretsky 1987; Smolensky 1988). The remaining schools, the implementational
school, which claim that connectionist architectures are mere implementations of
the classical symbol processing, and the revisionist school, which claim that con¬
nectionist architectures might lead to fundamental changes in our understanding
of symbol processing, still maintain a commitment to symbolic cognitive descrip¬
tion.
In Fodor and Pylyshvn's interpretation, cognition is characterized in terms of
a "language of thought" with the following properties (cf. Fodor 1975; Fodor and
Pylyshyn 1988: 12-13):
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1. Mental representations have a combinatorial syntax and semantics in which
there is a distinction between structurally atomic and structurally molecu¬
lar representations; the structurally molecular representations have syntac¬
tic constituents that are themselves either structurally molecular or struc¬
turally atomic; and the semantic content of a molecular representation is a
function of the semantic contents of its syntactic parts.
2. The formality condition: mental processes are (only) sensitive to the struc¬
tural properties of representations.
Behaviour is described in term of symbol processing where both the symbols and
rules are syntactic units which admit a semantic interpretation6. This distinction
between the syntax and semantics of symbol processing is manifest in that the
processes which process symbols are solely determined by the syntactic structure
of the symbols: i.e. their labels and structure. The semantic interpretation
of symbols, or rules, play no role in the characterization of cognitive processes.
Their semantics merely functions as independent validation of the consistency and
completeness of the system. Furthermore, the relationship between the syntax
and semantics of the system is transparent: semantic properties parallel, or follow
from, the syntactic properties. If the symbol has the property of being labelled
as syntactically complex, then it is also semantically complex.
This interpretation of symbol processing is intimately related to Fodor's stance
on modularity described in section 2.3.2. Processing in each module is charac¬
terized in terms of symbols transformed by rules. Since these modules are inde¬
pendent, yet systematically related, it follows that the symbols and rules in these
modules are also independent yet systematically related. Symbols and rules in
Syntax' a.nd 'semantics' here should not be confused with syntax and semantics in
linguistics. 'Syntax' simply refers to the structure of the symbol system, whether that
structure is syntactic, semantic or phonological. 'Semantics' refers to the interpretation
of the system.
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each module thus form distinct vocabularies which need to be explicitly related.
These relations are expressed in mapping rules which map between structures of
different modules.
Their interpretation of symbol processing can be illustrated by considering
the comprehension of happy women within the architecture shown in figure 2-
1. Given that the processing in the phonological module exports a phonological
representation of happy women to the syntactic module, this representation needs
to be mapped into symbols appropriate to this module. We assume the following
symbols and rules in the syntactic module:
(2.4) symbols: ADJ N NP
rules: NP —+ ADJ -f N
where *' is interpreted as a constituency relation. The mapping rules would
then map happy onto the symbol ADJ and women onto the symbol N. The rules
would then be applied resulting in the complex symbol NP related by constituency
to the atomic symbols ADJ and N. This structure is then mapped by rules into
the semantic module where the following symbols and rules are assumed:
(2.5) symbols: PROP OBJ COBJ
rules: COBJ -> PROP(OBJ)
The mapping rules map ADJ to PROP, N to OBJ and NP to COBJ and the
semantic rule establishes the semantic constituency relation between these se¬
mantic symbols. The result symbols are then given a semantic interpretation. In
the context-independent module, these symbols are mapped onto a set of female
individuals with the property 'happy' and context-independent inference rules
would apply yielding additional properties such as their relationship to men, their
ability to have children and so forth. Only at this point, would happy women be
give an interpretation within the context. If the context were as follows:
(2.6) The nuns love living in the abbey. These happy women grow their own
vegetables and make their own clothes.
Chapter 2. Linguistic Descriptions as Cognitive Descriptions 52
then the object for happy women could be identified with the object for the nuns
in the discourse model and domain-specific inferences would then add further
properties such as their commitment to celibacy. In this way, the interpretation
of happy women requires symbols in each module and rules which map between
them.
The approach to symbol processing we advocate for a cognitive linguistic
approach to language comprehension differs from Fodor and Pylyshyn's in two
respects: semantic interpretation is context-dependent; and symbol and rules
within modules are characterized in an explicitly information-theoretic manner.
In the first place, language comprehension processes can be affected by con¬
text where 'context' includes domain-specific knowledge, perceptual knowledge,
discourse knowledge and goals of the cognitive agent. Experimental evidence
suggests that inferential processes are not only affected by domain-independent
semantic information but also domain-specific information. For example, in the
'four card problem' it has been shown that when abstract concepts are replaced
with concepts from familiar domains, inferential abilities are noticeably improved
(cf. Wason 1977; Oaksford 1988). Likewise, it has been demonstrated that lim¬
itations on young children's reasoning abilities can be affected by the content of
the particular tasks, contra the Piagetian position (cf. Donaldson 1978). Other
evidence demonstrates that semantic processing can also be affected by the per¬
ceptual context. In Gesta.lt terms, the interpretation of the 'figure' symbol is
affected by the interpretation of the 'ground' symbols so that, for example, a
grey blob on a black background appears much lighter than the same blob on
a white background (cf. Wertheimer 1938). An analogous phenomena has been
observed in semantic interpretation. For example, the processes which determine
the semantic symbol appropriate for a linguistic expression can be affected by
the linguistic context in which the word occurs. In particular, it can affect which
semantic properties are accessible. In (2.7), the interpretation of skunk is affected
by the context in such a way that the property smell is more accessible than other
properties:
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(2.7) The skunk stunk up the entire neighbourhood.
Changing the current context can cause this property to become less accessi¬
ble than other properties. Evidence of this type has lead to the claim that the
semantic representation of a word can be divided into context-independent prop¬
erties and context-dependent properties, where the latter only become accessible
when the appropriate supporting context is present (cf. Barsalou 1982). Finally
semantic processing can also be affected by the goals of the cognitive agent. Se¬
mantic categorization is one of these processes7. If we accept that concepts form
hierarchies, with general concepts at the top and more specific concept under¬
neath them, then the categories in which concepts are placed can vary with the
goal of categorization (cf. Kintsch 1972). For example, while dog can be part
of a category with mammal and animal, it can also be part of a category pet
and animal. Which categorization of dog is appropriate will differ depending on
whether we are interested in a biological or pet classification. If we are interested
in the latter then turtle will be classified with dog; if the goal was the former
classification, then turtle would not be classified with dog (cf. Goodman 1972).
This evidence supports an approach where various sorts of 'context' play a
role in language comprehension. What it does not do, however, is distinguish be¬
tween an approach in which contextual interpretation occurs after non-contextual
interpretation versus an approach in which interpretation is systematically based
upon context. Crucially, there is a difference between these approaches. In the
former approach, the interpretation of ambiguous and polysemous expressions
would require all possible senses to be initially accessed and only later would the
contextually appropriate sense be selected. In the latter approach, since inter¬
pretation takes account of context, only contextually appropriate senses would
be considered; contextually inappropriate senses would not. By adopting the
later approach as part of the cognitive linguistic approach, we claim that con¬
text, specifically discourse context," can restrict semantic interpretation in an
'Categorization is discussed more fully in section 3.2.
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immediate rather than delayed manner. In terms of the architecture given in
figure 2-2, the claim is that discourse processing can immediately provide a con-
textually appropriate interpretation of linguistic expressions. This, of course,
complements the interaction between the discourse processing and linguistic pro¬
cessing modules: in some cases, the discourse context can immediately restrict
semantic interpretation in the discourse processing module; and in other cases, it
can immediately restrict the linguistic representations combined in the linguistic
processing module.
The second difference with Fodor and Pylyshyn's approach to symbol pro¬
cessing is that we explicitly adopt an information-theoretic approach. Two gen¬
eral approaches to information processing can be distinguished. In the first, the
quantitive approach, information is characterized in terms of the number of for¬
mal choices or options available in a given state of a computational device and
information processing involves a potential reduction, but not an increase, in the
number of choices (cf. Shannon and Weaver 1949). In the second, the qualitative
approach, information is characterized as the 'content' available in a given state
of processing and information processing involves transformations of this content.
Information-theoretic approaches extend the qualitative approach in a number
of ways (cf. Gibson 1979; Dretske 1981; Barwise and Perry 1983; Dretske 1985;
Devlin 1991). Information is seen as emerging from the satisfaction of constraints:
information does not exist a priori, but only after constraints have been satisfied.
Constraints are relations between properties. These relations can be conditional
or unconditional. Constraints expressing conditional relations are composed of
licensing properties and contingent properties: contingent properties are licensed,
or justified, by the licensing properties. When constraints have been satisfied,
information emerges and this licenses behaviour: the behaviour exhibited by an
information processing agent is determined by information which arises from the
satisfaction of constraints. Constraints, prior to satisfaction, can be seen as poten¬
tially informative and, when satisfied, as actually informative. Once constraints
are satisfied, or become informative, they specify information about a situation,
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such as a visual scene or a discourse situation. Finally, constraints provide in¬
formation which remains invariant, or persists, under transformation. Recurrent
behaviour then is accounted for by persistent information which emerges from
the satisfaction of constraints.
This approach can be illustrated with the example of our recurrent behaviour
at traffic lights8. Consider the situation when we are at a set of traffic lights; if
the lights are red, we stop; and if they are green, we drive on. Clearly there is
a recurrent relation between the colour of traffic lights and whether we stop or
not and this relation persists over time. What behaviour we perform, stopping
or driving on, depends upon the information arising from these constraints: if
the lights are at green, then this information licenses us to drive on; and if they
are at red, then this information licenses us to stop. Of course the conditions
under which a constraint is satisfied, and thus information licensing behaviour
emerges, is far more complex than simply the colour of the traffic lights: it also
involves whether we are driving a car, on a 'real' road, and so on (i.e. what we
have simply called the situation).
The information-theoretic approach embodied in the cognitive linguistic ap¬
proach differs from these approaches in its cognitive basis. For the approach
adopted by Gibson (1979), as well as by Barwise and Perry (1983), treats con¬
straints as restrictions which hold between situations in the real world. When
we, as cognitive agents, are attuned to these constraints, they yield information
about the situations in the real world. An alternative is to treat constraints as
cognitive relations: they are restrictions between a cognitive agent's interpreta¬
tions of, or beliefs about, situations independent of whether these relations hold
in the real world. The motivation behind this cognitive interpretation will be¬
come clear in chapter 4 where the relationship between semantic representation
and interpretation is discussed in more detail.
SI am indebted to Michael Oaksford for the example.
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In the cognitive linguistic approach, rules specify globally invariant relation¬
ships between symbols within a module: i.e. relationships which hold under any,
and every, circumstance. Local invariances are expressed as constraints within
symbols.
Constraints specify relations between properties of the symbols. When a con¬
straint is satisfied, the symbol becomes more informative and this affects how
the symbol can interact with other symbols. For example, linguistic symbols are
structured representations composed of three components — phonological, syn¬
tactic and semantic (conceptual) components — and constraints which express
relations both within and between these components. During combination, the
constraints in symbols guide the combination process by specifying the relation¬
ships between syntactic and semantic arguments. With a verb like kissed in Fred
kissed his wife, its linguistic symbol contains constraints which specify that the
semantics of its subject is to be identified with the value of the 'agent' role in
its semantics, just as the semantics of its object is identified with the value the
'theme' role. Furthermore, constraints play a key role in the discourse process¬
ing module. In this module, the important symbols are background knowledge,
or theories, about concepts. Constraints associated with these symbols specify
semantic relations both within and between concepts. When a linguistic symbol
is imported into the discourse module, its conceptual representation is integrated
with the current discourse model and a discourse symbol is sought. The con¬
straints in this discourse symbol are then applied to this concept: if they are
satisfied, then the concept may be extended with new properties as well as rela¬
tions with other concepts in the discourse model. For example, the concept 'kiss'
may be extended by constraints which specify temporal and causal relations be¬
tween the concepts which occupy the 'agent' and 'theme' roles.
Since local invariance is specified by constraints in symbols, only three gen¬
eral rules, or principles, are required. The first principle, combination, specifies
how symbols in the linguistic processing module combine: i.e. how the symbols
for linguistic expressions are combined into a (more informative) symbol for their
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concatenation. The second and third principle operate in the discourse processing
module. The second principle, anchoring, describes how conceptual representa¬
tions in linguistic symbols are integrated in the current discourse model so as to
yield a more informative representation of the discourse. This may involve either
the creation of new concepts in the model or the extension of old ones. The
third principle, elaboration, describes how concepts in the discourse model are
extended on the basis of discourse symbols, or theories. Crucially, this involves
the satisfaction of constraints in theories; these constraints can create relations
with concepts contained in the discourse model.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have addressed two issues pertinent to a cognitive linguistic
approach to language comprehension: methodology and the status of cognitive
descriptions as computational descriptions. With methodology, we rejected an
approach to cognition based upon direct observation of neural activity, but ad¬
vocated a hybrid approach where both informal and experimental observation
provide complementary perspectives. Embracing the computational theory of
mind, the cognitive linguistic approach was characterized as a level 1 computa¬
tional description with two modules, a linguistic processing module and a dis¬
course processing modules. The relationship between these modules was seen as
bi-directional: the linguistic processing module exports a linguistic description
of expressions to the discourse model and the later module exports a portion
of the discourse model to the former module. The notion of symbol process¬
ing in these modules was given an information-theoretic characterization: rules
express global invariances while constraints within symbols express local invari-
ance. Furthermore, the approach make two claims about the effects of context
on language comprehension. Firstly, it was claimed that semantic interpretation
in the discourse module can be affected by the discourse context so that con-
textually inappropriate senses of ambiguous and polysemous expressions are not
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integrated and elaborated as concepts in the discourse model. Secondly, it was
claimed that the discourse context can affect linguistic symbols in the linguistic
processing module such that contextually inappropriate senses of ambiguous and
polysemous expressions can be discarded prior to combination. Before we develop
this approach further we need to provide empirical evidence which supports these
contextual effects on conceptual representations.
Chapter 3
Concepts in Categorization and
Lexical Access
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 we developed the notion of linguistic description as a description
of the cognitive representations and processes which underlie a cognitive agent's
linguistic behaviour. In particular, these descriptions are to be supported and
validated through informal and experimental evidence pertaining to human cog¬
nitive agents; and the descriptions are seen as Marr's level 1 computational de¬
scriptions with language comprehension characterized in terms of two modules, a
linguistic processing module and a discourse processing module, whose symbols
contain constraints specifying local invariance and whose rules describe global
invariance in comprehension.
Central to this cognitive linguistic approach to language comprehension are
conceptual structures, the processes by which they are constructed and the effects
of context on these processes. In particular, three levels of conceptual structure
can be established: lexical conceptual structure associated with lexical expres¬
sions; linguistic conceptual structure which arises from the combination of lexical
conceptual structures in the linguistic processing module; and discourse concep-
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tual structure which arises from interpretation of linguistic conceptual structures
within the discourse processing module. In order to provide a precise charac¬
terization of these conceptual structures, we need empirical evidence about their
general nature and structure: this puts us in a position to make more precise
the distinction between linguistic and discourse conceptual structures as well as
the relation between them. To achieve this goal, we shall discuss two approaches
to conceptual structure, or more general concepts, which have been adopted in
cognitive psychology to account for categorization.
Furthermore, our approach makes two claims about the effects of context on
the construction of conceptual structure. The first is that context can affect the
construction of discourse conceptual structure. In particular, discourse context
can affect selection of the senses of ambiguous and polysemous expressions. If
we assume that these expressions are associated with lexical conceptual struc¬
ture which specify multiple senses, and these multiple senses are retained in the
linguistic conceptual structure when they combine with other expressions, then
context affects the process by which they are related to discourse conceptual
structures such that only those senses appropriate to the discourse context are
retained — inappropriate senses are discarded. The second claim is that dis¬
course context can also affect the construction of linguistic conceptual structure
from lexical conceptual structure. With ambiguous and polysemous expressions,
senses appropriate to the discourse context are retained in the linguistic concep¬
tual structure whereas inappropriate ones are discarded. Thus discourse context
can be seen as imposing restrictions which determine which senses are appro¬
priate and which inappropriate: in some cases, it restricts discourse processes
which construct discourse conceptual structure from linguistic conceptual struc¬
ture; and in others, it restricts the linguistic process which constructs linguistic
structure from lexical conceptual structure. These claims will be supported not
only by categorization evidence, but-also by lexical access evidence.
The chapter is organized as follows. Categorization is discussed in section 3.2.
In section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2 respectively, empirical evidence is adduced to
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show that the characterizations of concepts offered by the classical and prototype
approaches are problematic, especially with respect to context effects on catego¬
rization. In section 3.3, we turn our attention to context effects on lexical access
and consider two points of view: a view which claims that all senses of lexical
expressions are available for linguistic processing independent of context; and
a view which claims that context can restrict the senses available for linguistic
processing. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Categorization
At its simplest, categorization concerns the ability to judge 'category' relations
between concepts: i.e. to decide whether one concept is an instance, or exemplar,
of another concept. Our discussion of categorization is restricted in three ways.
Firstly, we shall focus on lexical concept categorization: i.e. our ability to judge
relations between concepts which can be represented by single linguistic expres¬
sions (cf. Murphy 1988). Secondly, the research on categorization has primarily
focused on concepts which describe entities, such as fruit and furniture, rather
than events, states and actions (cf. Medin and Smith 1984: 122)1. While this
allows us to build up an accurate picture of entity concepts, it does run the risk
that the characterization will not generalize to other types of concepts. We shall
assume, however, that the characterization of entity concept will generalize unless
there is specific evidence to the contrary (cf. the use of corroborative evidence
in section 2.2.2). Finally, for reasons of space, only decompositional featural ap¬
proaches are discussed: i.e. approaches where concepts are structured in terms
of features and relations. Accordingly, we shall not discuss non-decompositional
approaches such as the extensional approach where concepts are treated as un-
analyzed units structured by meaning postulates (cf. Kintsch 1974; Fodor et al.
Concepts and their features are indicated in the text as concept.
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1975; Fodor 1977; Fodor et al. 1980). Nor shall we discuss non-featural accounts
such as the dimensional probabilistic approach and the holistic probabilistic ap¬
proach (cf. Rosch et al. 1976b; Smith and Medin 1981: 130-142).
3.2.1 The Classical Approach
The classical approach, CA, has its roots in the Aristotelian notion that the mean¬
ing of words are definitions (cf. Johnson-Laird 1983; Medin and Smith 1984).
This approach can be seen as a cognitive version of the correspondence approach
to meaning (see section 4.2): concepts are treated as cognitive representations
which refer to sets, or categories, of objects in the world (cf. Murphy and Medin
1985: 290). Underpinning the relationship between concepts and categories is
an ontological commitment: conceptualization 'cuts the world at its joints', so
that conceptualization reflects the categorial structure of the world. This in¬
fluential approach to concepts, although criticized by a few (cf. Cassirer 1923;
Wittgenstein 1953), remained the standard approach until recently, when not
only were several empirical weaknesses exposed, but, perhaps more importantly,
a rival approach, the prototype approach, was developed. Although there were
some subsequent attempts to revive the classical approach within cognitive psy¬
chology, such as the hybrid conceptual core approach and the backup approach,
these sharply delimited its scope (cf. Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976).
In the CA, concepts are summary representations in the sense that they pro¬
vide a short unitary description of all its subordinate concepts. For example,
the concept fruit would be represented by a single description which covers all
its subordinate concepts, such as apples, pears and lemons, rather than as a
multiple description which covers each of these subconcepts2. These summary
representations are composed of a set of necessary features which are sufficient
2This later approach is adopted bv the exemplar prototype approach described in
section 3.2.2.
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to refer to all and only its corresponding objects in the world. That is, they are
definitional descriptions where each feature necessarily holds of each and every
subordinate concept and the set of features is sufficient to delimit reference to
the corresponding category of objects in the world. For example, bachelor can
be defined in terms of the necessary features unmarried, male and adult (cf.
Katz 1972). Thus, there cannot be a bachelor who is not unmarried, male and
adult and any object in the world of which these features hold is, by definition,
a bachelor. Finally, the superordinate-subordinate distinction is characterized in
terms of a subset relation between concepts which gives rise to different levels of
conceptualization. For example, in figure 3-1, there are two levels of categoriza¬
tion: the first level contains the concept furniture; and the second, the concepts
table and chair. These levels emerge from subset relation between the concepts:
Figure 3—1: The organization of concepts in the Classical Approach
the concept furniture is the superordinate concept and the concepts table and
chair are subordinate concepts since the subordinate concepts contain as part
of their definitions, the set of necessary features, {/l,/2,/3}, which define the
superordinate concept. The definition of these subordinate concepts also contains
other features not defined by furniture, features which differentiate subordinate
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Strengths of the Classical Approach
64
Two strengths of CA are its representational elegance and determinacy in cate¬
gorization. The CA is elegant in that concepts are compact summary represen¬
tations comprising a set of features capable of picking out (identifying) all and
only the objects in the corresponding category. This strength arises in part be¬
cause there is no distinction between the concept itself and the conditions under
which it correctly applies: i.e. the features which are necessary and sufficient for
the definition of the concept are also the conditions which correctly identify the
corresponding category of objects in the world.
The CA also confers certainty in categorization since a conceptual description
will only apply when its definition is satisfied. This certainty is also evident in
inference since if we know that an object is in a category corresponding to a given
concept, then we necessarily know what features it will have. For example, if I
know that John is a bachelor then, since the features of this concept are necessary
features, I know with maximum certainty that John is male, unmarried and an
adult. As we will see in section 4.3.2, this certainty is bought at a price and the
price is rigidity: if, for whatever reason, we come across an object which lacks one
of the alleged defining features, then we are thrown into complete uncertainty as
to the status of the concept.
Weaknesses of the Classical Approach
There are five weaknesses of the CA with respect to categorization: variation
in the centrality of concepts; the use of characteristic features; the existence of
unclear cases; the lack of overt definitions; and a nesting problem.
The first weakness is that it fails to predict that concepts differ in 'centrality'.
In the CA, categorization is symmetrical in the sense that all subordinate concepts
have equal status as members, or exemplars, of a concept. However, there is evi¬
dence which suggests categorization is not symmetrical: some concepts are more
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central to the superordinate concept than other concepts (member centrality);
and some conceptual levels are more central than others (level centrality).
Member centrality is manifest in categorization as typicality effects: the more
central a concept, the more 'typical' it is of the superordinate concept. For
example, the concept bird includes subordinate concepts such as eagle, dove,
parrot and so on. These concepts may differ in categorization tasks such that
eagle, for example, systematically manifests more typicality effects than the other
concepts. There is considerable experimental evidence for typicality effects (cf.
Rips et al. 1973; Rosch 1973; Rosch 1974; Rosch 1975; Rosch 1978):
Goodness of Exemplar Rating Members, exemplars, of the same concept sys¬
tematically differ with respect to typicality or representativeness (cf. Rips
et al. 1973; Rosch 1973). When subjects were asked to rate how good an
example of the concept various members are, it was found that there were
differences in goodness of exemplar (GOE) ratings which were systematic
across subjects (cf. Rosch 1973; Mervis et al. 1976). For example, when
robin, chicken, duck and goose are rated for their GOE as the concept bird,
robin has a significantly higher GOE rating than chicken, duck or goose
(3.00 v. 2.00 — Rips et al. 1973).
Reaction Time Members of a concept differ with respect to reaction time (RT)
for verification (cf. Roth and Shoben 1983). Subjects were given a sentence
of the form An [example] is a [concept], where [example] was a subordinate
concept of [concept], and were asked to decide if the sentence was true. The
results show that subconcepts differed in RT; for example, .4 robin is a bird
took less time to verify than than A chicken is a bird and A goose is a bird.
Error Rates Members of a concept differ with respect to error rates in verifi¬
cation. Again, the members judged more central by other measures have a
lower error rate than members judged less central or peripheral.
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Production of Exemplars Members systematically differ with respect to the
order in which they are produced (verbally or graphically): central members
tend to be produced before non-central ones (cf. Mervis et al. 1976).
Similarity Central subordinate concepts tend to be less similar to peripheral
subordinate concepts of a concept than vice versa. For example, when
American subjects judged United States to be a very good example of the
concept country, they also rated Mexico as more similar to the United
States than the United States is to Mexico (cf. Rosch 1975; Tversky and
Gati 1978).
Generalization Central members tend to allow generalization of new informa¬
tion to other, more peripheral members than vice versa (cf. Rips 1975). For
example, if people are told that robins have a contagious disease, then they
are more likely to believe that the disease spreads from robins to ducks on
an island than from ducks to robins when told that ducks have the disease.
Acquisition Members of a category systematically differ in acquisition such that
central member tend to be learnt before peripheral members. This has
been demonstrated in both semantic and perceptual categorization tasks
(cf. Rosch 1973; Mervis 1980).
These typicality effects support the hypothesis that subordinate concepts may
differ in centrality. Furthermore, since the subordinate concept(s) which tend to
manifest centrality within one task also tend to manifest centrality in other tasks,
these concepts are central to the superordinate concept in the sense that they
systematically manifest priority across different tasks. It is important to note
that centrality is merely based upon a tendency to manifest typicality effects in
a given task — central concepts do not necessarily manifest these effects.
Empirical evidence also supports level centrality as manifest in 'basic-level'
effects. Observation of these effects can be traced to Roger Brown (cf. Brown
1958; Brown 1965). He observed that while an object, such as dime, can be
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categorized at many levels within a conceptual hierarchy, one level was central or
basic. He argued for the existence of such a level on the grounds that it was the
level of distinctive actions3, the level first acquired by children and used to name
things, and the level where names are shortest and used most frequently.
More specific observations were made by Berlin with respect to levels of nat¬
ural kind categorization made by Tzeltal speakers of Mexico (cf. Berlin et al.
1974). The basic level of categorization was manifest in simple naming task:
when natives were asked to name plants and animals around them, they tended
to name them at the 'middle' level of categorization, genus, rather than at the
superordinate (less specific) life form level, or at the subordinate (more specific)
species level. For example, particular trees tended to be named as oak rather
than tree or white oak. These observations of the centrality of the middle level
were reinforced by experimental studies (cf. Rosch et al. 1976a; Mervis and
Crisafi 1982; Murphy and Smith 1982). For example, with the hierarchy fruit,
pear and conference pear, the middle-level, pear, has priority with respect to
speed of categorization and ease of learning. Other experimental manifestations
of level centrality parallel those discussed for member centrality.
The second weakness is that the CA does not predict that non-necessary, or
characteristic, features play a role in categorization since concepts only contain
features which necessarily hold of all its subordinate concepts. Rosch and col¬
leagues conducted a series of experiments in which they attempted to specify
the determinants of member centrality (cf. Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch et al.
1976b; Mervis and Rosch 1981). In one experiment subjects were asked to list
features of subordinate concepts of natural kind concepts such as bird, furniture,
30bjects categorized at this level correlate with distinctive non-linguistic actions
whereas other levels of categorization lack such distinctive actions. For example, dimes
are associated with distinctive actions such as exchangeable for cigarettes, milk, two
nickels and so on; other levels of categorization, such as money (superordinate level)
and 1952 dime (subordinate) are not.
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and fruit. The features listed for these concepts included non-necessary features;
for example, the feature made of wood was listed for the subordinate concept
chair, but it is not necessarily the case that all chairs are made of wood. In
fact, they demonstrated that there was a correlation between the frequency with
which features of a particular subordinate concept were listed and its centrality
in a superordinate as manifest in its GOE rating, speed of verification, and so
on. This correlation, 'family resemblance', stated that in superordinate concepts,
the centrality of a subordinate concept increases with the number of features it
shares with other subordinate concepts, and decreases with the number it shares
with the subordinate concepts of other superordinate concepts. For example,
the subordinate concept chair has a high family resemblance measure while the
subordinate lamp has a low measure, and this correlates with their respective
centrality in the superordinate concept furniture.
The use of non-necessary features in categorization is well attested by other
researchers. Hampton, for example, had one group of subjects list features of
concepts like fruit and then rate the degree to which their subordinate concepts
had these features (cf. Hampton 1979). These ratings were then used to pre¬
dict the time taken by another group of subjects to categorize the subordinate
concepts. Again, these features were non-necessary and the number of features
shared by the concept and its subordinate concepts provided a good indication
of the centrality of the subordinate concepts. Further evidence of the use of non-
necessary features comes from experiments which use similarity judgments rather
than attribute listing (cf. Rips et al. 1973; Shoben 1976). In such experiments
subjects are given two concepts to rate for similarity; for example, bird-eagle (su¬
perordinate and subordinate concepts) and robin-eagle (subordinate concepts).
The ratings are then used to construct a multi-dimensional similarity space where
distance between concepts correlates with their similarity (or dissimilarity). It
was found that the dimensions seem to reflect non-necessary features, such as
ferocity, and that the distance between a concept and its subordinate concepts
correlates highly with categorization time.
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These results are not only problematic for the CA in showing that non-
necessary features play a role in categorization, but also problematic in that
variation in the centrality of subordinate concepts seems to correlate with (non-
necessary) feature similarity to the superordinate concept. However, it should
be pointed out that the attribute listing methodology has been questioned (cf.
Tversky and Hemmenway 1984; Tversky 1977). In particular, it has been argued
that discourse and situational factors may affect attribute listing (cf. Tversky
and Hemmenway 1984). When subjects list attributes, they may only mention
those which make explicit relevant contrasts between subordinate concepts rather
than necessary features4; for example, two-legged may be listed as a feature of
bird but not of chicken or duck because it does not distinguish between these
concepts, whereas flies, listed for robin, distinguishes it from other subordinate
concepts such as chicken and penguin. Additionally, they may list features which
are relevant by virtue of being salient in the situations in which the concept is en¬
countered; for example, although edible can be seen as a feature of food, animals,
money, wood and so on, the feature is only directly relevant to the situations
in which food is typically used. Even with this qualification, however, it seems
difficult to deny that concepts consist of more than necessary features and that
non-necessary features play a role in categorization. This has been acknowledged
in one extension of the CA, where concepts are partitioned into a definitional
core with necessary features and an identification procedure with non-necessary
features (cf. Medin and Smith 1984; Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976).
A third weakness of the CA concerns the existence of unclear cases of cate¬
gorization. Since concepts are definitions and subordinate concepts contain the
definitional features of their superordinate concept, the CA predicts determinacy
in categorization. However, their categorization can be uncertain. For example,
since subjects did not consistently categorize tomatoes as fruit nor boxing gloves
4They invoke Grice's principle of relevance (cf. Grice 1975).
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as clothes, it is argued that categorization can be indeterminate (cf. Cohen and
Murphy 1984; McCloskey and Glucksberg 1978).
Indeterminacy in categorization seems a priori problematic if categorization is
based upon comparison between definitional concepts. However, the CA can adopt
various lines of retreat. One of these derives from Putnam's 'division of linguistic
labour' whereby some cognitive agents have non-definitional concepts, but others,
experts in the linguistic community, have definitional concepts (cf. Putnam 1973).
For example, my concept of gold may be incomplete as a definition, such as a
yellow precious metal, since it is not sufficient to pick out all and only the 'gold'
objects in the world, whereas an expert's definition is sufficient and yields a
determinate categorization of objects. The main drawback of this solution, as
we shall see, is that even expert's concepts are not necessarily CA definitions.
Another retreat is to assume that the same expression can be associated with
more one than concept. It has been argued that natural kind expressions are
associated with two definitional concepts, a technical one and a common one (cf.
Holyoak and Glass 1975). So, for example, the difficulty in categorizing tomato as
a fruit may stem from the expression being associated with two definitions, one
satisfying the technical definition of fruit (by virtue of having seeds) and another
satisfying the common definition of vegetable (by virtue of its role in meals).
The fourth weakness of the CA is that the definitional nature of concepts is
not manifestion in categorization. In experiments where subjects listed attributes
for concepts such as furniture and its subordinate concepts chair, table and so
on, the results show that no features listed for one of these subordinate concepts
were also listed for other subordinate concepts; i.e. no necessary features of
furniture was listed for its subordinate concepts (cf. Rosch and Mervis 1975).
Furthermore, observational evidence supports the claim that concepts are not
necessarily definitions. Wittgenstein argued that concepts like game and number
lack definitions since they do not to-share a set of necessary features with their
subordinate concepts:
Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relation-
Chapter 3. Concepts in Categorization and Lexical Access 71
ships. Now pass to card-games; here you many find correspondences
with the first group, but many common features drop out and others
appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is
retained, but much is lost. — Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess
with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or
competition between players? Think of patience ... And we can go
through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can
see how similarities crop up and disappear. (Wittgenstein 1953: 66)
The claim then is that there is no set of features common to all games sufficient
for the correct identification of the corresponding objects in the world. Of course,
there are some features, such as 'being an event', which are common to all games,
but no set of these are sufficient to pick out instances of 'games' in the world (cf.
Carey 1982: 386).
Closely related to Wittgenstein's argument against definitions is one by Austin
(1961). He questioned the traditional notion that concepts associated with the
same expression, i.e. senses of an expression, are simply subordinate concepts
of the same superordinate concept. Consider the three senses of the adjective
healthy in healthy body, healthy complexion and healthy exercise:
There is what we may call a primary nuclear sense of 'healthy': the
sense in which 'healthy' is used of a healthy body: 1 call this nuclear
because it is 'contained as a part' in the other two senses which may
be set out as 'productive of healthy bodies' and 'resulting from a
healthy body'. (Austin 1961:71 quoted in Lakoff 1987:18)
The relation between these senses, or concepts, is not simply based upon shar¬
ing features which are sufficient to delimit a superordinate concept. Rather the
concepts associated with the expression seem to be ordered in terms of centrality
with healthy qua a body as the central concept. The others are related to this con¬
cept by virtue of a. metonomy relation: i.e. healthy qua exercise produces healthy
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bodies and healthy qua complexion is the result of healthy bodies (cf. Lakoff 1987:
19).
Such experimental and observation evidence provides prime facie counter-
evidence to the CA's claim that concepts are definitions. One response to this
evidence is to claim that only a subset of concepts, such as scientific concepts,
have definitions. These concepts have been taken as providing the best support
for the claim that concepts can have definitions and these definitions are sufficient
to identify pre-existing categories in the world; for example, biological concepts
have been given definitions by biologists and these concepts correspond to 'real'
biological categories in the world. If this was the case, then biological concepts
would provide evidence that at least a subset of concepts have definitions. How¬
ever, it is neither the case that biological concepts reflect pre-existing categories
in the world nor that their concepts are CA definitions (cf. Lakoff 1987: 185-195).
If biologists' concepts did correspond to pre-existing categories of animals in
world, then we would expect there to be unanimous agreement as to these cate¬
gories. This, however, is not the case. There are at least three contrastive clas¬
sifications: the phenetic, cladistic and evolutionist classifications. For example,
two species of zebra, Grevey's zebra and mountain zebra, are categorized differ¬
ently according to these classifications: by the phenetic criteria, basically overall
current similarity, they both belong to a single category, but by the cladistic
criteria, roughly shared (historically) derived character, they belong to different
categories. Both classifications are useful in biology: one reveals groupings based
upon current similarity while the other takes a more historically oriented ap¬
proach. This multiplicity of classifications is hard to reconcile with the notion
that biological concepts correspond to pre-existing category in the world. Rather
it demonstrates that biologists are capable of developing diverse classifications
depending upon what satisfies their current goals. As a result, it seems problem¬
atic to bestow upon their categorization any metaphysical significance. If this
is the case with expert's concepts, then the ontological commitment which un¬
derpins the CA seems flawed. Furthermore, biological concepts are not obviously
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CA definitions. As Lakoff (1987) points out, the biological species concept of
the evolutionist position, fails to meet the criteria for classical definitions. For
example, species do not have homogeneous internal structures where members
share a set of necessary and sufficient features; definitions are polythetic. Thus it
is difficult to reconcile CA definitions with biological definitions and, by analogy,
other supposedly 'well-defined' conceptual domains.
A more successful response to this evidence is to maintain that concepts are
definitions, but admit that categorization evidence, as manifest in attribute list¬
ing for example, simply does not reveal the necessary features (cf. Smith and
Medin 1981: 30). In particular, definitions can be seen as 'hidden' parts of con¬
cepts, parts which do play a role in cognitive processes such as categorization,
comprehension and production, but parts which are not easy to verbalize. That
certain aspects of concepts are 'hidden' in this sense is not particularly contro¬
versial nor implausible. For example, Johnson-Laird (1987) makes a distinction
between verbal definitions and ineffable (truth) conditions: i.e. between meaning
acquired from verbal definition or use in verbal expressions and meaning acquired
from direct acquaintance with the referents of the expression (cf. Johnson-Laird
1987: 205-206).
The final weakness of the CA concerns concept nesting: the definitions of
superordinate concepts are nested inside subordinate concepts (cf. Smith and
Medin 1981: 46-49). If concept similarity is based on common and distinctive
features, a concept should be more similar to its immediate superordinate con¬
cept than to a distant superordinate concept (cf. Tversky 1977). Conversely, if
categorization speed is dependent upon the number of features to be compared,
then it should be quicker to categorize the concept as a distant superordinate
than an immediate one.
Experimental studies, however, confound definitional concept nesting. In one
study, a subordinate concept was given to subjects and they were asked to list its
superordinates. Given that the frequency with which a superordinate is produced
is a measure of the similarity, the CA predicts that immediate superordinates will
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be produced more frequently than distant superordinates. The results show that
no superordinate was more likely than any other; for example, given rose, flower
was not more frequently produced than plant (cf. Loftus and Scheff 1971). In
more recent studies, a concept and one of its superordinates were directly rated for
similarity (cf. Rips et al. 1973; Smith et al. 1974; Roth and Shoben 1983). The
results showed a tendency for concepts to be rated as more similar to immediate
than distant superordinates. There were significant exceptions to this tendency;
for example, duck and chicken were rated more similar to animal than bird. The
CA, while predicting the tendency, fails to account for the exceptions. In a third
set of studies, categorization times were investigated with respect to concept
nesting. Although some early studies found that categorizations were fastest
for immediate superordinates (cf. Collins and Quillian 1969), others found no
significant result (cf. Smith et al. 1974), a recent study found results parallelling
those of the similarity rating experiments (cf. Roth and Shoben 1983). That is,
there was a tendency for categorization to be fastest with immediate rather than
distant superordinate concepts, but there were notable exceptions; for example,
it took longer to categorize duck as a bird than duck as an animal.
While these results confound the CA's predictions about nesting, the excep¬
tions themselves are interesting in that they reveal an interaction between level
and member centrality. Given that the basic level is the immediate superordi¬
nate, similarity between concepts at this level and concepts at a superordinate
level is determined not only by the common and distinctive features, but also by
the centrality of the superordinate concept in the basic level concept such that
peripheral subordinate concepts, such as duck, are judged significantly less re¬
lated to the basic level concept than central subordinate concepts, such as robin,
but more related to distant superordinate concepts such as animal. Clearly, if an
approach to concepts is to account for this type of categorization evidence then,
unlike the CA, it must at least recognize level and member centrality.
In sum, categorization reveals a number of weaknesses in the classical ap¬
proach's characterization of concepts. Having said this, it is possible to envisage
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an approach which is based upon some tenets of this approach. A number of
changes would be required though. In the first place, the approach would need
to countenance the role of typicality in conceptual representations: subordinate
concepts can vary in the extent to which they are typical of their superordinate
concept; conceptual levels would also need to vary in typicality; non-necessary,
or typical, features would need to be introduced into the characterization of
concepts. As we have just observed, the interaction between member and level
typicality could then account for nesting. As for indeterminacy in categorization,
this could be accounted for if we accepted that the same linguistic expression
may be associated with more than one concept, and these concepts were not nec¬
essarily subordinate concepts of the same superordinate concept. In addition, we
would also need to accept that the relationship between concepts and categories
in the world is not transparent; biological concepts, for example, do not necessar¬
ily correspond to pre-existing categories in the world. Finally, the evidence for
necessary features is not well supported empirically: even if we accept that these
features are 'hidden' by, for example, the attribute listing methodology, then an
alternative source of support is required for these features.
3.2.2 The Prototype Approach
The prototype approach (pa) offers a radically different characterization of con¬
cept compared with the classical approach. For rather than extend the classical
approach to meet the empirical shortcomings discussed in section 3.2.1, the char¬
acterization of concepts was directly based upon empirical data, especially data
which highlighted a correlation between the typicality relations between con¬
cepts and conceptual levels, and characteristic (or typical) features of concepts
(cf. Lakoff 1987: 136-7). In particular, the pa rejects the characterization of
concepts as sets of necessary features. Instead it characterizes concepts in terms
of a set of characteristic features, the prototype, which stands a minimum distance
from other subordinate concepts, or exemplars, of the concept, and a maximum
distance from the exemplars of contrastive concepts. Membership of the concept
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is determined by a similarity metric (with a threshold) which measures the degree
of similarity between a potential exemplar and the concept prototype. Within
the PA there are two views: the probabilistic view and the exemplar view.
The Probabilistic View The probabilistic view, like the CA, holds that
concepts are summary representations: i.e. the prototype constitutes a homo¬
geneous representation of the concept. Its homogeneity has two consequences
for the prototype: it is an abstract representation; and it always plays a role in
categorization. Furthermore, the prototype is structured probabilistically: i.e. it
consists of a set of characteristic features which vary in their probability of occur¬
ring in exemplars of the concept. A simple probabilistic representation for apple
is given in figure 3-2 (cf. Smith and Osherson 1984). In figure 3-2 the weights on
the features colour, shape and texture represent their diagnosticity (or salience in
categorization) and the weights on the (mutually exclusive) values, such as red,
white and yellow, represent the likelihood of an exemplar having a feature with
this value. The prototype for apple is constructed from this representation by
selecting the features and values with the highest weight: i.e. the prototypical
apple is red, round and smooth. Membership of the concept is based on a metric
which determines whether the target concept possesses some criterial sum of the
weighted features of this prototype. For example, while a red apple or brown
apple will be exemplars by virtue of meeting the similarity threshold, a lemon
will not since it fails to be sufficiently close to the prototype in terms of shape
(oval), texture (rough) and colour (yellow).
The Exemplar View The exemplar view differs from the probabilistic view
in not treating concepts as summary representations. The prototype is a set of one
or more specific exemplars of the concept. With the representation of the concept
apple shown in figure 3-3, the prototype consists of the specific exemplars granny
smith and golden delicious apples. In this representation, the prototypes granny
smith and golden delicious apples are specializations of apple and each prototype
is given a featural description (cf. Smith and Medin 1981: 145). Membership
of a concept is decided on the basis of (unweighted) featural similarity with the
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3 colour red 8
white 1
yellow 1
1 shape round 9
oval 3
2 texture smooth 9
rough 1
Figure 3—2: A probabilistic representation of the concept apple
prototypes. Since the prototype consists of multiple descriptions, the exemplar
view permits membership decision to be made in various ways: for example, all
prototype exemplars could be retrieved and the target concept is a member if
it is sufficiently similar to one of these; or, making use of the homogeneity of
structure, only one of these exemplars may be retrieved and compared with the
target concept.
The substantive difference between these PA views is not the abstractness nor
multiplicity of prototypes, but explicitness of disjunction.
In both views the prototype can actually vary in abstractness. The probabilis¬
tic view does not exclude a concrete prototype and the exemplar view permits




Exemplar 2 other instances
golden-delicious (not exemplars)
shape: round shape: round
texture: smooth texture: smooth
colour: brown colour: green
Figure 3—3: An exemplar representation of the concept apple
abstract prototypes. For example, the Medin and Schaffer (1978) context model
and the Cohen and Murphy (1984) model are versions of the exemplar view
which incorporate summary information in the prototype. Furthermore, empir¬
ical evidence suggested that prototypes may vary in abstractness. For example,
in Rosch's work on colour categories she found that focal colours were best exem¬
plars, or prototypes, even though there were no names for them in the language
(cf. Rosch 1973). Other work has shown that more specific exemplars may also
be used in categorization. For example, it has been demonstrated that when
subjects were asked to estimate the frequency of certain types of events, their
estimates were based upon recruitment of a few specific exemplars of each event
type (cf. Kahneman and Tversky 1973; Kahneman and Miller 1986). Other stud¬
ies have furnished evidence by demonstrating that the negative categorizations,
i.e. deciding that a target concept is not a member of a given concept, is based
upon the retrieval of particular counterexamples. For example, the speed in de¬
ciding that all birds are eagles is false may be attributed to the retrieval of the
counterexample robins (cf. Holyoak and Glass 1975). And if specific exemplars
are used in negative categorizations, it is plausible that they are used in other
sorts of categorizations.
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Another insubstantial difference is the multiplicity of prototypes. Catego¬
rization data certainly supports their multiplicity. In many cases more than one
exemplar attains relatively high GOE rating; for example, carrot and peas have
ratings of 1.5 and 1.7 respectively as exemplars of vegetable (cf. Armstrong et al.
1983: 276). Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine there being a single prototype
for concepts such as animal or furniture (cf. Smith and Medin 1981: 147). While
this seems to confound the probabilistic view, it is plausible that more than one
prototype can be abstracted from the representation by varying the diagnosticity
of features.
The important difference between these views concerns disjunction (cf. Smith
1978). The probabilistic view involves implicit disjunction, while the exemplar
view involves explicit disjunction. This is illustrated schematically in figure 3-
4 (cf. Smith and Medin 1981: 167). The significance of this difference will






Concept Instance 1 Instance 2
Exemplar 1 Exemplar 2
Fr F3 F: F3
f2 f4 f2 f4
f5 f5 f5 f5
Figure 3—4: Implicit and explicit disjunction in prototype concepts
become apparent when we consider how the PA accounts for the apparent lack of
definitions.
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Unsurprisingly, the strengths of the PA are that it accounts for the empirical data
on categorization which is problematic for the CA.
The first strength is that it predicts that exemplars, or subordinate concepts,
vary in centrality. The central exemplar(s) is represented as the prototype and
categorization is based upon sufficient similarity with the prototype. Since the
prototype is represented in terms of features, these features are the (proto)typical
features of the concept: they tend to be shared by many (but not necessarily all)
exemplars of concept and constitute the basis for the determination of categoriza¬
tion (cf. Rosch and Mervis 1975). The similarity metric varies slightly depending
upon which PA view we consider. With the probabilistic view, for example, the
metric is based upon weighted features: a target concept is more similar to a
concept depending on similarity as measured by weighted shared features. Thus
robin would share more salient features with bird than chicken; whereas bird
and robin share feathered, winged, flies and sings, bird and chicken lack the last
two features (alternatively, these features are not so highly weighted in chicken
as they are in bird). Now consider two manifestations of centrality: typicality
ratings and speed of categorization. With typicality ratings, robin will be judged
more representative of bird than chicken since it has a higher 'family resemblance'
score than chicken; likewise, robin will be quicker to categorize as a bird than
chicken since the similarity metric will attain the threshold for bird more quickly
than for chicken.
The second strength is that it accounts for level centrality: i.e. experimental
evidence which supports the centrality of the 'basic level'. One account is based
upon cue validity (cf. Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch 1978). Cue validity can
be seen as an alternative similarity metric for the probabilistic view. Rather
than base similarity on shared features, the family resemblance metric is based
upon distinctive shared features: i.e. features common to the concept which
are not possessed by contrastive concepts (cf. Medin et al. 1987: 244). For
example, while animate is a common feature for bird, it is not distinctive in that
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it is shared with contrastive concepts such as dog, cat, elephant and so on (cf.
flies and winged). Cue validity is the conditional probability that a exemplar is
a member of a particular concept given some feature as a cue (cf. Smith and
Medin 1981: 79):
The cue validity of a particular feature /, vis-a-vis a particular target
concept x, is such that it increases with the probability that / occurs
with exemplars of / and decreases with the probability that / occurs
with exemplars that contrast with x.
For example, animate would have a low cue validity for bird, whereas feathered
would have a high cue validity.
Category cue validity can be defined as the sum of all individual cue validities
of the features associated with a concept and, it is argued, concepts at the basic
level have the highest category cue validity. For example, in the taxonomy with
furniture, chair and kitchen chair, chair, as the concept on the basic level, should
have the highest category cue validity. The cue validity for the subordinate
concept kitchen chair will be low because most of its features will be shared with
other contrastive concepts and only a few features, such as found-in-kitchens,
would be distinctive to the concept. Likewise, furniture will have a low category
cue validity since it has few or no common features (cf. Rosch and Mervis 1975).
The basic level category chair, however, will have a high category cue validity
since its exemplars share many distinctive features.
The third strength of the PA is its ability to account for nesting phenomena.
Given that similarity is measured in terms of family resemblance, the PA predicts
that while robin is judged more similar to bird, chicken is judged more similar to
animal. For robin has more shared features, and fewer distinctive feature, with
bird than animal, whereas the reverse holds for chicken. Likewise robin will be
categorized as a bird faster than it will categorized as an animal since it shares
more features with bird and thus will reach its membership threshold fastest.
The opposite holds for chicken: it will be categorized faster as an animal than as
Chapter 3. Concepts in Categorization and Lexical Access 82
a bird since it shares more features with animal. The different views within the
PA may account for this in slightly different ways; for example, the probabilistic
view will measure similarity in terms of the weighted sum; and the exemplar
view can account for this phenomena even more transparently by including in
the prototype of bird the exemplar robin but not chicken and including the
exemplar chicken but not robin in the prototype of animal (cf. Smith and Medin
1981: 151). Thus the PA accounts for the interaction between member and level
centrality: central exemplars of a basic level concept are more closely related to
the immediate superordinate than distant superordinates, whereas the reverse
holds for peripheral exemplars.
Its fourth strength is its account of unclear cases. Unclear cases of member¬
ship can arise from two sources in the PA: the target concept can have a family
resemblance score which is close to, but does not exceed, the threshold; and its
family resemblance score can be close to, or perhaps exceed, the threshold of more
than one concept. For example, boxing glove may have a family resemblance score
which is close to, but does not exceed, the membership threshold for clothing;
and tomato may have a score which exceeds the membership thresholds for both
fruit and vegetable. As expected, the probabilistic and exemplar views account
for this in slightly different ways. With the former, the membership threshold is a
weighted featural sum. With the later, the threshold is featural sum based upon
(family resemblance) similarity with prototype exemplars: thus, membership be¬
comes unclear when the target concept is not sufficiently similar to a (number
of) prototype exemplars of a particular concept and/or the prototype exemplars
of more than one concept.
As for the use of non-necessary features, their use is intrinsic to the PA: cat¬
egorization is not based upon necessary features. In fact, with the probabilistic
view the issue of necessity does not arise since features are only probabilistically
related to the concept. However, given that features with a high conditional
probability are analogous to necessary features, this view assumes that features
with a low conditional probability play an important role in categorization. For
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example, low weighted features flies and sings play a crucial role in accounting
for the GOE ratings of robin and chicken as exemplars of bird. In the exemplar
view, where the issue of necessity may arise, non-necessary features play a role
in categorization since categorization is based upon a comparison with prototype
exemplars and its features may not necessarily hold of other exemplars of the
concept, including other prototype exemplars. For example, if robin is a pro¬
totype exemplar for bird, then one of its features, red-breasted, will play a role
in categorization without it necessarily being a feature of all exemplars of the
concept bird.
The apparent lack of definition is also unsurprising in light of the PA. Apart
from the issue of whether necessary features are involved in the concept represen¬
tations, the use of a membership threshold based on family resemblance allows
featural sufficiency to vary: i.e. the set of features which are sufficient to delimit
a concept is not invariant. Thus one exemplar can be a member of a concept on
the basis of sharing the distinctive feature /*, /2 and /3 with the concept proto¬
type, but another exemplar can be a member on the basis of sharing the features
f1, /4, and f5. In both cases then, these exemplars will exceed the membership
threshold for the concept but not on the basis of the same feature set. Again
each view interprets this in a slightly different way. With the probabilistic view,
membership is determined on the basis of a weighted sum of features and differ¬
ent combinations of features will attain the same sum. For example, while both
chair and rug match enough features of furniture to gain membership, they do
so on the basis of slightly different feature sets as shown in figure 3-5 (cf. Smith
and Medin 1981: 68). With the exemplar view, variation in featural sufficiency
is even more transparent: since membership is determined on the basis of simi¬
larity to a prototype exemplar, and since these exemplars can consist of different
feature sets, two concepts can be exemplars of the same concept on the basis of
sharing different sets of features.
This variation highlights the importance of disjunctive conceptual structure in
PA. With the implicit disjunction in the probabilistic view, membership cannot
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Figure 3—5: Membership based on different features
be entirely heterogeneous since it is determined by comparison with a single
implicit prototype and so there will be at least some degree of featural overlap
(cf. Smith and Medin 1981: 68). However with the explicit disjunction in the
exemplar view, membership can, in principle, be entirely heterogeneous: since
membership is determined by comparison with one of a number of prototype
exemplars, and each of these exemplars can be associated with non-overlapping
feature sets, different members of the category need not have any features in
common. So while both PA views can be seen to account for the lack of definitions
for membership in terms of variation in the sufficient set of features, they differ
as to how much variation is permitted.
Weaknesses of the Prototype Approach
The major weakness of the PA is that its account of concept centrality is not ad¬
equate. In both the probabilistic and exemplar views, the prototype is fixed for
the concept and manifestations of centrality only vary depending on the family
resemblance between a target concept and the prototype. However, empirical
data suggests that centrality is not fixed but variable, and this variation is sys-
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tematically related to aspects of context such as goals, perspectives, category
labels and discourse context.
Variation in centrality is manifest in goal-derived concepts (cf. Barsalou 1983;
Barsalou and Sewell 1984). These are concepts which are constructed for some
immediate goal; for example, things to take from one's home during a fire, what
to get for a birthday present, foods not to eat on a diet and so on. His cat¬
egorization experiments with these concepts yield four pertinent results. First,
knowing the goal that relates the target exemplars facilitated subjects' decisions
as whether they were exemplars of the concept or not; not knowing the goal made
the decision correspondingly more difficult. For example, knowing that the goal
is things to take from one's home during a fire helps determine that children,
jewelry, photographs and camera are exemplars of the concept. Secondly, exem¬
plars vary in centrality; for example, chocolate is a better exemplar of food not
to eat on a diet than bread. Thirdly, variation in centrality is not predicted by
the family resemblance similarity metric since the exemplars have a low family
resemblance scores. Fourthly, variation in centrality can be predicted, and so
possibly determined by, the degree to which each exemplar satisfies the relevant
goal — for example how high a value they have on a relevant dimension, such as
calorific value for food and worth for things to take out during fire — as well as
how frequently they have been used as past instances of the concept, for exam¬
ple how familiar a particular lood is as an exemplar of diet foods. Furthermore,
Barsalou has also suggested that our goals may also play a role in the determi¬
nant of centrality in categories other than goal-derived concepts. Variation in
centrality may be (partially) based upon the degree to which exemplars satisfy
our goals or ideals in interacting with the object rather than family resemblance;
with fruit, for example, how much we like the taste of it. Thus the PA prediction
that family resemblance systematically predicts centrality is confounded in the
case of goal-derived concepts and perhaps even more generally — the purpose of
the categorization can partially determine concept centrality.
Barsalou also demonstrates that another aspect of context — perspectives —
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play a role in determining centrality (cf. Barsalou 1985; Barsalou and Sewell
1985; Barsalou 1986). Whereas previous categorization experiments made no
mention of the cultural perspective from which GOE was to be rated — the
context was 'null' with respect to cultural perspective — Barsalou conducted a
series of experiments in which subjects were explicitly asked to rate exemplars
of taxonomic and goal-derived concepts from various cultural perspectives such
as Americans, French, Chinese, hippies and housewives. The results showed
that conceptual centrality systematically varied with perspective. This confounds
the PA prediction that centrality is transparently and invariantly determined by
family resemblance.
Barsalou (1985) further demonstrates that context, this time in the form of a
name for the concept, affects centrality. The main task for subjects was to rate
fictional characters as to their suitability for a given occupation. Prior to this,
subjects were divided into two groups: the first group was told that the characters
were either PE teachers, who jogged with varying degrees of regularity, or current
affairs teachers, who read newspapers with varying degrees of frequency; and the
second group was told that the joggers and readers were simply known as Q and Z
programmers. Analysis of the GOE rating showed that determination of centrality
was affected by whether the names for the two groups of characters related the
activities to their jobs: when they were related, as with current affairs teachers
who read newspapers, centrality was principally determined by the degree to
which the character participated in the activity; when they were not related, as
with Z programmers who read newspapers, centrality was determined by family
resemblance. Again, the PA does not predict that centrality can vary as a function
of context.
Similar findings have been reported with respect to linguistic context (cf. Roth
and Shoben 1983). Linguistic context came in the form of sentences presented to
subjects before their reading time for a target sentence was measured. Consider,
for example, the context sentences in (3.1) to (3.3) and the target sentence in
(3.4):
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(3.1) Mary watched the bird all day.
(3.2) Mary saw the bird swimming.
(3.3) Mary looked at the bird on the telephone wire.
(3.4) Mary was very fond of ducks.
The results show that exemplars judged central to the concept only had faster
RTs than peripheral exemplars following neutral context sentences, such as (3.1)
above. The RT for peripheral exemplars was significantly affected by biasing con¬
texts: with contexts such as (3.2), which is biased towards the duck exemplar
interpretation (the bird is able to swim), the RT was faster than with the neutral
context; but with contexts such as (3.3), which is biased against the duck inter¬
pretation (the bird is able to fly in order to be on the telephone wire), the RT
was slower than with the neutral context. These results support the claim that
centrality is determined by family resemblance in null contexts, but by seman¬
tic relations between concepts in biasing contexts: if the target concept satisfies
restrictions imposed on the superordinate concept (bird), then categorization is
facilitated as with duck in (3.2); if the target concept does not satisfy the restric¬
tions, as with duck in (3.3), categorization is disfacilitated and an increased RT
results.
The facilitatory effect of semantic relations between a concept in the context
and the target concept is also manifest in tasks such as artificial concept construc¬
tion and concept learning (cf. Wattenmaker et al. 1986; Medin et al. 1987). For
example, this claim is supported in the learning of concepts which differ in their
separability. In the PA concepts are separable on the basis of feature summing:
i.e. concepts are linearly separable through a (weighted) additive combination of
features. This yields the prediction that linearly separable concepts are easier to
learn than non-linearly separable concepts. To test this prediction, Medin and
Schwanenflugel (1981) conducted a series of experiments with varying concept
sizes and materials, but failed to find evidence to support it. However, other
researchers found that the explicit presentation of a theme which related features
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of concepts did facilitate the acquisition of linearly separable concepts (cf. Wat-
tenmaker et al. 1986). For example, in one experiment, the central features of
the target concept were relevant and appropriate features if subjects were look¬
ing for a substitute hammer. With subjects who were introduced to the notion
of substitute hammer, linearly separable concepts were easier to learn than non-
linearly separable concepts. Furthermore, when linking themes were introduced
for non-linearly separable concepts, they were easier to learn than linearly separa¬
ble concepts. Thus the presentation of a theme which relates concepts facilitated
their learning.
The second weakness of the PA approach concerns its account of level central-
ity. Here there are two problems: the cue validity account is flawed; and, like
exemplar centrality, level centrality can systematically vary with contexts which
make explicit semantic relations between a concept in the context and the target
concept.
In the PA, the basic level is that level which maximizes the number of common
and distinctive features. With the probabilistic view, this is measured in terms
of category cue validity: concepts on the basic level have the largest sum of cue
validities for their features. The problem with this account, however, is that it
consistently identifies the superordinate level within a taxonomy as the central
level (cf. Murphy 1982; Medin and Smith 1984; Murphy and Medin 1985). For
any feature which cues membership in one category will always cue membership
in a superordinate concept. Thus cue validity for superordinate concepts will
always be equal to or greater than that for allegedly basic level concepts. For
example, while the feature winged will be good cue for the concept bird, it will
also be a cue for the concept animal. As Murphy (1982) points out, this problem
can be circumvented by not directly connecting features of basic level concepts
to superordinate concepts: features of basic level concepts would only act as cues
for these concepts, not superordinate concepts.
Another alternative is that the central level is determined by a function which
combines cue validity with category (inference) validity (cf. Jones 198-3; Murphy
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and Medin 1985). Category validity is the opposite of cue validity in that the
central level is the one whose categories maximize inferences (cf. Medin 1983). In
particular, inference validity is the conditional probability that, given a concept,
we can infer that it has a particular feature. Category inference validity is the sum
of such inference validities for a concept. For example, given the concept duck,
we might infer with a high degree of probability that it has the features feathers,
winged, swims, and so on. However, category inference validity systematically
identifies the most subordinate level in a taxonomy as the central level since, as
the most specific, it permit most inferences. For example, my pet duck, Nora
Barnacle, will not only have the inferences associated with animal, bird and
duck, but will also permit specific inferences concerning the exact colour of its
feathers, where it lives, what it eats, and so on.
There are two alternatives accounts of level centrality. The first concerns
correlated features (cf. Rosch et al. 1976a; Rosch 1978; Mervis and Rosch 1981).
With basic level concepts, such as natural kind concept, it has been argued that
there is a tendency not only for certain groups of features to co-occur, but also
to co-vary. For example, not only do the features wings, feathers and beaks co-
occur in the concept birds (cf. other animals), but there are correlations between
these features so that, for example, the larger the wing span of birds, the greater
the probability that they live by the sea and eat fish5. Malt and Smith (1983)
provide evidence that basic level concepts have correlated features and that they
play a role in categorization. Medin and Shoben (1988) show that naming one
feature affects correlated features in adjective-noun combinations; for example,
spoons are typically small, but wooden spoons are typically large. Thus the basic
level could be characterized as that level whose concepts have a greater number
of correlations between features than concepts at superordinate or subordinate
levels. The problem, however, is that, like category validity, the most specific
concepts will have the most correlated features. For example, with my pet duck,
5Though there are exceptions such as golden eagles.
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there will be additional specific correlations between colour and size, location,
ownership and so on. This is corroborated by Murphy and Medin who argue
that correlated features can be the basis for inferences which go beyond the given
(cf. Murphy and Medin 1985: 293); for example, on seeing a round object in
a gymnasium, we might predict that it can bounce (correlations between shape
and location of the object and our characteristic interaction). Clearly, the more
specific the concept, i.e. lower in a taxonomy, the more correlated features and
thus more inferences beyond the given.
The second alternative, although closely related to the correlated features
account, appears to avoid this problem. The central level is characterized as the
most abstract level at which exemplars of a concept have approximately the same
parts (cf. Medin and Smith 1984; Tversky and Hemmenway 1984). As Lakolf
points out, this account of level centrality is closely allied to Gestalt perception,
the perception of overall part-whole configuration, although it clearly goes beyond
perception (cf. Lakoff 1987: 47). The basic level has priority over other levels
of categorization in that concepts at this level have more features concerned
with parts. There are two reasons why parts are salient: parts correlated with
functions — for example feathers on birds are correlated with their capacity to
fly; and we interact with objects in terms of their parts — for example, we see the
shape of birds. Markman and Callahan (1983) corroborate the salience of parts
in so far as they provide experimental evidence to show that collection concepts
based upon part-whole relations, for example a family is a collection concept with
parts for father, mother and children, are easier for children to understand than
concepts based upon the subset relation. Furthermore, this account can be seen
as closely related to the correlated feature account since the basis for partitioning
whole concepts into parts may well be the clustering of correlated features: i.e.
parts can be interpreted as clusters of correlated features.
This part-whole account, however, is inadequate since it is unclear how it is
to be applied. For rather than concepts at different levels in a taxonomy either
having or not having a part-whole structure, categories at all levels may have
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a part-whole structure and these structures may differ in specificity. Different,
compatible concepts then may share the same part-whole structure, but cate¬
gories at lower levels may have more specific parts. For example, the concept for
a particular subordinate concept of car, such as a Renault lfOOTS, has more spe¬
cific part-whole structure(s) than car: a car may have the part spare tyre whose
location on the car is not specified, whereas on the concept for a Renault 1400TS
the location of the spare tyre is specified as directly above the engine. Further¬
more, the superordinate concept vehicle may consist of parts such as physical
shape and mode of propulsion, and these parts are correspondingly more specific
in exemplars such as cars. Thus if levels of categorization differ in terms of the
number and specificity of part-whole structures, it is difficult to see what level is
the 'most abstract level with approximately the same parts'.
The second problem for the Pa's account of level centrality is that context
affects the centrality of conceptual levels. Like exemplar centrality, experiments
alleged to furnish evidence for a cue validity account were conducted with a null
or neutral context. For example, with natural kind terms, where the basic level
is bird rather than robin or animal, the experiments tend to be simple listing
features, word pairs and so on. However, when experiments also use biasing
contexts, level centrality seems to be affected by context.
Level centrality seems to vary with cultural perspective and degree of exper¬
tise (cf. Rosch et al. 1976a; Dougherty 1978). For example, the basic level of
categorization of plants and trees can vary depending upon whether the subjects
come from urban, industrialized cultures or agricultural non-industrialized cul¬
tures. While the life form level, tree, are basic for American subjects, the genus
level, oak and teak, are basic for Tzelta.1 speakers. This suggests that the basic
level may be partially determined by the importance of the conceptual domain
within a culture: the more important the domain to a culture's activities, the
more differentiated the concepts and so the lower the basic level in the taxonomy6.
6Murphy and Medin (1985: 305) provide convincing evidence that membership of
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Furthermore, within a given culture, there will be groups to whom particular con¬
ceptual domains are important and their basic level will be correspondingly lower
in the taxonomy than other members of the culture; for example, train spotters
will have a more differentiated concept of trains, such that specific types of train
will be more central than the generic level. This is closely related to Putnam's
notion of the division of linguistic labour: i.e. for a given domain, there may be
experts and novices where the experts, since their concepts are more differenti¬
ated, have a central level of categorization which is lower on the taxonomy than
the basic level of the novices (or even beyond their taxonomy).
In the second place, observational evidence suggests that level centrality can
be determined by situational context. Consider exophoric reference where a ex¬
pression refers to an object in the extra-linguistic situation (cf. Sanford and
Garrod 1981: 119). Such expressions need to be sufficiently specific to differenti¬
ate the intended referent from other potential referents, yet only as specific as is
relevant to the aim or theme of the discourse. Consequently, the central level of
conceptual description in a taxonomy will not be fixed, but vary in accordance
with referential requirements imposed by the discourse context. In null contexts,
i.e. contexts which impose no specific referential requirement, the appropriate
conceptual expression will be at the basic level; for example, if there is only one
bird, a robin, in the garden, then look at the bird in the garden is appropriate. In
other contexts, the central level may be more specific or less specific. In a situa¬
tion where there are three birds — a. robin, a thrush and an eagle — and we wish
to identify the robin, then a subordinate level description is appropriate: look at
the robin in the garden. A superordinate level description may be appropriate
when the goal is to highlight a property of the superordinate concept rather than
a property of the 'basic' level; for example, look at the silly animal in the garden
would be appropriate if the 'silliness' was not specific to birds or robins.
concepts is similarly affected. The Karam of New Guinea do not categorize cassowary
as a bird on account of their antithesis of forest and cultivation.
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Observational evidence also suggest that discourse context can impose restric¬
tions on the appropriate conceptual level of description. Consider the following
examples:
(3.5) John bought a vehicle yesterday. It was a
(3.6) John bought a car yesterday. It was a
(3.7) John bought a BMW yesterday. It was a
In each, the context sentence introduces a concept, a type of vehicle, and the
target sentence further describes the concept. With a semantic restriction such
that subsequent descriptions of a concept add new information, then we would
expect the appropriate level of description to be more specific than mentioned
in the context sentence rather than simple at the basic level, car. With (3.5),
the semantic constraint and the basic level coincide and we would expect a car
as a frequent response. With (3.6), we would expect a concept at more specific
level of description, such as BMW. Finally, with (3.7), we would predict that the
appropriate level was still more specific; for example, series five BMW. In this
way, experimental and observational evidence suggests that level centrality is not
fixed but can vary as a consequence of context (culture, expertise, situational,
linguistic) imposing specific semantic requirements.
In sum, while the prototype approach to concepts provides an account of
categorization data problematic for the classical approach, its own weaknesses
are exposed when experiments include non-null contexts. In particular, while the
correlation between characteristic features of a concept and its centrality with
respect to a superordinate concept may hold in null contexts, concept centrality in
non-null contexts seems to arise from semantic relations between the context itself
and the concept. As we have just observed, context can have an analogous effect
on level centrality in non-null contexts. Furthermore, while it would be possible
to take either the classical or prototype approach as the basis for our approach to
concepts, we will modify the classical approach along the lines suggested at the
end of section 3.2.1. For while the prototype may be a "conventional grammatical
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fiction" (Rosch 1978: 40) useful for accounting for the some of the minutiae of
experiments, and could be extended to make centrality more context-sensitive,
the classical approach, as we shall see, is easier to incorporate into cognitive
linguistic approach to language comprehension.
3.3 Lexical Access
In this section, we consider lexical access as evidence to support our claim that
context can affect lexical conceptual structure as well as discourse conceptual
structure. Many experimental studies have shown that context does affect con¬
ceptual structure. The data used in these studies tends to fall into two groups:
ambiguous expressions, such as bank, whose lexical representation contains two
different lexical concepts — one for the 'financial institution' sense and another for
the 'river' sense; and polysemous expressions such as eat, whose lexical represen¬
tation contain a lexical concept — the generic sense — together with subordinate
concepts corresponding to specific senses appropriate to what is being eaten (cf.
Weinreich 1966). Hodgkin (1977) demonstrated that local linguistic context, in
the form of a verb's selection restrictions, may select between the senses of un¬
ambiguous nouns; for example, butcher was responded to faster when the verb
imposed an animacy restriction as with the milk pleased the butcher than when
the verb lacked an animacy restriction as with the milk soaked the butcher. An¬
derson and Ortony (1975) show that nouns such as container can have specific
senses imposed by context; for example, with the container held the apples, basket
proved to be a better recall cue than container. Garnham (1979) demonstrates
a similar effects for verbs; fried is a better recall cue than cooked for the house¬
wife cooked the chips (but not for the housewife cooked the peas). Potter and
Faulconer (1979) demonstrate that with house in the context of a preceding ad¬
jective like burning, an atypical picture of house burning was responded to faster
than the typical picture of house. Finally, Tabossi and Johnson-Laird (1980)
demonstrated that context can recjuire expressions to contribute concepts with
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specific properties; for example, when the question Is a diamond brilliant? is
followed by The mirror dispersed the light from the diamond subjects responded
faster than when it was followed by The goldsmith cut the glass with the diamond
where the context highlights its hardness rather than reflectivity.
This data has been taken to demonstrate that context does affect the con¬
ceptual structure. What is not addressed by these experiments is when context
affects it: i.e. given that context imposes semantic restrictions on the upcom¬
ing lexical expressions in a sentence, when do these restrictions affect conceptual
structure? In particular, does discourse context select the appropriate sense of
ambiguous and polysemous expressions before or after linguistic processing? If
they apply before linguistic processing, then it is reasonable to expect sense selec¬
tion to take place during the retrieval of lexical representations. If, on the other
hand, sense selection on the basis of discourse context takes place after linguis¬
tic processing, then all senses, including contextually inappropriate ones, will be
available even if we are not conscious of their availability (cf. Holley-Wilcox and
Blank 1980). The first view is adopted by the context-dependent selective access
view (cdsa) which claims that context can have an immediate effect on lexical
access: only contextually appropriate senses of a linguistic expression are accessed
(cf. Glucksberg et al. 1986; Tabossi 1988a). The second view is adopted in the
context-independent multiple access view (cima) which claims that all senses of
a lexical expression are initially accessed and then, and only then, can context
select the relevant sense (cf. Swinney 1979; Onifer and Swinney 1981; Prather
and Swinney 1988). The contrast between these views can be illustrated with an
ambiguous expression such as bank:
(3.8) The robber held up the cashier at the bank.
(3.9) The fisherman sat on the bank hoping for a catch.
The cima claims that in both the contexts in (3.8) and (3.9), lexical access results
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in two lexical concepts being accessed7. Once both sense have been accessed,
context can then play a role in selecting an appropriate sense: the institution
sense is appropriate in (3.8) while the river sense is appropriate in (3.9). With
the CDSA, only the appropriate sense for each context will be accessed; in (3.8),
for example, the river bank sense will not be accessed at all.
There is a third view which incorporates aspects of both the CIMA and CDSA
views. In this view, access is also determined on the basis of the relative frequency
of senses (cf. Onifer and Swinney 1981; Simpson 1981). The most frequent sense
is accessed independent of context unless the context is highly inappropriate. Less
frequent, or subordinate, senses are only accessed in clearly appropriate contexts.
Consequently, given the senses of bank are ordered such that the institutional
sense is more frequent than the river sense, in a sentential context like John
walked to the bank, where either sense may be appropriate, only the institutional
sense is accessed since this context is not 'clearly appropriate' to the river bank
sense. Likewise only the institution sense is accessed in (3.8), whereas in (3.9)
only the river bank sense is accessed: the context is highly inappropriate to
the institutional sense. This view of lexical access bears comparison with the
prototype approach discussed in section 3.2.2.
In order to evaluate these views we need data which bears upon the relation¬
ship between lexical access, context and sense ordering (or centrality). The data
will cover access of both ambiguous and polysemous expressions since, on the
grounds of descriptive economy, the same process is involved in both (cf. Tabossi
1988a: 158; Lytinen 1988).
'It is not relevant to this view whether these senses are represented as different
lexical entries or different parts of the same one.
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3.3.1 Semantic Priming
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Semantic priming concerns the facilitatory effects related words, such as doctor
and nurse, can have on comprehension tasks (cf. Neely 1977). For example, when
subjects are asked to make a lexical decision, i.e. decide whether an expression
is a word, the decision is quicker in the context of a related word. For example,
lexical decisions are quicker with the related pair doctor-nurse than with the
unrelated pair doctor-bread (cf. Meyer and Schvaneldt 1971).
Semantic priming has been used with the lexical decision task to probe whether
the contextually appropriate sense of ambiguous expressions is accessed. Schvaneldt
et al. (1976) demonstrated that a 'priming' context containing a related member
of a pair can have this effect with ambiguous expressions such as bank. While
bank alone (the neutral context) facilitated lexical decisions on both the targets
money and river, when bank was preceded (and primed) by a word such as save,
then only the contextually-relevant target, money, was facilitated.
This finding has been interpreted as evidence for the CDSA and counterevi-
dence to the CIMA: although both senses are activated in a neutral context, only
the relevant sense is activated in a context which primes the sense; otherwise
we would expect both targets to be facilitated. The problem with this interpre¬
tation, however, is that the decisions occurred around 500ms after the onset of
the ambiguous expressions, but CIMA claims that both activation and selection
take place within 200ms (cf. Seidenberg et al. 1982; Glucksberg et al. 1986).
Consequently, within 500ms all senses could be accessed and the relevant sense
selected and the irrelevant suppressed by a post-access decision. While this data
from semantic priming provides further evidence for the selection of contextually
appropriate senses, it does not discriminate between the CIMA and the CDSA.
3.3.2 Cross-Modal Priming
Experiments within the cross-modal semantic priming paradigm provide a more
convincing source of evidence (cf. Swinney 1979; Swinnev et al. 1979; Onifer and
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Swinney 1981). Subjects perform a visual lexical decision task while listening
to a sentential context which either primed one of the sense of an ambiguous
expression or was a control. Importantly, the visual target for the lexical decision
task is presented precisely on the offset of the ambiguous expression. Swinney
argues that by presenting the visual target simultaneously with the end of the
ambiguous item, the lexical decision on the target clearly reflects the effects of
priming on the semantic activation of the ambiguous expression.
Swinney (1979) used this technique to demonstrate that context did not affect
lexical access and thus provided evidence for the CIMA approach. Sentences were
auditorily presented and these were either controls or primed one of the sense of
ambiguous expressions such as bug-, for example,
(3.10) The man was surprised when he found several spiders, roaches, and other
bugs in the corner of his room.
primes the insect sense rather than the microphone sense of bug. At the offset of
this expression, subjects performed a lexical decision task on visual targets such
as ant or spy. The results showed that bug facilitated lexical decision on these
targets independently of whether it was related to the contextually primed sense:
i.e. lexical decisions for where bug was primed for the insect sense and the target
was spy and where bug in the microphone sense with ant as target were faster than
the control context with either spy or bug as target. Furthermore, when the visual
targets were presented three syllables from the auditory prime, only those targets
related to the contextually primed sense were facilitated. This contrast between
the immediate effect and delayed effect of context was taken as evidence for the
CIMA and as counterevidence for the CDSA. Moreover, Onifer and Swinney (1981)
found similar results for ambiguous expressions whose senses, unlike those of bug,
differed in frequency. For example, ring has a dominant sense, the jewellery sense,
and a subordinate sense, the noise sense, yet in priming contexts such as:
(3.11) The housewife literally lit up as the plumber extracted her lost wedding
ring from the sink trap.
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(3.12) The office walls were so thin that they could hear the ring of their neigh¬
bor's phone whenever a call came in.
ring facilitated lexical decisions on targets independent of context. This evidence
was taken as support for claiming that lexical access is independent of both
context and the frequency of senses.
Other experimental results, however, seem to confound these results. Using a
120ms inter stimulus interval (iSl), Simpson (1981) found frequency and context
effects: in neutral context, visual targets related to the frequent sense of ambigu¬
ous expressions were facilitated, whereas those related to the infrequent sense
were not. For example, with bank as the context, the target money (related to
the dominant financial institution sense) was facilitated but not river. Further¬
more, in highly constrained priming contexts, targets related to the contextually
primed sense were facilitated, independent of the frequency of these senses. For
example, with the context in (3.13):
(3.13) The vampire was disguised as a count.
the target duke, related to the subordinate nobility sense, was facilitated whereas
number, related to the dominant enumeration sense, was not. Similarly, in
(3.14):
(3.14) My dog wasn't included in the final count.
only the target num.ber was facilitated. These result provide evidence for an
approach where lexical access is dependent upon the centrality of senses in neutral
contexts, but upon semantic relatedness in highly constraining contexts.
Onifer and Swinney claim, however, that these results are also consistent with
the CIMA on account of the 120ms ISI (cf. Onifer and Swinney 1981): their results
where obtained with a zero ISI in the immediate condition and this delay, they
claim, might be long enough to select by frequency and context the appropriate
senses and thereby suppress accessed, but inappropriate, senses.
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Other results are not quite so easy to accommodate to the CIMA. Seidenberg
et al. (1982) used a word naming task rather than a lexical decision task where
there was no delay between the ambiguous auditory word prime and the visual
target. They found good evidence for selective access albeit only when the context
contained a word semantically related to one sense of the ambiguous expression.
For example, the context sentence in (3.15):
(3.15) Although the farmer bought the straw ...
facilitated naming with the target hay but not sip since farmer is closely related
to the 'crop' sense of straw (cf. Although Joe bought the straw . .. where there
was no evidence for selective facilitation). Since this result cannot be dismissed
on the grounds of a delayed ISI or the effects of post-access decision processes, it
constitutes prime facie counter-evidence to the CIMA. It would appear that while
some contexts may not affect lexical access, the contextually relevant sense is
immediately accessed in highly constraining contexts. However, such a view does
not explain the discrepancy between Swinney's and Seidenberg's experiments:
i.e. the former consistently obtains multiple access, yet the later obtains selective
access in biasing contexts.
Two explanations have been suggested (cf. Seidenberg et al. 1982). The first
is methodological: backward priming in the cross-model priming paradigm has
created the effect of multiple access (cf. Glucksberg et al. 1986). The second is
that selective access is only apparent in contexts which impose specific constraints
on the sense of ambiguous primes: the contexts in Swinney's experiments are not
sufficiently constraining to yield selective access (cf. Tabossi et al. 1987; Tabossi
1988a; Tabossi 1988b). While both explanations attempt to support the CDSA,
only the later is capable of sustaining support.
3.3.3 Backward Priming.
Backward priming in the cross-modal priming paradigm concerns the effect the
visual target word has on an auditory ambiguous prime. Glucksberg et al. (1986)
Chapter 3. Concepts in Categorization and Lexical Access 101
assume that the form of an auditory word is not processed immediately, but
stored in 'echoic' memory and processed at the same time as the visual word.
For example, an auditory ambiguous prime like cast is stored in echoic memory
and processed simultaneously with a visual word like actress. Accessing the
senses of cast takes place against two contexts: the first context provided by
prior auditory sentential context; and the second provided by the 'subsequent'
visual word. Glucksberg et al. argue that this later context can facilitate the
lexical access of inappropriate senses of the ambiguous prime word. A sentential
context for cast, such as the nurse adjusted the cast on the patient's leg, facilitates
the medical sense of cast. However, given that cast is retained in echoic memory
and processed simultaneously with an inappropriate visual target such as actress,
presented at the offset of the ambiguous prime cast, the relationship between the
visual target and the inappropriate sense of the ambiguous prime (the theatre
sense) is detected and this causes the inappropriate sense to be accessed as well.
This in turn makes lexical decisions on inappropriate target words faster than
those of (unrelated) control target words.
Backward priming effects have been independently observed within the visu¬
ally presented lexical decision tasks (cf. Koriat 1981; Kiger and Glass 1983). The
claim of Gluckeberg et al. is that the same effect is also manifest in cross-modal
lexical decision tasks of Swinney (1979) and Onifer and Swinney (1981) and that
multiple access of ambiguous words may be an artifact of backward priming. In
biasing sentential contexts, the appropriate sense is selected on the basis of this
context. However, the visually presented word provides a second context which
allows inappropriate senses to be accessed and thus gives an effect of multiple
access. In order to determine whether backward priming is the source of multiple
access, Glucksberg et al. constructed a variant of the cross-modal lexical decision
paradigm intended to prevent backward priming. This paradigm used interfer¬
ence rather than facilitation as an measure of lexical access. In particular, their
experiments used the auditory material of Onifer and Swinney (1981) but with
non-words as the visual targets. The rationale for using non-words was that, as
non-lexical items, they lacked relations with lexical items and hence could not
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serve as contextual cues for ambiguous words: non-words could not (backward)
prime the ambiguous words. The non-word targets were misspelt variants of
words semantically related to the ambiguous word as well as controls. For exam¬
ple, in experiments with the ambiguous word state, there were four visual targets:
condry, a misspelling of the country related to the (dominant) country sense of
state; conbishun, a misspelling of condition, related to the (subordinate) condi¬
tion sense of state; and control targets droncy, a scrambled version of condry,
and chubison. The rationale for using these targets concerned the time taken
to make a lexical decision on non-words: a non-word, such as condry, which is
more similar to a word (country), take longer to judge than an obvious non-word
like droncy. Crucially, sentential context could interfere with this lexical decision
task: the context may select the sense of an ambiguous word, state, semantically
related to a word country and accessing this sense makes it more difficult to de¬
cide that condry is a non-word due to its similarity with country. According to
Glucksberg et ah, a sentential context such as:
(3.16) Even though the outside of the car appeared new, the motor was actually
in a very bad state and the mechanic said it would probably need a
complete overhaul to work again.
should interfere with the lexical decision on a non-word visual target on account
of similarity with words semantically related to the appropriate sense. The re¬
sults showed that contexts which make appropriate the dominant sense of an
ambiguous prime, the related non-word took longer than the control yielding an
interference effect of 60 msecs; and in inappropriate contexts, an interference ef¬
fect of 15 msecs. The pattern of interference for targets related to subordinate
senses was similar: in appropriate contexts, the effect was 49 msecs; and in ap¬
propriate contexts 5 msecs. Glucksberg et al. take these results as evidence that
the multiple access of ambiguous words in appropriate contexts is an artifact of
backward priming since experiments precluding backward priming yield evidence
for selective access.
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While there is no doubt as to the experimental sophistication of the Glucks-
berg et al. approach, there are problems with their interpretation of the results.
The evidence for backward priming between auditorially and visually presented
words has been questioned by Prather and Swinney (1988). They conducted
cross-modal variants of Kiger and Glass's visual modality experiments and found
no evidence of priming or interference. Moreover, they also questioned the as¬
sumption that non-words such as condry and conbishun cannot facilitate the
processing of related senses of ambiguous words. Glucksberg et al. describe a
pilot study which found no facilitatory effects of non-words targets of ambiguous
primes; for example, fisch did not affect the lexical decision time on an ambigu¬
ous word like scale. However, when the Glucksberg et al. material was used in a
priming experiment where both the prime and non-word targets were presented
visually, facilitation effects were found: a non-word 'related' to the sense of an
ambiguous prime facilitated lexical decisions relative to control non-words. This
suggests that non-words can facilitate the processing of 'related' words and this
in turn undermines the claim of Glucksberg et al. that their results, unlike those
of Onifer and Swinney (1981), are not susceptible to backward priming effects.
This conclusion is reinforced by experiments conducted by Tanenhaus et al.
(1988). They conducted a series of non-word decision experiments using the
ambiguous primes and non-word targets used by Glucksberg et al. together
with unambiguous primes and more word-like control targets. They interpreted
the results as demonstrating that non-word interference effects were strategic:
non-word interference is only manifest when more than 50% of trials contained
prime words related to the non-word target. The}' further suggest an alternative
explanation of why Glucksberg et al. only observed non-word interference when
targets were related to the contextually appropriate sense of the ambiguous prime:
The nonword interference task, as used by Glucksberg and colleagues,
is sensitive only to contextual integration. Thus, the context effects
obtained by Glucksberg et al. reflect the fact that only the con¬
textually appropriate sense of an ambiguous word is integrated with
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the preceding context, whereas the inappropriate sense is rapidly dis¬
carded. (Tanenhaus et al. 1988: 322)
While undermining the interpretation of Glucksberg et ah, neither Prather and
Swinney nor Tanenhaus et al. directly challenge the claim that multiple access
is an artifact of backward priming. There are, however, two problems with this
claim.
The first is that there is conflicting evidence about the occurrence of back¬
ward priming in cross-modal experiments and thereby for the claim that backward
priming is a source of multiple access in this paradigm. Peterson and Simpson
(1987) found backward priming of auditory primes by visual targets after both 0
msec and 200 msecs delays in lexical decision tasks. Using the same primes and
targets in contexts similar to those of Onifer and Swinney (1981), no backward
priming effect was obtained in contexts biasing the prime word. Although their
primes were not ambiguous, multiple access without backward priming might
have been observed in these contexts. On the other hand, Van Petten and Kutas
(1987), argue for a backward priming explanation of multiple access patterns ob¬
tained through measuring event-related brain potentials of target words following
sentential contexts with ambiguous words. With a 200 msecs delay, an unrelated
and inappropriately related target showed a larger reading than the appropri¬
ately related target. Approximately 300 msecs later, however, the reading for the
inappropriately related target began to converge with that for the appropriately
related target.
The second problem is that there is evidence of multiple access in paradigms
which are not susceptible to backward priming. For example, Whitney et al.
(1985) used Stroop interference rather than RT to measure the semantic activation
of unambiguous nouns in contexts which biased either a prominent property, a
non-prominent property or were control contexts:
(3.17) The boy skinned his trout.
(3.18) The boy dropped his trout.
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(3.19) The boy skinned his knee.
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These contexts were followed by visual target, such as scales and slimy, describ¬
ing these properties of the noun. Each of these visual targets were presented in
coloured ink and the subjects' task was to name the colour of the ink. After a 0
msec delay, targets describing either low or high prominence properties interfered
with the naming task significantly more after biasing contexts than the control
context. After 300 and 600 msec delays, however, this pattern was only observed
with high dominance properties: low dominance properties significantly inter¬
fered with the task only after the appropriate biasing context. Whitney et al.
interpret this pattern as supporting multiple access: initially all noun information
is accessed independent of context and only subsequently does context impose
restrictions by discarding non-dominant or contextually inappropriate properties
of the noun.
In sum, the claim that multiple access is an artifact of backward priming
is not well supported by experimental studies. Not only is there considerable
doubt concerning the premise of Glucksberg et al. experiments — non-words
cannot facilitate processing of related senses of ambiguous words — but other
experiments suggest that multiple access may occur without backward priming.
This can be taken as an indication that further experimental studies are required
to demonstrate the occurrence of backward priming, as well as the correlation
between backward priming and multiple access.
3.3.4 Contextual Constraints
The second explanation for the discrepancy concerns the relationship between the
priming word and its context. Selective lexical access arises when the context im¬
poses semantic restrictions which are sufficiently specific to discriminate between
the different senses of the priming word. When context is not sufficiently spe¬
cific, multiple access arises: all senses are compatible with the context's semantic
restrictions and hence are accessed. Consequently, the conflict between the mul-
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tiple access effects obtained by Swinney (1979), Onifer and Swinney (1981) and
Whitney et al. (1985) and the selective access effects obtained by Seidenberg
et al. (1982) arises from the relationship between the context and the priming
words; many contexts for ambiguous primes in the former experiments "do not
contain words highly related to the ambiguous words" (cf. Seidenberg et al. 1982:
528).
Patrizia Tabossi, the main proponent of this approach, argues that these
contexts in these experiments act like neutral contexts with respect to lexical
access. Consider again the contexts in (3.11) and (3.12) used in Onifer and
Swinney (1981). The context does not disambiguate ring by imposing specific
semantic restrictions: it does not make salient specific properties of the jewellery
sense of ring, such as its round shape or its high value (cf. Tabossi 1988a:
158). Likewise, contexts used by Swinney (1979) and Whitney et al. (1985) fail
to disambiguate through the imposition of specific semantic restrictions. With
(3.10), the context does not make relevant specific properties of the animal sense
of bug, such as its animacy, which differentiate it from the microphone sense.
And although some of the context used by Whitney et ah, such as (3.17) and
(3.18), do impose such restrictions, many do not; for example, The man used the
oak was intended to make relevant the low dominance property lumber of oak,
the context itself does not highlight this property (cf. The man chopped up the
oak). Since many of the contexts in these experiments failed to make relevant
the specific property of the prime word, the prime word was accessed as if in a
neutral context and multiple access effects were obtained.
If the nature of the context does have this effect on lexical access, then ex¬
periments which systematically vary the semantic restrictions imposed by con¬
text should obtain selective access effects when these restrictions are sufficient
to discriminate between senses of the priming word and multiple access effects
otherwise. Experimental studies on recognition of unambiguous words used to
complete sentences have clearly distinguished between the constraining effects of
different sentential contexts (cf. Schwanenflugel and Shoben 1985; Schwanen-
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flugel and LaCount 1988). Contexts were divided into high and low constraint
contexts as illustrated in (3.20) and (3.21) respectively:
(3.20) The landlord was faced with a strike by the
(3.21) She cleaned the dirt from her
where high constraint sentences imposes a strong semantic restrictions on the
upcoming word and low constraint sentences only imposes weak semantic re¬
strictions. The upcoming words were of three types: expected words such as
tenants and shoes; related words such as residents and sandals; and unrelated
words such as builders and floor. The results of these experiments showed that
high constraint sentences have a narrow range of facilitation since only expected
completion were facilitated. Low constraint sentences have a wider scope of
facilitation: both expected completions and completions related to the expected
completion were systematically facilitated. Unrelated completions, however, were
never facilitated by high or low constraint sentences.
Tabossi uses a similar technique to obtain selective access effects for both
unambiguous and ambiguous words. Using a cross modal lexical decision task,
she investigated the effect of different contexts on the unambiguous words such
as butter8 (cf. Tabossi 1988a). In one experiment a visual target, such as fat,
was presented at the offset of the unambiguous word in three contexts:
(3.22) In order to follow her diet, the woman eliminated the use of butter.
(3.23) Before paying, the man checked the price of butter.
(3.24) In order to soften it, the woman heated the piece of butter.
The context in (3.22) imposes a. specific semantic restriction on the sense of
butter, a restriction which is appropriate to the visual target fat (butter is fat-
8The experiments were actually conducted in Italian, but Tabossi's examples are
given in English.
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tening). The second context in (3.23) imposes no specific restrictions on the sense
of butter, while the third context in (3.24) imposes a specific restriction which is
inappropriate to the target butter (butter is malleable). According to the mul¬
tiple access view, where each of these senses is accessed independent of context,
the lexical decision task will not be affected by the nature of these contexts for
butter. According to the view that selective access is dependent upon the facili-
tatory effects of context on butter, the results should differ. In particular, lexical
decisions in positively constraining contexts like (3.22) should be faster than in
unconstraining, or neutral, contexts like (3.23). Lexical decisions in negatively
constraining contexts, such as (3.24), however, should be slower than in a neutral
context on account of interference between the sense facilitated by the context
and that required by a visual target like fat.. The results of her experiments
matched these predictions and she concludes that:
Lexical access may be affected by prior sentential context, provided
that it imposes constraints upon the semantic information to be re¬
trieved in an incoming word. (Tabossi 1988a: 159)
This conclusion is further supported by experiments using ambiguous words (cf.
Tabossi et al. 1987). This time, the sentential contexts imposed semantic con¬
straints on ambiguous words by priming characteristic properties of either its
dominant or subordinate sense:
(3.25) The violent hurricane did not damage the ships which were in the port,
one of the best equipped along the coast.
(3.26) Deceived by the identical colour, the host took a bottle of barolo, instead
of one of port, and offered it to his guests.
In (3.25), the dominant meaning of port is facilitated through the context im¬
posing the characteristic property that the port is safe, whereas in (3.26) the
subordinate meaning is primed through the property that the port is red. These
sentences were followed by either visual targets, such as safe and red, which re¬
lated to one of these senses or were a control such as short. The results showed
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that in (3.25), which biased the dominant meaning, safe was responded to faster
than red or short. However, in contexts which biased the subordinate meaning,
both safe and red were responded to faster than the control short. These results
support not only the effects of context upon lexical access, but also dominance
effects. While context and dominance constraints converge in contexts biasing
the dominant meaning so that only the dominant sense need be accessed, both
senses are accessed in contexts which bias the subordinate sense since context
and dominance effects diverge.
Accounting for the lack of selective access effects in some experiments on
the basis of the nature of the sentential context has been further reinforced by
experiments which demonstrate that the discrepancy is not due to different rela¬
tionships between the visual targets and the priming word (cf. Tabossi 1988b).
For whereas Tabossi used targets which described a characteristic aspect of the
sense (e.g. red, safe), Onifer and Swinney (1981) used targets which were asso¬
ciates or synonyms of the priming word (e.g. with ring the targets were finger
and bell). Consequently, the discrepancy could be due not to differences in con¬
text, but different intra-lexical relations between prime and target words. Tabossi
investigated this by varying the primes and targets. Using targets which are as¬
sociates of the prime, such as sea and liqueur for the prime port, in a context
such as:
(3.27) The man had to be at the port at five o'clock for a very important meeting.
which was biased towards the dominant sense but did not prime it, no selective
access effects were observed: lexical decisions with sea and liqueur were faster
than control hand. Likewise, using the same biasing, but non-constraining con¬
text, but with targets describing characteristic aspects of the prime's senses, no
selective effect was observed: lexical decisions on red, safe were faster than the
control hand. Finally, when associate primes were presented after constraining
contexts such as (3.25), selective access was obtained: decisions on sea were faster
than those on liqueur or hand.
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In sum, the results of these experiments reinforce the results of Seidenberg et
al. (1982) and support a view of lexical access in which both context and domi¬
nance play a role in selecting the appropriate sense of expression. This view also
provides an explanation of the discrepancy with results, such as those of Swinney
and Onifer (1981), which failed to find these selective effects. Furthermore, these
results provide empirical support for our claim that discourse context can affect
lexical as well as linguistic conceptual structure: in cases where the discourse
context is sufficiently specific, the contextually appropriate sense can be selected
from lexical conceptual structure; and in cases where it is not sufficiently specific,
the contextually appropriate sense is selected from linguistic structure.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed empirical evidence which provides an insight
into the nature and structure of conceptual descriptions in categorization and
lexical access processes. This evidence supports our claim that discourse con¬
text can affect lexical as well as linguistic conceptual structure. In the case of
expressions with multiple senses described in their lexical conceptual structure,
a context which is sufficiently specific to discriminate between these senses can
lead to the selection of the contextually appropriate sense, and the discarding of
inappropriate senses prior to integration with a model of discourse (cf. Johnson-
Laird 1987). Contexts which lack this degree of specificity can still play a role
in sense selection but only at a. later stage in the processing of conceptual struc¬
ture. As a result, this supports our claim that there is an interaction between the
linguistic processing and discourse processing modules: the discourse processing
module must provide the linguistic processing module with a. discourse context
which then provides contextual restrictions on lexical conceptual structure.
As for the nature of conceptual structures themselves, lexical access as well
as categorization emphasizes the importance of centrality and typicality. For not
only do concepts contain characteristic or typical features, but concepts, and lev-
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els of concepts, are also related by typicality. However, the prototype approach's
account of the ordering of concepts and levels of concepts in terms of typical fea¬
tures of concepts, is insufficient since the accessibility of concepts is also sensitive
to context. One way of dealing with this is to treat concept centrality as a 'de¬
fault' ordering which, unless overridden by a sufficiently specific context, such as
contextual information about the culture perspective, goals or current discourse
model, determines the accessibility of concepts. Such a treatment is compatible
with organizing concepts in terms of the subset relations as we observed in the
classical approach. In other words, concepts can be internally and externally or¬
ganized by necessary relations, such as the subset relation between concepts, and
typicality relations, such as the typicality relation between a concept and one of
its features. However, if we are to develop this approach further, then two issues
must be addressed. The first is the nature of the relation between levels of con¬
ceptual structure. For example, an expression like fruit in John ate the fruit has
a lexical conceptual structure which is related to a linguistic conceptual structure
in the linguistic processing module and then to a discourse conceptual structure
in the discourse processing module. What then is the nature of the relationship
between each of these conceptual levels? The second issue concerns the neces¬
sity and typicality relations themselves. For while the empirical evidence in this
chapter provides evidence for typicality relations, it does not provide evidence
for necessary relations. What motivation is there for necessary relations? Once
we have addressed these issues in chapter 4, we can provide a characterization of





In chapter 3 we discussed empirical evidence which supported not only the need
for typicality relations in conceptual structure, but evidence which supported
our claims about the effects of context on conceptual structure. In terms of the
cognitive linguistic approach to language comprehension outlined in chapter 2,
discourse context can restrict lexical conceptual structures as well as linguistic
conceptual structures: the discourse processing module exports a discourse con¬
text to the linguistic processing module which can lead to the selection of the
contextually appropriate sense in lexical conceptual structures; and, within the
discourse module, the discourse context can lead to the selection of the contextu¬
ally appropriate sense in the linguistic conceptual structure. In this chapter we
shall develop this approach by addressing two related issues.
The first issue concerns the relationship between levels of conceptual struc¬
ture. In particular, we shall focus on the relationship between linguistic concep¬
tual structure and discourse conceptual structure — as we shall see in chapters 6
and 7, the relationship which holds between these levels also holds between lexi-
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cal and linguistic structures, thus giving a uniform relationship between levels of
conceptual structures. From the formal semantics point of view, the relationship
between these levels is one of interpretation within a model: the linguistic con¬
ceptual structure is a semantic representation for linguistic expressions and the
discourse conceptual structure is an interpretation of this representation within a
model of the world, or more specifically, a model of the discourse. Two principles
of the formal semantic approach are of particular interest: semantic represen¬
tations and interpretation are seen as independent levels of structure which are
systematically related by a correspondence relation; and many, but not all, formal
approaches subscribe to a realist theory of meaning, which makes a number of
claims about the relationship between meaning and the world. The cognitive lin¬
guistic approach primarily differs from the formal semantic approach with respect
to these principles: the realist theory is rejected; and semantic representations
and interpretations are treated as levels of conceptual structure related by ex¬
tension — discourse conceptual structure is an extension of linguistic conceptual
structure.
The second issue concerns the nature and structure of these conceptual rep¬
resentations. With an extensional relationship between linguistic and conceptual
structure, conceptual structures are treated as partial objects: i.e. semantic rep¬
resentations which are incomplete and which can become more complete through
the addition of new properties and relations. Linguistic conceptual representa¬
tions are extended into discourse conceptual representations within the discourse
processing module and this leads to them (potentially) becoming less partial rep¬
resentations. Furthermore, as we suggested in chapter 3, these conceptual rep¬
resentations are structured in terms of typicality and necessity relations. These
relations are motivated in terms of a. criteria! approach where criterial necessity
relations are characterized as weaker necessity relations than deductive necessity
relations.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 we describe the corre¬
spondence approach to semantic interpretation and briefly discuss the problems
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which arise from its realist foundations. In section 4.3 we develop the cogni¬
tive linguistic approach by discussing five key aspects: semantic interpretation,
or meaning, is bound to the information state of cognitive agents; this informa¬
tion state changes over time; in language comprehension, the information state
can be characterized as a cognitive agent's dynamic discourse model; linguistic
conceptual representations are characterized as dynamic partial objects which are
extended in discourse conceptual representations within the cognitive agent's dis¬
course model; and conceptual representations are structured in terms of criterial
necessity and typicality relations. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Interpretation as Correspondence
The correspondence approach to semantic interpretation is founded upon two
principles: a model-theoretic approach to interpretation; and a truth-conditional
approach to interpretation (cf. Dowty et al. 1981).
The model-theoretic approach characterizes interpretation using the resources
of mathematical logic such as set theory. A distinction is made between domains:
the logical form, or semantic representation, associated with expressions in nat¬
ural or formal languages; and a model which specifies the semantic value, or
interpretation, of the representation. These domains are ontologically indepen¬
dent: structure of semantic representations is defined in terms of predicates,
constants, variables and operators, such as conjunction and (logical) implication;
and structures in the model are defined in terms of a set of objects and rela¬
tions. These ontologies do not overlap: structures in these domains are defined
in different formal languages. While these domains are independent, they are
also systematically related by correspondence. The systematic correspondences
between structures in these domains are specified by a recursive interpretation
function. Interpretation is thus compositional: the interpretation of a whole
structure is a function of the interpretation of its parts (cf. Frege 1976). Fur¬
thermore, the meaning of the part in the logical form language is the conditions
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under which it corresponds to an object in the model. Depending upon the state
of the model these conditions may, or may not, be satisfied within the model.
The truth-conditional approach imposes further conditions upon the model-
theoretic approach (model theory itself is neutral). In particular, the conditions
under which a structure in logical form corresponds to a structure in the model
are treated as truth conditions and the model itself is treated as an instance of
the world. The interpretation of natural language expressions is thus based upon
semantic representations which specify conditions under which there is a true
correspondence between expressions and (a model of) the world:
To know the meaning of a (declarative) sentence is to know what the
world would have to be like for the sentence to be true. (Dowty et al.
1981: 4)
The semantic representation of a sentence, then, is the set of necessary and suffi¬
cient conditions under which it truly corresponds to relations between objects in
the model of the world. Its semantic interpretation can either be true or false: i.e.
either these conditions are satisfied in the model or they are not. Consider, for
example, the representation and interpretation of Bush welcomed Gorbachev illus¬
trated in figure 4-1. Its semantic representation is characterized as the structure
w(b,g)\ i.e. a two-place predicate w whose first argument is the constant b and
whose second argument is the constant g. The conditions on the interpretation of
this structure are as follows: the interpretation of b, i.e. |6|, must correspond to
the object Bush, just as the interpretation of g must correspond to Gorbachev,
and the interpretation of w must correspond to a relation between objects, where
the relation is characterized a set of paired objects << Bush, Gorbachev >>.
Consequently, the interpretation of the sentence Bush welcomed Gorbachev is
true with respect to the model M if and only if these conditions are satisfied in
the model: i.e. if the representation can be compositionally related by interpre¬
tation function F, here fwa, to the set of objects in the model A.





hi = << Bush, Gorbachev >>
M = < A, F >
A = < Bush, Gorbachev, Yeltsin >
1 if a £ A
fwa= I
0 otherwise
Figure 4—1: Model-theoretic interpretation of Bush welcomed Gorbachev
The correspondence approach originates with Tarski's extensional definition
of truth which states that a sentence S is true in model M under assignment
g (cf. Tarski 1944). As formal semantics developed, however, richer definitions
have emerged which provide more structure within the model and correspondingly
finer distinctions in the truth conditions. For example, approaches where truth is
evaluated against a 'world' which is one of the 'possible' worlds within the model,
arose from the introduction of modality: i.e. a sentence S is true at world W
in model M under assignment g (cf. Kripke 1965; Montague 1974). With other
definitions, truth is also evaluated against a subset of possible worlds accessible
from the world W in which the sentence is uttered (cf. Veltman 1983; Stalnaker
1984; Veltman 1985):
A sentence S is true at world W in model M under assignment g
given some contextual (information) structure I.
where / is a subset of worlds constituting the 'background' information available
at the world W. Other more recent definitions, such as those offered within
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Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), have taken into account the discourse
context of the sentence (cf. Kamp 1981; Heim 1982; Heim 1983; Groenendijk and
Stokhof 1989):
A piece of discourse D is true in a model M under a proper embedding
of (the representation of) D into M.
And finally, the definitions offered by Situation Semantics take both the structure
and partiality of objects into account (cf. Barwise and Perry 1983; Israel 1983;
Fenstad et al. 1987).
One advantage of the correspondence approach is its clarity: the analyses of
semantic phenomena it offers are couched in terms of a framework where semantic
representations, semantic interpretations, and the relationship between them are
clearly defined (cf. Dowty et al. 1981). Another advantage is that it can give
an account of what language is good for. Language can be used to communicate
about the world and thus guide our behaviour within it (cf. 'language success'
in Putnam 1978). Given that the systematic correspondence between semantic
representations of linguistic expressions and objects and relations in a model
of the world are satisfied, information about the world can be communicated
and this information can guide the behaviour of cognitive agents. If one agent
utters the sentence there is a dangerous dog in the next room, for example, then
another agent could interpret this with respect to their model of the world and this
information could lead to her running away or making sure the door is securely
closed.
The correspondence approach, however, is problematic for a cognitive linguis¬
tics approach in that it is not a cognitive approach to semantic interpretation:
i.e. neither semantic representations nor their interpretation in a model of the
world have anything to do with cognitive representations. This raises the ques¬
tion of whether the correspondence approach could be part of cognitive approach
to language comprehension (cf. Partee 1978). In particular, are the semantic
representations associated with linguistic expressions, and their interpretation in
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a model of the world, available to us as cognitive agents? If they are not, then
the utility of model-theoretic approach is that of a meta-constraint upon formal
semantic description rather than part of cognitive agent's interpretative compe¬
tence: satisfaction within a model does not reflect our judgment as to whether or
not a description associated with a sentence is true, but whether the description
of that judgment is formally correct (cf. Putnam 1988).
In the first place, semantic representations, or intensions, in the correspon¬
dence approach are not available to us in the sense of grasping the content of an
expression:
The model-theoretic intension of a word has in principle nothing what¬
soever to do with what goes on inside a person's head when he uses
that word. (Dowty 1979: 375; original emphasis)
Furthermore, even if they were cognitive representations, they would be beyond
the capacities of individual cognitive agents. For they describe the outer limits
on meaning of expressions rather than the actual meaning available to a partic¬
ular agent. Consider, for example, the treatment of natural kind terms such as
lion and gold. The intension of gold specifies not what a listener grasps during
comprehension or production, but rather all the relevant connections between a
word and its semantic interpretation:
How to recognize its extensions, all semantic entailments and true
empirical facts involving the word. (Dowty 1979: 385).
With natural kind terms such 'connections', it is assumed, are only known to a few
experts within the linguistic community: the majority of language users do not
have access to these semantic representations, the}' do not know the conditions
under which this expression is true or false. As a result, it seems difficult to
treat these semantic representations as conceptual representation in the cognitive
linguistic approach.
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In the second place, given that interpretation is determined within a model of
the world, it seems possible that this model is available to cognitive agents. Such
a model, however, is not available to us in the sense of 'grasping' the content of
a sentence (cf. Dowty et al. 1981; Kamp 1981; Rott 1990):
Such a model is not in any sense a representation, mental or otherwise,
of the content of the sentence.
Another way in which this model could be available to cognitive agents is as
a 'mental' model of the world: i.e. the model in the correspondence approach
is our model of the world. Satisfaction within the mental model would then
mirror the judgment as to whether a certain state of affairs holds in the world.
The problem, however, is that many instances of the correspondence approach
adopt a realist approach to the relationship between meaning and the world. For
example, Landman (1985: 35) treats Situation Semantics as a realist theory of
meaning:
The most striking difference between the semantic theory embodied
in Jon Barwise and John Perry's Situations and Attitudes and most
variants of intensional semantics is the strict realism it supports.
Realism is a philosophical doctrine founded upon the following principles:
Bivalence all descriptions of the world are either true or false.
Logical Independence the truth (or falsity) of a description obtains indepen¬
dently of any individual.
Metaphysical Independence the world is determinately constituted indepen¬
dent of any experience we may-have of it.
However, if we were to adopt a. realist approach towards the relationship between
meaning and the world, then we would face a number of problems.
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In the first place, the principle of bivalence has been questioned on the grounds
that there are situations in which cognitive agents can be unsure as to whether a
description of the world is true or false. For example, while we may be sure that
London is the capital of England, we may be unsure whether the statement Ed¬
inburgh is more beautiful than London is true or not. A second problem concerns
logical independence: i.e. truth is absolute and not relative to the information or
evidence of a cognitive agent. For example, the comparison between Edinburgh
and London is true or false independent of the evidence which any cognitive agent
can be adduced. No matter how much evidence, say in the form of surveys, is
provided to show that the description is 'true', the truth or falsity of the state¬
ment is unaffected. The third problem is that realism claims the structure of
the world obtains independently of our perceptions of it. The world, apparently,
comes to us with structure, i.e. objects and relations, over which we have no
control. However, some semanticians have denied that we can directly refer to
any objects in this world (cf. Landman 1986): we do not actually know which
real world objects and relations our language refers to since we do not interact
with the world directly— it is always mediated through our experience. Further¬
more, it is arguable that our experience of the world and the world itself cannot
be separated:
It can be misleading ... to speak of direct physical experience as
though there were some core of immediate experience which we then
'interpret' in terms of our conceptual system. (Lakoff and Johnson
1980: 57)
Rather our experience of the world is "a product of the kind of being we are
and the way we interact with our physical and cultural environments" (Lakoff
and Johnson 1980: 119). Since part of this interpretation is cultural, it would
be appropriate to say "we experience our 'world' in such a way that our culture
is already present in the very experience itself (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 57).
Given these considerations, it seems that the world realism speaks of is not the
world available to cognitive agents. We only have access to an interpretation of
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the world — the real world, whose existence is not denied, is always beyond our
ken.
4.3 Interpretation as Extension
If the correspondence approach to interpretation is rejected as inappropriate to
a cognitive linguistic approach to language comprehension, then how is the re¬
lation between the semantic representation of a linguistic expression and its in¬
terpretation characterized? The relationship can be characterized in terms of an
extensional relationship: a semantic interpretation is an extension of a semantic
representation. Crucial to this approach is that semantic representations and in¬
terpretations share the same ontology: they are structures composed of elements
drawn from the same vocabulary, rather than different vocabularies. Extension
itself is characterized in terms of the relationship between partial objects: a se¬
mantic representation is a partial object which can become less partial through
interpretation. Before we provide a more formal characterization of the exten¬
sion of partial objects in section 4.3.1, we need to address the issue of how this
approach to interpretation differs from the correspondence approach.
The most obvious difference is that this approach is cognitive. Semantic
representations and interpretations are cognitive structures:
• meaning is first and foremost that which is grasped by a cognitive agent
who comprehends or produces an utterance.
• interpretation of an utterance is determined within a cognitive agent's
model of the world.
While this does not preclude a truth-conditional approach to interpretation, the
truth of interpretation is not directly germane to a cognitive linguistic approach.
Furthermore, although interpretation takes place within a 'model of the world',
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the approach is not model-theoretic: the focus is on the conceptual representa¬
tions, processes and the effects on context rather than providing a model theory
for their interpretation. This model of the world differs from models in the cor¬
respondence approach in three ways: the model specifies information available to
the cognitive agent; the model is dynamic in that this information changes over
time; and the model specifies information available in a discourse.
Many model-theoretic approaches have now adopted the epistemic rather than
logical notion of interpretation (cf. Landman 1986; Morreau 1990; Veltman 1990).
What is foundational to these approaches is the centrality of the information
state in the process of interpretation: the information state provides evidence
upon which a cognitive agent can determine whether or not an utterance is true
or false. Such approaches, however, are not committed to the cognitive reality
of the information state (cf. Rott 1990). In Veltman's approach, for example,
the information state is treated a set of possible worlds compatible with all an
epistemic cognitive agent 'knows' or what the}' accept as true. In the cognitive
linguistic approach, we are committed to the cognitive reality of the information
state: it describes part of the world against which a individual cognitive agent
interprets linguistic expressions.
The implication of the cognitive notion of information state is that mean¬
ing and interpretation are 'mind-bound': i.e. the information state describing
objects and relations in the world differs in structure and content between each
and every individual. For example, my representation of Edinburgh may differ
in structure and content from your representation; I may have a more detailed,
perhaps contradictory, information about the geographic layout of the city com¬
pared with yours. Such a position has been resisted within formal semantics
since Frege's criticisms of psychologism and idealism (cf. Frege 1976). Formal
semantic frameworks which have adopted the epistemic position consequently
treat information states, and the objects and relations which populate them, as
more abstract representations. One position, the intersubjectivist position, treats
information states as information about the world which is shared by cognitive
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agents. In one version of this, information states are private to cognitive agents,
but they are assumed to be related by a counterpart relation; for example, we
have our own private representations for Edinburgh, but assume there is a cor¬
responding representation in the information states of other cognitive agents (cf.
Zeevat 1985). Another version of this position again holds that our information
states are private, but that there is a structural isomorphism between our private
representations and another abstract, non-private structure (cf. Landman 1986:
107-108). In particular, our private representations of Edinburgh are subjective
tokens of the same intersubjective type of representation. With the intersubjective
position, meaning is neither in the world nor in cognitive agents, but is shared by
different cognitive agents in the sense that there is a underlying common pattern
in their information states.
The problem with the intersubjective position is that by assuming a common
thread in our information states it leaves no room for mis-understanding between
cognitive agents. Although our private representations of Edinburgh may differ
in detail, they still contain a core of shared information. Such an assumption,
however, becomes problematic in cases where cognitive agents interpret utter¬
ances in fundamentally different ways. Consider the following example of 'repair'
taken from Cawsey (1991) (cf. Levinson 1983):
(4.1) A: I think John's got his oral tomorrow.
B: Oh, is he going down to Cambridge?
A: No, I mean John Smith.
In (4.1), the representations associated with John differ in the information states
of A and B: B's representation is of an individual called John who did his PhD
at Cambridge, whereas A's representation is of another individual with the same
name who did not do his PhD at Cambridge. Until this misunderstanding is
repaired in the third turn, their information states are incompatible — their
information states contain different representations for John. Thus A and B are
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talking about different individuals1. If this is the case, then it seems difficult to
maintain that information states are 'shared' in the intersubjective sense.
We maintain that information states are private and mind-bound as are repre¬
sentations and relations within them. Adopting this position, of course, raises the
problem of how we know about the information states of other cognitive agents:
if my information state and your information state are private to us, then how
can I know what you mean? The answer is that while our information states
are private, we use language to express these states and other cognitive agents
interpret these expressions against their own information states. For example,
the first turn of A in (4.1) will be interpreted against the information state of
B so that a structure representing John's got his oral tomorrow is created. This
structure may then by augmented by inferences which provide a full name for
John, say John Brown, and a location for the oral examination, say Cambridge.
When B expresses part of this information state to A in the second turn of the
dialogue, A attempts to interpret the question against her own information state.
However, A's information state has a structure where it is John Smith who has
the oral and the location is, say Edinburgh not Cambridge. Since this inter¬
pretation is inconsistent with her information state, A attempts to repair it by
clarifying which John is being discussed. In this way, their interpretations can
be incompatible with the current information state of the other cognitive agent,
although they not aware that they are incompatible until the difference is made
public. This does not imply that we assume other cognitive agents have the same
information states as ourselves: only that the difference is irrelevant until we have
reason to think there is such a difference (cf. Garrod and Anderson 1987). This
notion of epistemic information state, although irreducibly mentalist, recognizes
1 Simon Garrod (p.c.) also observed this phenomena when subjects were discussing
individuals at parties which they thought the other subjects had attended (they had
not).
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that representations and relations in our information state must be expressed,
must be made public, in order to communicate meaning.
Another difference with traditional model-theoretic approaches is that infor¬
mation states are dynamic rather than static. The correspondence approach is
static in the sense that the representation of an utterance is related to fixed and
eternal structures, namely the objects and relations in the model. Accordingly,
interpretation can be seen as validation: a representation is truthful if and only
if it can be validated against the model (cf. Putnam 1988). There is no sense it
which interpretation changes the model. With a dynamic information state, on
the other hand, interpretation can result in a change to the information state.
In the dialogue in (4.1), B's information state may not contain a structure cor¬
responding to I think John's got his oral tomorrow.. Once B has interpreted
the utterance against her current information state, the structure is added to,
or integrated with, this information state to yield a new information state with
this structure. In this way, a cognitive agent's information state can change over
time. This dynamic notion of meaning and interpretation has been developed in
semantic frameworks such as DRT and update semantics, as the following quote
from Veltman illustrates:
You know the meaning of a sentence when you know the change it
brings about in the information state of anyone who wants to incor¬
porate the piece of news conveyed by it. (Veltman 1990: 28-29)
Such a notion derives, in part, from computer science where the interpretation of
a program can be given in terms of operations over machine states. Where they
differ is that the notion of dynamic semantics is declarative rather than procedu¬
ral: the change an utterance brings about in the information state is described
in terms of relations between two information states, the current information
state and the new information state, rather than in terms of an ordered set of
operations (cf. Wedekind 1990).
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Finally, interpretation in the cognitive linguistic approach takes place with an
information state for a discourse rather than simply a sentence: the information
state can be seen as a cognitive model of the discourse. Traditional model-
theoretic approaches, such as Montague's, were based upon interpretation of iso¬
lated sentences. Each part of a sentence was assigned a representation which was
recursively composed into a representation for the whole sentence. The sentence
was then assigned an interpretation within the model. No account was taken of
how the interpretation of the current sentence was affected by the interpretation
of preceding sentences. However, with the advent of dynamic approaches such
as DRT and update semantics, the context of interpretation moved beyond the
sentence: a sentence was interpreted within a current information state which
included the interpretation of preceding sentences. One of the advantages of such
a move is that formal semantics could provide formal descriptions of not just
sub-sentential anaphora but also super-sentential anaphora of the sort illustrated
in (4.2):
(4.2) George bought a car. He drives it to work.






Figure 4-2: A DRT representation of George bought a car. He drives it to work.
as the pronouns he and it are interpreted relative to the dynamic discourse con¬
text. The discourse context is represented as discourse representations structures
(DRSs) which are incrementally constructed according to the linear ordering of
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the corresponding sentences2. Each DRS consists of two components: a set of
discourse referents; and a set of conditions upon the discourse referents. In fig¬
ure 4-2, the top box contains the discourse referents and the lower box their
conditions. The referent of each noun phrase in (4.2) are represented as a dis¬
course referent in figure 4-2 (given in bold typeface): g is the discourse referent
referring to an individual called George; and c is a member of the set of cars.
The first three conditions are established with the first sentence; the last one with
the second sentence. The reason why there are only two discourse referents, but
four noun phrases, is that anaphoric noun phrases access discourse referents given
in preceding DRSs. In other words, rather than interpret the second sentence in
isolation from the first part of the discourse, it is interpreted in the context of
the first, thereby allowing the anaphoric relations to be (implicitly) represented.
Where the cognitive linguistic approach differs from DRT is in the represen¬
tation of content. If we take the DRS conditions as descriptions of the content of
the associated expressions, something which Kamp does not do, then it should
be apparent that they only provide a coarse-grain description of the semantics
of the corresponding utterance. They do not, for example, specify the nature of
the semantic relations between 'buyer' and 'bought' in the verb bought let alone
any conditions upon the nature of the objects which can be so related. There
is, for example, no condition upon 'buyer' that it is sentient; in DRT cabbages
are capable of buying cars! This is not to deny that DRT could not be aug¬
mented to include these conditions, only that it does not currently do so3. Other
formal frameworks, such as Situation Semantics, are quite capable of specifying
such conditions. Specifying such conditions is necessary for the cognitive linguis-
Construction is non-monotonic in DRT. Other dynamic approaches, such as dy¬
namic predicate logic have adopted a monotonic approaches to construction (cf. Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof 1989). We return to the issue of monotonicity in section 5.7.
3Recent, unpublished work by Kamp has adopted this approach (cf. Kamp and
Partee 1989).
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tic approach on two grounds. Firstly, it is these conditions which differentiate
conceptual representations. Secondly, if the construction of conceptual structure
can, as we have claimed, be affected by context, including the discourse context,
then such distinctions must be explicit so that the context can play a role in
determining which sense is appropriate with the current discourse context.
In sum, the cognitive linguistic approach to interpretation differs from tra¬
ditional formal semantic approaches in that interpretation takes place against
an information state which is available to a cognitive agent and which changes
through the integration of detailed descriptions of objects and relations linguisti¬
cally referenced in the discourse. We shall term this information state a discourse
model. Furthermore, linguistic conceptual structures and discourse conceptual
structures are characterized in terms of the same basic elements and relations.
What differentiates them is that discourse conceptual structures are integrated
into the discourse model — linguistic conceptual structures are not part of this
model. Finally, the relationship between these levels of conceptual structure is
characterized in terms of the extension of partial structures: a linguistic concep¬
tual structure is a partial structure which is extended into a partial discourse
structure through interpretation against a discourse model.
4.3.1 Extending Conceptual Structures
Conceptual structures are characterized as partial objects which are related through
extension: a lexical conceptual structure is extended into a linguistic concep¬
tual structure which, in turn, is extended into a discourse conceptual structure.
This idea of relating structures through extension arises from treating concep¬
tual structures as partial structures. In recent years there has been a growing
interest with partiality in semantics (cf. Barwise and Perry 1983; Benthem 1985;
Landman 1986). There are two parts to this development: an ontological shift
from total to partial objects in the model; and a linguistic shift from total to
partial interpretations of representations. Here we focus on partial objects, their
ordering in terms of subsumption and their extension through unification.
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The distinction between partial and total objects concerns the 'specificity'
of objects. Total objects are objects which are totally specific relative to the
ontology of the system; partial objects are underspecified objects. More formally,
an object 0 is a total object if for every property p defined within the ontology,
then either p(0) or ->p(0). In other words, a total object is an object whose
properties are all specified. A partial object, on the other hand, is an object
whose properties are underspecified: i.e. only some properties of the object are
specified.
Unlike total objects, partial objects can be ordered in terms of specificity: i.e.
one object can be more specific than some other object. For example, given a set
of (compatible) properties {p1, p2, p3} and a set of objects {01, 02} where 01 is
defined as the set of properties {pa,p2} and 02 is defined as the set {p1 ,p2,p3},
then 02 is 'less partial than' 01 because the set of properties which defined 01 is
a subset of the properties which define 02. Conversely, 02 is 'more partial than'
01. We shall use the notion of subsumption to refer to partial ordering between
object:
0A subsumes 0s, notated as 0A C 0s, iff 0A is at least as specific
as, if not more specific than, 0B: i.e. the set of properties defining 0A
is identical to the set of properties defining 0B or they are a subset
of the properties defining 0B.
Objects which can be ordered by subsumption, can also be extended into
another (partial) object by means of unification:
0A unifies with 0B, notated as 0AU0B1 iff the result of unification is
the least informative object subsumed by 0A and 0B: i.e. two objects
can unify if they have compatible properties and all their properties
— no more, no less — are properties of the object which results from
their unification.
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For example, if there is an object O3 with the properties {p4,p5}, O3 could unify
with O2 if the properties of O2 and O3 were compatible and the object which
results from their unification had the properties {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5}.
There are two different notions of extension, however, depending upon whether
the partial objects are treated as static or dynamic partial objects. Fred Landman
nicely illustrates this difference with an analogy between extension and watching
movies:
A movie is a dynamic entity which gains its sense by the things hap¬
pening in it. We can stop the movie at certain points, freeze the
action at a certain scene; that can even help us understand the movie
better. But taking a classical view on the movie, is taking an external
view on it, regard it as an ordered set of distinct images. Doing that
might serve some purposes, but we cannot understand the meaning
of the movie in that way, because its meaning lies in the action, in
the things that are happening in it. It is impossible to understand a
movie, if while watching it, you seriously regard it as a long sequence
of distinct pictures. It is only by ignoring that aspect of the movie, by
stepping in it, that is, by taking an internal view, that we can make
sense of it. (Landman 1986: 125)
In particular, the extension of static objects is the replacement of two partial
objects by another, distinct object: static extension gives rise to a distinct object.
With dynamic objects, on the other hand, extension is the growth of two partial
objects into one and the same partial object: dynamic extension results in the
same object.
This distinction emerges from different notions of identity. The extension of
static objects is based upon a notion of identity where objects are distinguishable
from all other objects: they are only identical with themselves. Extension then
involves the replacement of objects with another object, which cannot be identical
to the original objects. Extension of dynamic objects, however, is based upon an
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alternative notion of identity, namely the Identity of Indiscernables (cf. Landman
1986: 34):
Identity of Indiscernables
P and Q are identical if they are indiscernable with respect to incom¬
patibility.
Incompatibility is defined as follows:
Incompatibility
Two facts are incompatible if one carries information that the world
is organized in a different way from what it is according to the other.
In other words, objects can only be identical if they do not have incompatible
properties. Furthermore, identity is based upon discernibility: i.e. whether two
objects can be distinguished on the basis of an information state. Discernibility
and (weak) indiscernibility are defined below (cf. Landman 1986: 126):
Discernability
d\ is discernable from d2 on the basis of information state s iff there
is a property P such that:
either P(d\) £ s while P{d2) is incompatible with some fact / £ s or
or P(d2) £ s while P(d\) is incompatible with some fact / £ s.
Indiscernability
di and d2 are indiscernable on the basis of s iff they are not discernable
on the basis of s.
Two partial objects can grow into one and the same object if they are not discern¬
able on the basis of incompatible properties in the information state. Dynamic
partial objects can be (successively) extended, but will remain the same object
so long as they are not extended into an object incompatible with the object at
previous stages of extension.
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Conceptual structures are characterized as dynamic partial objects in the cog¬
nitive linguistic approach. Conceptual structures are defined for some, but not
all, properties in the ontology and, as partial objects, can be ordered in terms of
subsumption. Furthermore, conceptual structures can be extended through unifi¬
cation with other partial objects. In the case of a linguistic conceptual structure,
it is unified with a structure in the current discourse model so as to yield a
discourse conceptual structure for the linguistic expression. Since these struc¬
tures are dynamic partial objects, different linguistic expressions can reference
the same discourse conceptual structure in the discourse model: i.e. different lin¬
guistic conceptual structures can be extended into the same discourse conceptual
structure in a cognitive agent's discourse model.
4.3.2 Necessary and Typical Properties
So far in this chapter we have developed the cognitive linguistic approach by
characterizing conceptual structures as dynamic, partial objects which can be
ordered in terms of subsumption and extended through unification. The relation¬
ship between linguistic conceptual structures and discourse conceptual structures
is characterized in terms of the extension of linguistic conceptual structures into
discourse conceptual structures within the discourse model of the cognitive agent.
In chapter 3, we discussed the classical approach to concepts and suggested that
the classical approach can be augmented with typicality relations: conceptual lev¬
els, subordinate concepts of a superordinate concept, and properties of concepts
can be related by typicality relations. Furthermore, conceptual levels, concepts
and properties are also related by necessity relations. For example, subordinate
concepts are related by a necessary subset, or subsumption, relation to their su¬
perordinate concepts: subordinate concepts such as chair and table must be at
least, if not more, specific concepts than the superordinate concept furniture. In
addition, the properties of these concepts are related by necessity and typicality
relations; for example, table has the necessary property of being supported by
legs and the typical property of being made of wood.
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These relations, however, do not seem to hold independent of background
knowledge which we bring to bear in interpreting linguistic expressions: there
seems to be a dependence between necessary and typical properties defined for
conceptual structures and the background knowledge which we use in interpreting
them within a discourse model. With chair, for example, the necessary property
of being supported by legs depends upon a particular theory of chairs: our theory
of chairs defines certain necessary and typical properties of the concept chairs.
Crucially, if this background knowledge changes, then so does the concept of
chair. For example, although a chair is typically made of wood, this is not
a property of metal chair: the background knowledge that chairs are typically
made of wood is 'overridden' by the asserting that they are made of metal and
its conceptual structure in the discourse model has the 'material' property metal
rather than wood to reflect this. We shall further develop the notion of theories
and their role in interpretation in chapter 5 and focus in this section on motivating
necessary and typicality relations in terms of criterial and symptomic evidence
relations, respectively.
The term 'criterion' derives from Wittgenstein's later philosophical writing
(cf. Wittgenstein 1953). Wittgenstein himself rarely made it entirely clear what
he meant by criterion (there is no 'a criterion may be defined as ...') since he saw
his remarks as 'a number of sketches of landscapes ... where ... the same or almost
the same points were being approached afresh from different directions, and new
sketches were made' (Wittgenstein 1953: pvii). In the main, the interpretation
offered here is heavily reliant on Lycan's interpretation of the role of criterion in
descriptive language use (cf. Lycan 1971).
Commentators have differed over how to interpret the form of a criterion:
some have seen it as an object, others as a relation. With a criterion as an
object, one object is a criterion for another object, where 'object' ranges over
linguistic expressions, the use of such expressions, properties, entities and events.
This may be expressed as 'x is a criterion for y, where x and y range over such
objects' (cf. Lycan 1971: 109). With a criterion as a relation, one object stands
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in a criterial relationship with another object. This may be expressed as 'x has a
criterial relation with y' (cf. McGinn 1980; Baker 1977; Baker and Hacker 1984;
Grayling 1985). It would appear, however, that there is no substantial difference
between these two interpretations. For when Wittgenstein talks about a criterion
as an object it is clear that a criterion is always a criterion for something and
this implies that such an object must always hold a relationship with something
else — hence we can talk about the relation itself as the criterial relation.
The equivalence of these interpretations is reinforced by each having the same
function in the theory of descriptive language use. For criteria fulfill two roles:
they are a privileged type of evidence; and this evidence can used to justify
a claim, or interpretation, made by a cognitive agent (cf. Wittgenstein 1953;
Wellman 1967; Lycan 1971). Here we focus on the types of evidence relations
since this provides us with motivation for necessity and typicality relations in
conceptual structure.
The evidential status of criterion can be simply described as follows: to say x
is a criterion for y is 'to say at least that, whenever I know that x is instantiated
(that something of the type x occurs or obtains), I am to that extent warranted
in supposing that y is instantiated as well' (cf. Lycan 1971: 109). However, the
same general statement could be made of two other evidence relations, namely
deductive and inductive evidence relations. These relations differ with respect
to the situations, or parts of situations, in which the relation holds. When x is
in a deductive relation with y, then if x is present in any situation, so too must
y. Conversely, if y is not present in some situation, then x cannot be present
either. Thus there is no situation, apart from the absurd situation, in which one
is not present without the other. This relation is closely related to two inference
rules, modus ponens and modus tollens. With modus ponens, or affirming the
antecedent, a relation R is deductive iff y is present in all situations in which x
is present:
modus ponens
VxVy(i?(x, y) A x —> y)
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With modus tollens, or denying the consequent, R is deductive iff x is absent in
all situations in which y is absent:
modus tollens
VxVy(/?(x, y) A ->x —► ->y)
Accordingly, with the deductive evidential relation, the status of x as evidence
for y is maximumly certain since no matter what the situation, if x exists, then
so must y. The inductive evidence relation, on the other hand, involves not
necessity but possibility: if x is present, then y may be present. Conversely, if
y is absent, then x may be absent. Thus y does not necessarily accompany x in
every situation and x does not logically entail y: in some situations x may be
present, yet y absent.
The criterial evidence relation has a status intermediate between deductive
necessity and inductive necessity relations: it is a stronger type of evidence rela¬
tion than the inductive relation, but a weaker type than the deductive relation.
Criterial relations attain this intermediate status because criterial necessity is
intimately related to the situation; in particular, a cognitive agent's background
knowledge about part of the situation. Consequently, the certainty of a criterial
necessity relation is related to this background knowledge. This contrasts with
the deductive evidence relation where no matter what the situation, x is evidence
for y: deductive necessity gives us certain evidence independent of our knowledge
about the situation. With inductive evidence, of course, there can be no certainty
at all: no matter what the situation, if x is present, y may, or may not, be present.
Five properties of the criterial relations underpin their intermediate status:
context-dependence, normativeness, convention, public observability and multi¬
plicity. Of these, the first three directly support its difference with deductive and
inductive evidence relations.
Firstly, criterial relations are context-dependent: x is only good evidence for
y in certain contexts (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: 584). Consequently, the relation
between a concept and a necessary property only holds when we have the appro-
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priate background knowledge about a situation. Deductive relations, however,
are context-independent: the necessity relation holds across all situations so that
x is always and everywhere good evidence for y. Inductive relations are also
context-independent, although the relation is simply one of possibility rather
than necessity.
Secondly, criterial relations are normative: x is good evidence for y in some
situation unless evidence has been produced to the contrary. As Chihara and
Fodor put it:
x is a criterion for y in situations of type s if the very meaning or
definition of y justify the claim that one can recognize, see detect or
determine the applicability of y on the basis of x in a normal situation
of type s. (Chihara and Fodor 1967: 181-182)
In 'normal' cases then, x is good evidence for y. However, there may be 'bizarre'
cases, where specific counterevidence has been adduced, and the relation no longer
holds. In other words, the status of x as evidence for y is revisable in ('bizarre')
circumstances which reveal alternative background knowledge about a situation
and this knowledge does not support the necessity relation between x and y. Con¬
trast this with the deductive evidence relation where the status of x as evidence
for y is not revisable. When counterevidence is adduced to a deductive evidence
relation in a deductive system, all axioms are undermined: maximum doubt is
the twin of maximum certainty.
An example of pain behaviour illustrates normative nature of criterial rela¬
tions as well as their revisibility. Suppose that you are walking along Princes'
Street in Edinburgh on a Saturday afternoon. You see someone, Albert, exhibit¬
ing pain behaviour; for example, he is rolling on the ground, emitting agonized
shrieks, holding his left leg and shouting 'Oh the pain, the pain!'. On the criterial
approach, the pain behaviour is criteria! evidence for an observer claiming that
Albert is in pain: the observer's background knowledge about the situation sup¬
ports a necessary relation between pain behaviour and the claim that the person
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displaying the pain is in pain. This is the normal case. But suppose someone, a
Sceptic perhaps, denies Albert is in pain. For this denial to be accepted, and so
the relation between pain behaviour and someone being in pain revised, he would
have to provide evidence that the case was bizarre: i.e. that the background
knowledge which the observer used in interpreting the situation is inappropriate
for this circumstance. For example, the observer's background knowledge may be
inappropriate because this event takes place during the Edinburgh Fringe Festi¬
val and Albert is an actor advertising a play. This would be a bizarre case: new
background knowledge about the situation has been revealed, knowledge which
no longer supports the status of pain behaviour as evidence for Albert being in
pain.
The example also illustrates how we, as cognitive agents, are not omniscient:
not all background knowledge about a situation is available to us when we inter¬
pret situations. We judge the status of Albert's pain behaviour as evidence of
pain on the basis of the actual background knowledge which we bring to bear in
interpreting the situation. In normal cases, this background knowledge and the
situation are not incompatible: i.e. the background situation does not support
properties of the situation which are incompatible with the actual situation. In
bizarre cases, on the other hand, further information about the situation — that
Albert is an actor advertising a play — is not compatible with our current back¬
ground knowledge and so the evidential status of pain behaviour must be revised
in light of this new information. Thus we may be forced, through incompatibil¬
ity, to revise our background knowledge about situations as further information
emerges.
Thirdly, criteria! relations are conventional: that x is necessarily good evi¬
dence for y is determined by convention. In particular, criterial necessity relations
are defined within our background knowledge about situations and this knowl¬
edge is part of our social or cultural knowledge (cf. Wittgenstein 1953). This
knowledge determines what information counts as necessarily good evidence for
us to make a claim: we have learnt within our culture to call x good evidence for
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y in certain contexts. Deductive evidence relations, however, are not determined
by conventional knowledge but by logical necessity.
The fourth property of criterial relations is that they are publicly observable:
i.e. given that x and y are in criterial relation for one cognitive agent, then this
relation must be available to other agents so that its evidential status can be
inspected and corroborated. Wittgenstein adopts this position on criteria as a
curative to what he sees as the 'illness' of adopting mental pictures or private
sensations as criteria. To take private sensations, for example, as criteria is
fallacious since the sensations of one individual are not available to other cognitive
agents and thus others cannot check them.
Wellman, however, argues that Wittgenstein is wrong about our ultimate cri¬
teria being publicly observable (cf. Wellman 1967: 165-168). While accepting the
need for criterial relations to be observable, he argues that only private sensations
can be observed. He bases this claim upon, for example, differences in agent's
powers of discrimination (e.g. colour blindness and loss of discrimination in taste
with age) and private experiences, such as dreams and hallucinations. The prob¬
lem with Wellman argument is that criteria are no longer open to corroboration:
an agent's own sensations, or memory, cannot corroborate the evidential status
of criteria since they themselves are the basis for asserting the relations and as
such do not offer an independent check on the appropriacy of the criteria.
Further, since we have already rejected the notion that cognitive agents have
access to the world independent of their interpretation of it, criteria must be cor¬
roborated in some other way. Rather we hold that criteria are publicly observ¬
able in the sense that we express in language our interpretation of, or information
about, situations and these can be corroborated by other people. This makes cor¬
roboration of criteria only intersubjective rather than subjective— as in the case
of private sensations, or objective — as in the case of the real world. It is inter¬
subjective because, although corroboration comes from another cognitive agent,
that agent is constrained to make an interpretation on the basis of the 'same'
background knowledge (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In this way then, the
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evidential status of criteria can be corroborated by another individual applying
the same background knowledge in interpretation. The case of Albert in Princes'
street illustrates the point. If I were to say that Albert's pain behaviour was good
evidence for claiming that he is in pain, then my claim could be corroborated by
another individual applying background knowledge which supported a necessary
relation between pain behaviour and the pain itself. This other individual could
corroborate my claim or deny it by, for example, arguing that Albert's behaviour
did not constitute pain behaviour or that I had made a misinterpretation of the
situation since I did not have the background knowledge that Albert is only an
actor faking pain.
The fifth and final property of criterial relations is multiplicity: there may
be several different xs in a criterial relation with any one y. y may be present
on the basis of the presence of different xs. Which criterion is relevant will
depend on background knowledge about the situation: x1 may be good evidence
for y in one situation, but x2 in another. In contrast, while deductive relations
may be multiple too, they cannot be dependent upon background knowledge
about the situation: a deductive relation must hold across all situations and so
cannot be evidence in one situation, but not evidence in another. Furthermore,
the relationship between these different criterial relations give rise to a 'family
resemblance' effect. Wittgenstein illustrates this with the notion of a game:
Games form a family the members of which have family likenesses.
Some of them have the same nose, others have the same eyebrows
and others again have the same way of walking; and these likenesses
overlap. (Wittgenstein 1953: 17)
Thus difference criteria ma)' be appropriate in different situations but there must
be a sufficient degree of similarity between the different criteria for the same
claim; if there is not a. sufficient degree of similarity, then the different criteria
cannot be good evidence for the same claim.
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Thus the criterial evidence relation differs from both deductive evidence re¬
lations and inductive evidence relations in terms of context-dependence, norma-
tiveness, convention, public observability and multiplicity. Necessary relations
in conceptual structures are based upon criterial evidence relations where these
relations are supported by conventional, publicly observable background knowl¬
edge which we use in interpreting a situation. The sort of certainty which criterial
necessary relations in background knowledge confer on interpretation has the ad¬
vantage that it is neither absolute, as with deductive relations, nor simply proba¬
ble, as with inductive relations. For with criterial necessity, we draw a boundary
around the information about a situation and assume that further information
will be compatible with our current interpretation; 'doubting has come to an end'
(cf. Wittgenstein 1953: 180). However, when information comes to light which
is incompatible with our current interpretation, then our interpretation is revised
by changing the background knowledge which leads to this interpretation.
Finally, typicality relations, like criterial relations, in conceptual structure are
also supported by background knowledge about a situation. Typicality relations
are symptomatic evidence relations which provide contingently, as opposed to
necessarily, good evidence for a claim. Since criterial evidence is necessarily
good evidence for y, this leads to the certainty of y in terms of the background
information about the situation; symptomatic evidence, on the other hand, is
contingently good evidence for y in terms of this background information and so
only leads to an increased probability of y. These relations also differ in directness:
while criteria provide direct evidence, symptoms only provide indirect evidence.
This leads to two ways in which a claim can be justified, as the following quote
illustrates:
To the question "How do you know that so-and-so is the case?", we
sometimes answer by giving 'criteria'and sometimes by giving 'symp¬
toms'. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a
particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case "why do you say
this man has got angina?" then the answer "I have found the bacillus
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so-and-so in his blood" gives us the criterion, or what we may call the
defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, "his
throat is inflamed", then this might give us a symptom of angina. ...
Then to say "A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him" is
a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of "angina".
But to say, "A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat"
is to make a hypothesis. (Wittgenstein 1953: 24-25)
If background knowledge about a situation supports typicality as well as necessary
relations, then this suggests another way in which interpretation can be revised.
Background knowledge may support a typical relation between a concept and
a property; for example, that actors typically fake behaviour. This relation is
supported by the situation unless there is evidence to the contrary. In some
situations, this evidence may be adduced; for example, although Albert is an
actor he really is in pain since he has just been mugged by 'casuals' (football
hooligans). As a result, our interpretation of the situation needs to be revised
in light of information which undermines a typicality relation supported by the
background situation.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have developed the cognitive linguistic approach to language
comprehension by discussing the nature of the relation between conceptual struc¬
tures and motivating necessary and typicality relations within these structures.
We rejected the characterization of the relation between linguistic conceptual
structures, or semantic representation, and discourse conceptual structures, or
semantic interpretation, as a correspondence between independent levels of struc¬
ture partly on the grounds that the approach is positively non-cognitive and
partly because of problems with realism to which some of these approaches sub¬
scribe. Instead, we developed an approach where the relationship is characterized
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in terms of the extension of dynamic, partial structures. In interpretation, lin¬
guistic conceptual structure is extended into a discourse conceptual structure
which then becomes part of a dynamic model of discourse available to cognitive
agents. Furthermore, we motivated necessary and typical relations within con¬
ceptual structures on the basis of criterial necessity and symptomic evidence rela¬
tions. The interpretation of linguistic expressions involves background knowledge
and this knowledge supports necessary and typical relations within and between
conceptual structures. One important aspect of this criterial motivation is that
interpretations are revisable: our interpretation of linguistic expressions needs to
be revised in light of further information incompatible with current background
knowledge. Consequently, the description of the discourse processing module
must provide an account of cases where linguistic interpretation is revised. As
we shall see, this description is based upon two aspects of interpretation high¬
lighted in this chapter: linguistic conceptual descriptions are extended into dis¬
course conceptual structures in a discourse model; and interpretation makes use





In this chapter we describe how a cognitive linguistic approach to language com¬
prehension characterizes semantic interpretation. According to the modular ar¬
chitecture discussed in section 2.3.2, our account of language comprehension is
divided between two modules. The linguistic processing module constructs a
linguistic structure for a phrasal expression from lexical structures associated
with lexical expressions. The conceptual part of the linguistic structure, i.e. the
linguistic conceptual structure, is then interpreted in the discourse processing
module so as to yield a discourse conceptual structure. As we discussed in sec¬
tion 4.3, the relationship between linguistic and discourse conceptual structure
is characterized in terms of extension: the linguistic conceptual structure is .ex¬
tended into a discourse conceptual structure in the cognitive agent's discourse
model. Furthermore, in motivating necessary and typicality relations in terms
of criteria! necessity and symptomatic evidence relations, we claimed that these
relations are supported by background knowledge, or theories, about the situa¬
tion described by the linguistic expressions. In the cognitive linguistic approach,
i
two processes are defined in the discourse processing module: an anchoring pro¬
cess which extends the linguistic conceptual structure into a conceptual struc-
143
Chapter 5. Discourse Processes 144
ture within the discourse model; and an elaboration process which extends the
conceptual structure in the discourse model through application of constraints
defined by a theory. That is, theories are defined for constraints, as discussed in
section 2.3.3, and these describe necessary and typicality relations between prop¬
erties of concepts. Consequently, the cognitive linguistic approach characterizes
the interpretation of linguistic expressions in two phases: a phase in which lin¬
guistic conceptual structures become anchored conceptual structures; and a phase
where these structures become elaborated conceptual structures. As we shall see,
not all cases of anchoring and elaboration involve a straightforward monotonic
extension of concepts: in some cases, there is a conflict between the properties of
the same concept in the discourse model.
This characterization of interpretation supports the relationship between con¬
ceptual structure and discourse context for which we provided empirical evidence
in chapter 3. In particular, the current discourse model is used to guide the
anchoring process: linguistic conceptual structures with multiple senses, or con¬
cepts, are interpreted so that only contextually appropriate concepts are anchored
and elaborated in the discourse model. In addition, a portion of the discourse
model, a discourse context, is exported to the linguistic processing module: this
context, as we shall see in chapter 7, is used to guide the combination process
such that the relevant senses of ambiguous and polysemous expressions can be
selected immediately. In this way, the approach can support both delayed and
immediate sense selection.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.2 we discuss a number of key
features of the approach, including its incrementality, its unitary ontology and
the consequences of an extensional relationship between conceptual structures. In
section 5.3, we describe the common ontology underlying conceptual structures
and theories. We then describe the conceptual structure and discourse process in
detail: in section 5.4 we describe the nature and structure of linguistic concep¬
tual structures; in section 5.5 the anchoring of linguistic conceptual structures
in the current discourse model; and in section 5.6 the elaboration of anchored
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descriptions through application of theory constraints. The two type of exten¬
sion, growth and correction, which emerge from this approach are discussed in
section 5.7 and a partial account of sense correction is offered. In section 5.8, we
exemplify this approach with cases of discourse level sense selection. Section 5.9
concludes the chapter.
5.2 Discourse Interpretation
In the cognitive linguistic approach, conceptual structures are related by ex¬
tension: linguistic conceptual structures are an extension of lexical conceptual
structures; anchored conceptual structures are an extension of linguistic concep¬
tual structures; and elaborated conceptual structures are an extension of anchored
conceptual structures. Since these conceptual structures are related by extension,
they share the same ontology: all levels of conceptual structures are described in
terms of the same set of properties and relations. These conceptual properties
and relations are defined by background knowledge, or theories, about concepts:
i.e. lexical, linguistic, anchored and elaborated conceptual structures are all
composed of properties and relations defined by theories about concepts. These
properties and relations of concepts are described in section 5.3. This approach
to semantic structures thus differs from approaches, such as the correspondence
approach described in section 4.2, which characterize semantic representations
and semantic interpretations in terms of disjoint sets of properties and relations.
Likewise, it differs from approaches, such as traditional psychological approaches
to concepts, where there is an ontological distinction between concepts and back¬
ground knowledge (cf. Miller 1978). Rather conceptual structures and theories
differ in the roles they play in language comprehension. While lexical and linguis¬
tic conceptual structures are directly associated with linguistic representations of
lexical and phrasal expressions, theories are not: they provide constraints on con¬
ceptual structures in the discourse model. For once a conceptual structure has
been anchored in the discourse model, a theory for it is sought: the theory is
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defined for constraints which may not only confirm properties of the anchored
concepts, but also add new properties and relations. These relations may re¬
late the concept to other new concepts, which require anchoring in the discourse
model, as well as concepts which are already anchored.
The extension of conceptual structures takes place incrementally rather than
in a batch. With a 'batched' approach, linguistic conceptual structures are only
exported to the discourse processing module at the end of a clause or sentence
(cf. Crain and Steedman 1985). For example, with a sentence like These happy
people grow their own vegetables, the linguistic process would combine concep¬
tual structures for each lexical expression into a linguistic conceptual structure
for the whole utterance and then, and only then, this structure is exported.
This approach tends to be adopted in frameworks based upon the correspon¬
dence approach to interpretation, such as Unification Categorial Grammar (see
section 6.3)1. With an 'incremental' approach, the linguistic conceptual struc¬
tures are interpreted as the linguistic structures are combined: i.e. the linguistic
structure for each word or phrase is exported to the discourse processing model
and this linguistic conceptual structure is anchored and elaborated in the dis¬
course model. If the order of combination follows the order of words, then the
conceptual representation of these happy people is anchored and elaborated prior
to its combination with grow. The interpretation of subsequent expressions such
as grow can then be affected by concepts in the discourse model arising from the
interpretation of expressions earlier in the sentence. In this way, interpretation of
an expression in a sentence can not only be affected by concepts in the discourse
model contributed by previous sentences, but also by concepts contributed within
the current sentence.
1The correspondence approach itself is not committed to batch interpretation: the
principle of compositionality ensures that every word and phrase can be assigned an
interpretation in the model (see section 4.2).
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Incremental extension can have three effects on conceptual structures: concep¬
tual structures in the discourse model can be more specific, coherent and stable
than linguistic conceptual structures.
Increased specificity arises from the nature of extension: a linguistic concep¬
tual structure subsumes a discourse conceptual structure. While the discourse
conceptual structure must contain the properties given in the linguistic concep¬
tual structure, new properties and relations can be added through anchoring and
elaboration in the discourse model. Consider, for example, the interpretation of
the two instances of ticket in (5.1):
(5.1) John bought a ticket to Paris. The ticket was blue.
The first sentence gives rise to a discourse model with a concept for bought re¬
lated by an 'agent' relation to the concept for John and by a 'theme' relation
to a concept for a ticket to Paris where the concept for ticket is related by a
'goal' relation to the concept for Paris. Once anchored, the conceptual struc¬
ture is elaborated by theories for each of these concepts. The concept for ticket
may be elaborated by a theory which creates additional concepts and relations.
These relations underpin both the internal coherence of the concept as well as
its external coherence. These relations include necessary, typical or co-variation
relations between concepts (cf. section 3.2.2). In particular, a 'journey' theory of
ticket may create a 'journey' concept which consists of two concepts: an 'arrive'
concept, itself consisting of relations to concepts for 'theme' (who is arriving on
the journey), 'place' (where they are arriving) and 'time' (when they are arriv¬
ing); and a similarly structured 'depart' concept. Furthermore, the theory may
establish relations between these concepts so that, for example, the 'goal' concept
instantiated by the concept for Paris is necessarily identified with the concept in
the 'place' role within the 'arrive' concept of the 'journey' concept — i.e. Paris
is the arrival location in a journey. In this way, the concept for ticket has become
more specific through elaboration. In the second place, a concept can become
more specific through anchoring to a concept already elaborated in the discourse
model. If, for example, the linguistic concept for ticket in the second sentence
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is anchored to the elaborated concept for ticket referenced in the first sentence,
then the concept will be extended through the addition of properties and rela¬
tions already defined for 'ticket': i.e. it will consist of a 'journey' concept, itself
consisting of a 'depart' and 'arrive' concepts, and so on.
Secondly, the extension of linguistic concepts can also give rise to increased
coherence, in particular increased discourse coherence. Discourse coherence con¬
cerns how discourse holds together in a meaningful or sensical way: i.e. how the
phrases and sentences form a meaningful whole rather than simply a collection
of isolated individual parts (cf. Kintsch and vanDijk 1978; vanDijk and Kintsch
1983; Myers et al. 1986: 6-8). One prominent approach to discourse coherence is
that it is determined by relations between sentences: i.e. parts of the sentential
representations are related and these relations give rise to coherent discourse.
For example, in the Kintsch and vanDijk (1978) model, propositional informa¬
tion is abstracted from the incoming text and connected to previous propositional
information in order to form a coherent discourse representation. One of the sim¬
plest ways in which propositions are linked is via explicit repetition of a noun
phrase as with (5.1): the first proposition, with bought as the predicate, is linked
to the second proposition, with is blue as the predicate, through repetition of
ticket. However in the cognitive linguistic approach, we adopt a more general
approach to discourse coherence: coherence can be established not only by ex¬
pressions which are anchored to explicit concepts in the discourse model, but
also implicit concepts (cf. Sanford and Garrod 1981). The distinction between
explicit and implicit concepts arises from the contrast between linguistic concep¬
tual structures and their corresponding theories: explicit concepts are concepts
in linguistic concept structure — i.e. they are referenced by linguistic expressions
— while implicit concepts are concepts introduced by theories. For example, in
(5.1), the elaborated concept of ticket is related to an implicit "colour' concept:
the theory defines a 'colour' role with a 'colour' concept whose specific colour
is not defined. When blue in the second sentence is interpreted, it is anchored
to this implicit concept in the discourse model, and elaboration by its theory
provides a specific value for the 'colour' property of the 'ticket' concept. Thus
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not only is conceptual structure for the second sentence linked to the conceptual
structure for the first via the explicit concept 'ticket', it is also linked by the
implicit concept 'colour'.
Finally, the extension of a linguistic conceptual structure into a discourse
conceptual structure may give rise to increased stability in the discourse model.
For the lexical conceptual structures for polysemous and ambiguous expressions
can consist of multiple concepts which vary in their relatedness (cf. Lakolf 1987).
For example mother is polysemous: it has specific senses, such as those expressed
in biological mother, nurture mother and genetic mother, and these senses can
be characterized as a lexical conceptual structure with a concept representing the
generic sense of mother and subordinate concepts representing its specific senses.
With an ambiguous expression like bat, however, its lexical conceptual structure
consists of two unrelated concepts for its 'animal-bat' and 'game-bat' senses: no
generic sense subsumes these senses in the lexical conceptual structure2.
These lexical conceptual structures may be preserved in the linguistic concep¬
tual structure for a phrasal expression. For example, the linguistic representation
for bat in I bought a bat will retain the concepts for both its 'animal-bat' and
'game-bat' senses if linguistic combination does not select between them (see sec¬
tion 7.2.2). When this linguistic conceptual structure is interpreted, each of these
concepts could be anchored and elaborated in the discourse model. For exam¬
ple, an anchored concept will be created for the 'game-bat' sense and a theory
associated with this concept may create properties which relate it to concepts in
the discourse, such as the implicit concept 'game' and the explicit concept 'buy'.
Such an interpretation, however, would be unstable since the same expression
references two alternative, virtual extensions of the same linguistic conceptual
2The lexical concept for each of these senses can, of course, subsume more specific
senses, as in cricket bat and guana bat. Thus the lexical conceptual structure for am¬
biguous expressions can included subsumed conceptual structures, as with polysemous
expressions.
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structure. Such instability can be resolved by only anchoring and elaborating the
most typical sense or maintaining the instability until further information which
resolves the instability turns up, as with (5.2):
(5.2) I bought a bat. It is called Harry and eats mice.
where the second sentence will lead to the 'game-bat' extension being discarded
and the 'animal-bat' extension being maintained as the contextually appropri¬
ate extension of bat. In some circumstances, interpretation can be immediately
stable: only one of a set of alternative concepts is anchored and elaborated in
the discourse model. This immediate increase in stability arises from one, but
not the other, concept in the linguistic conceptual structure being anchored to
an existing concept in the discourse model. For example, the first sentence in
(5.3):
(5.3) I was in the pet shop yesterday. I bought a bat.
acts as a context for the interpretation of bat. In particular, interpretation of pet
shop creates an implicit concept 'animal' and, given 'animal-bat' but not 'game-
bat' is subsumed by this concept, the 'animal-bat' concept is anchored to this
implicit concept. In this way, interpretation where an anchored concept in the
discourse model is related to one, but not the other, sense of polysemous and
ambiguous expressions can result in the selection of the contextually appropriate
senses and thereby confer stability upon the linguistic conceptual structure of the
expression.
From this brief discussion of the nature of interpretation and its effects on
linguistic conceptual structure, it should be apparent that interpretation is char¬
acterized in terms of three types of conceptual structure and two extensional
phases. In the first phase, linguistic conceptual structures are extended into an¬
chored conceptual structures in the discourse model by an anchoring process. In
the second phase, anchored conceptual structures are extended into elaborated
conceptual structures in the discourse model by an elaboration process which
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makes use of constraints in theories. As we will demonstrate in section 5.8, this
approach to interpretation can account for cases where the contextually appro¬
priate sense is selected after linguistic combination: i.e. where the linguistic
conceptual structure for a lexical expression contains multiple concepts and one
of these concepts is selected for anchoring and elaboration on account of its re¬
lationship with a concept in the current discourse model. Obviously, it cannot
account for cases where sense selection occurs within the linguistic processing
module since we have not yet described this module (see chapter 7). However,
if the linguistic process is going to be capable of selecting a contextually ap¬
propriate sense, rather than simply a linguistically appropriate sense, then the
linguistic processing module requires a discourse context: i.e. a set of concepts
anchored and elaborated in the discourse model which can restrict the lexical
access such that only contextually appropriate sense are contained in the linguis¬
tic conceptual structure. Consequently, while the linguistic processing module
incrementally exports a linguistic structure to the discourse processing module,
the discourse processing module incrementally exports to the linguistic process¬
ing module a discourse context. The interaction between linguistic and discourse
processing, as well as the phrases in the extension of conceptual structures, is
illustrated in figure 5-1.
5.3 Basic Ontology
In this section, we describe the ontology shared by concepts and theories: i.e.
they are constructed from the same, as opposed to disjoint, sets of properties.
As we shall see in more detail in section 5.6, concepts differ from theories in
that concepts do not contain constraints, only the result of applying constraints
and conversely, theories only specify constraints, not the result of applying the
constraints. We shall also see how different stages in the extension of conceptual
structure differ.
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Figure 5—1: Interaction between the linguistic and discourse processing modules
together with phases in conceptual extension
As discussed in chapter 4, concepts are characterized as partial objects: i.e.
objects which may be underspecified with respect to the properties defined in the
ontology of the system. Concepts are thus composed of one or more properties.
These properties are represented in terms of attribute values pairs: i.e. each
property has an attribute label and a value (cf. Shieber 1986; Pollard and Sag
1987; Johnson 1988; Wedekind 1990). Values may be atomic or complex: an
atomic value is a constant or variable; and a complex value consists of one or
more attribute value pairs.
The simplest approach to characterizing concepts is to treat each one as an
independent set of attribute value pairs. The disadvantages of this approach is
that it fails to express the relationships between different concepts and it fails
to capture generalizations about the properties of these concepts. For example,
as we observed in section 3.2.1, concepts can be related by a subset relation and
the properties defined for a. superordinate concept, such as furniture, are also de¬
fined for subordinate concepts, such as chair and table. One method of providing
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generalizations about concepts is to characterize them as templates or types (cf.
Shieber 1986). Such an approach is derived from sorted logics and strong data
typing in programming language theory. In the simplest approach, concepts can
be characterized as atomic types (cf. Smolka 1988). A set of atomic concept
types are defined as well as a partial ordering over these types, i.e. a subsump-
tion hierarchy with a top type and types which are subsumed by the top type.
Figure 5-2 shows part of an ontological hierarchy where, for example, the type
SENTIENT is subsumed by the type ANIMATE: i.e. SENTIENT is a more specific
type of concept than ANIMATE3. The problem with characterizing concepts as
top
Figure 5—2: A simple atomic type hierarchy
atomic types, however, is that they are unable to express relationships between
types of concepts and properties: i.e. that the type of a concept is related to its
properties. Accordingly, concepts are characterized as complex types (cf. Smolka
1989). The definition of a complex type involves the declaration of the relation
between types as well as between types and their properties. For example, with
complex types, not only can we state that the concept SENTIENT is a subtype of
the concept ANIMATE, but that it is also defined for the property cognitive. Fi¬
nally, concepts are characterized as closed types (cf. Smolka 1988): i.e. a concept
3The type of a concept is given in small capitals while its properties, including
attribute (or role) labels and atomic values, are given in sans serif.
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is only defined for properties in its definition — other properties are undefined for
the type. Whereas generalizations expressed with open type definitions have the
force of existential quantification, the generalizations in closed type declarations
have the force of universal quantification (cf. Moens et al. 1989).
Concepts in the cognitive linguistic approach are defined in (5.4) where 'A'
indicates conjunction of properties and indicates that the label is an abbrevi¬
ation for a set of properties:
(5.4) concept = id A type A mode properties* A core properties* A constraints
That is, a concept is defined as the conjunction of id, type, and constraints prop¬
erties together with a set of mode and core properties. We now consider each of
these in turn.
5.3.1 Id
The first property, id, specifies an index for the concept. The value of this property
can be a variable or a constant. Concepts which are not yet anchored in the
discourse model have a variable value for this property4. For example, a linguistic
structure may describe a concept of the type SENTIENT and its value for id will
be a variable. However, when this concept is anchored in the discourse model,
the value of id is given a constant value such as sentientl. Properties can then be
assigned to this anchored concept through elaboration by an appropriate theory.
In this way, concepts with constant values for their id property are pegs: they
indicate a place holder upon which properties of an concept are predicated in the
4Properties with variables as their values can be omitted from the concept unless
the variable is shared with another concept. For example, in John wants to buy a bat,
the concept for John and the concept in the agent role of buy are co-referential and so
share the same variable value.
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discourse model (cf. Landman 1986: 124). Concepts without a constant value for
id cannot be distinguished from any compatible concept in the discourse model;
when the id of a concept is instantiated, the concept is distinguishable from all
other concepts in the discourse model. In addition, when a concept in linguistic
conceptual structure is assigned the same constant value for id as specified for
a concept already anchored in the discourse model, these concepts are identical:
they have been dynamically extended into one and the same partial concept5.
The type property identifies the location of the concept within an inheritance
hierarchy. A representative portion of an inheritance hierarchy is given in fig¬



















Figure 5—3: A portion of an ontological hierarchy
5They are partial concepts since another concept later in the discourse may also be
anchored with the same id and add further properties.
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types of concept subsume more specific types and, conversely, types which are
subsumed by more general types inherit properties from them. Apart from the
root of the hierarchy, which defines mode properties, each type is defined for ei¬
ther atomic or complex core properties: atomic properties are characterized with
a value attribute; and complex properties are characterized with one or more role
attributes, where each role expresses a relation between the concept itself and
another concept in the hierarchy. In the hierarchy shown in figure 5-3, the root
type TOP is defined for two mode properties, polarity and definite. The TOP type
subsumes four general types of concept which in turn inherit these mode prop¬
erties: EVENT, ENTITY, PROPERTY and PRE-PROPERTY. The type EVENT, for
example, is defined for a core property (or role) theme. This property is inherited
by the type RUN which is also defined for the roles source and goal. Likewise,
ENTITY is defined for the role colour and this property is inherited by subsumed
concept types such as ELEPHANT.
The four types subsumed by TOP deserve a special mention since they consti¬
tute the major ontological divisions in the hierarchy. EVENT is distinguished from
ENTITY on the basis of dependence and spatio-temporal stability. For EVENT
concepts require ENTITY concepts to fulfill their roles; for example, a LIKE event
requires an ENTITY to fulfill the agent role and another for the theme role. Al¬
though ENTITY concepts may have roles, they are not dependent upon them. In
addition, ENTITY concepts are time-stable since they maintain their identity over
time and spatially-stable since they occupy a (contiguous) region of space (cf.
Givon 1979). EVENT concepts, on the other hand, lack these properties since
they can change over time and are not space-occupying.
PROPERTY concepts fulfill core property roles in ENTITY or EVENT concepts.
For the later concepts provide what Bartsch (1987) terms 'thematic dimensions':
thematic dimensions are ways in which an ENTITY or EVENT can be specified. An
ENTITY, for example, can be specified by its location in space and time (spatial
and temporal dimensions). But it can also be specified by its location on thematic
dimensions; for example, John can be specified from the perspective of his health
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or wealth as in John is a very wealthy man. Specifying an ENTITY by different
thematic dimensions singles out its relevant properties.
Pre-properties, on the other hand, fulfill mode property roles on PROPERTY,
ENTITY or EVENT concepts. Pre-properties provide a specification of a property
which needs to be evaluated during interpretation. For example, in a very drunk
man, the noun man is associated with a concept of the type SENTIENT. This
concept has a role drunk which takes a concept of the type PROPERTY as its
value; say DRUNK-PROPERTY. The adverb very specifies a mode property on the
DRUNK-PROPERTY and the value of this property is partly determined by the
mode specification.
5.3.3 Mode Properties
The motivation for the distinction between mode and core properties is due to the
process of anchoring concepts in the discourse model. Whereas core properties
form part of the anchored concepts, mode properties merely guide the process:
they are used to determine which peg is appropriate for anchoring a concept, but
pegs themselves do not contain mode properties.
Mode properties are concepts of the type PRE-PROPERTY. In the hierarchy
shown in figure 5-3, two mode properties are defined for TOP and, by inheritance,
for every type in the hierarchy. The polarity pre-property describes the polarity
of a concept. For example, no is associated with a concept of the type POLARITY
with the value negative. The definite pre-property indicates whether a concept is
linguistically marked as anchorable to an existing peg in the discourse model. For
example, the is a concept of the type DEFINITE with a value positive and indicates
that there should be a peg for it in the discourse model (cf. a)6. When concepts
6Unfortunatelv, natural language is not this systematic: indefinite NPs can reference
concepts already in the discourse model, just as definite NPs may fail to reference a
concept in the discourse model (cf. Sanford and Garrod 1981; van derSandt 1988).
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with polarity and definite roles are anchored in the information state, the values of
these roles guide the process. For example, a concept with negative polarity, such
as contained in the conceptual structure for no plants, guides anchoring so that
the concept is not anchored with concepts of the type PLANT as would normally
be the case.
5.3.4 Core Properties
Core properties are properties of a concept which persist when the concept is
anchored in the discourse model. The value of property is a complex value: the
property label describes a relationship between the concept itself and some other
concept of the type ENTITY, EVENT or PROPERTY. For example, RUN is defined
for three properties (or roles): theme whose value is a concept of the type ENTITY;
and goal and source whose values are concepts of the type LOCATION7. A concept
such as this describes the concept of run in a sentence such as John runs from
London to Brighton as illustrated below:
'These properties are (loosely) based upon thematic roles in grammar and thus can
be seen as linguistically relevant properties of concepts (cf. Anderson 1971; Anderson
1977; Fillmore 1987; Starosta 1988; Anderson 1989). They can be interpreted as follows:
agent roles specify the source of an action; theme the entity which is in a state or affected
by an action; goal the destination of a theme in a 'moving' event; and source the source
of a theme in a 'moving' event.
















where John has specialized the value for the theme role as SENTIENT with a
name property which related to a FIRSTNAME concept with the value john, while
London and Brighton have specialized the LOCATION types of the source and goal
roles as CITY and provided a value for each concept.
5.3.5 Constraints
The final attribute of a concept is constraints: i.e. a set of constraints on a con¬
cept. Constraints make explicit the relation between a concept and its properties.
The relations between concepts and properties are criterial relations: i.e. criterial
necessity and symptomatic typicality (see section 4.3.2). This differentiates the
approach from feature-based approaches which either lack typicality, such as the
classical approach (see section 3.2.1), or characterize necessity as a deductive ev¬
idence relation. Furthermore, the use of criterial relations also differentiates our
approach from non-decompositional approaches, where concepts are atomic, i.e.
unstructured, but are related by 'extrinsic' relations such as meaning postulates
(cf. Dowty 1979; Dowty et al. 1981). For while intrinsic approaches with deduc¬
tively related properties and extrinsic approaches with meaning postulates are
formally equivalent, the equivalence disappears with intrinsic approaches with
criterial relations (cf. Jackendoff 1983; Franks et al. 1988).
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Constraints is a complex property defined as follows:
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(5.6) constraints = set-of(constraint)
constraint = name A type A condition A arg*
name = equality V inequality V vequality
V co-variation V causality
type = necessary V default
condition = path V constraint
arg = path V constraint
With constraints, sub-structures within a concept are explicitly related. The
name of the constraint specifies the relation between the arguments in the con¬
straint. Relations include equality, inequality, vequality (value equality), co¬
variation and so on. For example, a vequality constraint specifies the value of
a path argument. The type of constraints indicates whether the relation is nec¬
essary or a default; while default relations may hold, necessary relations must
hold for the concept to be well-formed. Conditions indicate that the relation is
conditional; necessary constraints must hold if the condition is satisfied; default
relations may hold if the condition is satisfied. Using such constraints, the rela¬
tionship between the sub-structures can be made explicit as the following example
demonstrates:
Chapter 5. Discourse Processes 161
type : wash
agent : type : animate
theme : type : entity
name : vequality
type : necessary







where the first constraint specifies that the path <agent type> necessarily has the
value animate and the second constraint that the path Ctheme type> necessarily
has the value entity. In this way, constraints can be seen as well-formedness
conditions on concepts: they specify which properties a concept must have as
well as what properties it might have. As we shall see, lexical and linguistic
concepts do not contain constraints: only theories of concepts contain constraints.
Consequently, when a concept in linguistic conceptual structure is elaborated, its
properties are checked by applying the constraints in the theory of the concept.
Constraints do not just confirm structure in a concept: they can also create
structure. For example, a concept in linguistic structure can be underspecified
with respect to the core property colour. A necessary constraint on the con¬
cept may then create the path < colour type colour—property> and a default
constraint specify a default value for this concept:










Constraints can thus be defined for a concept so that its elaboration by a theory
in the discourse model gives rise to the creation of new properties which express
relations with concepts. For example, the concept in (5.9) is part of the linguistic
conceptual structure for bed and partly describes the 'plant-bed' sense. The



























When the constraints in (5.10) are applied to the concept in (5.9), the concept is
elaborated through the addition of the roles material and location. The first and
second constraints creates the role material and assigns its concept the type MA¬
TERIAL and the value soil. The third constraint, a default constraint, creates the
role location and assigns its concept the type GARDEN. Constraints on a concept
can thus be seen as inference rules which elaborate underspecified concepts in
linguistic conceptual structure. In the case of (5.9), these constraints infer that
if there is a plant bed, then it must be made of soil and it may be located in a
garden.
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5.4 Linguistic Conceptual Structure
The linguistic conceptual structure is the semantic part of the linguistic structure
exported by the linguistic processing module. As we shall see in chapters 6 and 7,
lexical and linguistic structures are characterized as structured objects, namely
signs, which have semantic, syntactic and phonological properties, as well as
constraints which explicitly relate substructures within signs. Combination of
expressions is characterized in terms of the extension of signs to produce a result
sign for the phrasal expression. Thus a linguistic conceptual structure is the value
of the semantics property in a result sign.
Linguistic conceptual structures are composed of concepts as defined in sec¬
tion 5.3. In the simplest case, the linguistic conceptual structure for an expression
is a single concept: i.e. the expression always specifies the same sense. However,
in the cognitive linguistic approach, the relationship between concepts and lin¬
guistic conceptual structure can be more complex due to the tension between
conceptual flexibility and specificity (cf. Dunbar and Myers 1988; Murphy 1988;
Myers et al. 1989). What underpins this approach are the two assumptions about
word meaning (cf. Lyons 1977b; Ross 1981):
1. The meaning of any words can consist of more than one sense; the majority
of words have a large number of interrelated senses.
2. The meaning of a word varies systematically with context.
These assumptions directly oppose the assumption that most words have a single
sense and that where there is more than one sense, there are only a few, unrelated
senses. The later assumption underpins Lexical Atomism (cf. Lycan 1988). The
linguistic theories of Davidson, Hintikka and Montague are founded upon lexical
atomism. In particular, Lexical Atomism assumes a limited role for flexibility,
especially ambiguity, in natural language:
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Lexical ambiguity in a natural language is neatly limited. Of course
a word may have more than one sense, but the several senses it has
may be crisply captured in a short, discrete list and treated by lin¬
guistic conceptual as brutally homonymous or equivocal (otherwise
its separate uses could not have been learned in so short a time by
speakers), (cf. Lycan 1988: 107)
We, on the other hand, claim that flexibility is fundamental to natural language:
many words are ambiguous and/or polysemous in that they can specify more than
one specific sense and which sense they will specify depends upon the context in
which they occur8. Consider, for example, the different senses of charged in (5.12)
to (5.17) respectively (taken from Lycan 1988: 111):
(5.12) Chatterton charged the gun.
(5.13) Chatterton charged the jury.
(5.14) Chatterton charged her with murder.
(5.15) Chatterton charged him with responsibility.
(5.16) Chatterton charged the chap too much.
(5.17) Chatterton charged the battery.
In these examples, charged specifies a range of sense varying from the 'swearing
in' sense in (5.13), through the financial sense in (5.16) to the electrical energy
sense in (5.17). However, in each example which specific sense is appropriate
seems unproblematic.
This tension between flexibility and specificity has directed us towards treat¬
ing the senses of many expressions as conceptual structures which contain more
than one concept. Each of these concepts specifies linguistically relevant proper¬
ties of concepts: i.e. properties of the concept described in section 5.3 which, like
8See chapter 3, especially sections 3.2.2 and 3.3, for experimental evidence.
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traditional selectional restrictions, restrict the combinatorial potential of the ex¬
pression (cf. Katz and Fodor 1963). In particular, each concept must be specified
for its type; may be specified for mode properties such as definite and polarity, as
well as core properties, such the thematic roles agent and theme which determine
the valency of verbs like wash] but is never specified for constraints. Furthermore,
these concepts in a linguistic structure are ordered in terms of subsumption and
disjunction. Consider for example, the conceptual structure associated with bed.
In (5.9), one of its senses, the 'plant-sense', is represented. However, bed is both
polysemous and ambiguous: there are, for example, more specific sense compat¬
ible 'plant-bed' senses, such as 'flower-bed' and 'vegetable-bed', as well as other,
incompatible senses such as 'mattress-bed' and 'river-bed'. These sense can be
ordered in term of subsumption and incompatibility as figure 5-4 illustrates.
The conceptual structure for bed can be characterized in terms of disjunction of
Figure 5—4: Senses of bed ordered in terms of subsumption and incompatibility
incompatible concepts and the conjunction of compatible ones. If, however, dis¬
junctive normal form is used to represent incompatible concepts, then there may
be redundancy since the shared properties will need to be represented separately
in each sense (cf. Bouma 1990). This redundancy can be avoided by 'general'
disjunction where a disjunctive structure is optimized so as to partition it into a
definite or stable part, containing only unconditional conjunctions, and an indefi¬
nite or unstable part containing a set of disjunctions (cf. Kasper 1987; Wedekind
1990). For example, the structure in (5.18) can be optimized as (5.19) with cr as
the definite part shared between each disjunction:
flower-bed
vegetable-bed
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(5.18) A <r) V (A A cr) V (x A o)
(5.19) er A (0 V A V x)
In this way, shared properties of concepts can be represented as a stable part
shared by each disjunct in the conceptual structure.
By ordering concepts in linguistic conceptual structure in terms of subsump-
tion and disjunction, bed can be associated with the conceptual structure in
This conceptual structure consists of a top-level disjunction where each disjunct
specifies a general concept: the first disjunct contains a concept of the type
MATTRESS-BED; and the second, a concept of the type PLANT-BED. Nested
within the second disjunct is a further disjunction specifying two specific sense
subsumed by the PLANT-BED concept: the first disjunct specifies a VEGETABLE-
BED concept; and the second specifies a FLOWER-BED concept. Each of these
disjunctions can be specified for typicality as suggested in chapter 3; for example,
MATTRESS-BED may be the dominant sense and within the subordinate sense
PLANT-BED, VEGETABLE-BED may be more typical than FLOWER-BED. As we
shall see in section 7.2, these typicality relations can be defined by constraints on
signs.
Characterizing lexical conceptual structure in this manner supports the no¬
tion that flexibility is an inherent part of language comprehension. For extending
conceptual structures of this sort can result in any embedded concept being se¬
lected for anchoring and elaboration in the discourse model. The point at which






{type : vegetable-betype : flower-bed
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context will provide sufficient restrictions on the upcoming concept to select a
concept in the lexical conceptual structures. In other cases, the conceptual struc¬
ture of a combining expression can constrain the appropriate sense; for example,
with charged in (5.12) to (5.17), the conceptual structure for the object NPs plays
a crucial role in selecting the appropriate sense. In still other cases, the linguistic
conceptual structure will retain the disjunctions specified in lexical conceptual
structure of the combining expressions. When this occurs, the current discourse
model plays the major role in selecting the appropriate sense. For example, with
bed in (5.21):
(5.21) The kids were playing in the house. Peter fell onto his bed and giggled.
the MATTRESS-BED concept is appropriate since the interpretation of house re¬
sults in the creation of an implicit concept (BEDROOM) which contains another
implicit concept of the type MATTRESS-BED in the discourse context and only the
concept MATTRESS-BED in the structure for bed can be anchored to this concept.
In this way, flexibility in conceptual structure is natural since cognitive agents
are also provided with the means of selecting the appropriate sense. Of course,
there will still be cases where even the discourse model will be unable to select
between competing senses. If neither of the top-level disjuncts are selected, then
ambiguity arises; if one of these is selected, but lower disjuncts cannot be selected,
then a generic sense arises.
5.5 Anchored Concepts
The first phase of interpretation in the discourse processing module involves the
anchoring of concepts in the linguistic conceptual structure. The purpose of the
anchoring is to integrate the concept into the current discourse model. This can
occur in one of two ways. One way is through unification of the concept with a
peg, i.e. a concept already anchored in the discourse model with a constant value
for its id property. Consider the discourse given in (5.22) to (5.25):
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(5.22) John and Mary traveled into London yesterday.
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(5.23) They went into a travel agents.
(5.24) John bought a ticket to Paris.
(5.25) The ticket was blue.
In (5.25), the linguistic conceptual structure for The ticket may consist of a single
concept of the type TICKET. This concept can be unified with the concept for
a ticket to Paris which is already anchored and elaborated at this point in the
















place : type : city
value : paris














place : type : city
value : paris
If there is no compatible peg in the discourse model for the concept to unify
with, then a new peg is created: the id of the concept is assigned a constant
value and the concept is added to the discourse model. For example, at the point
of interpreting (5.22), given in (5.29), there is no compatible peg in the current
discourse model for the concept associated with London9:
9In (5.29), the conjunction John and Mary is treated as a concept with a set value.











name : id : firstname 1







firstname : type : firstname
value : mary
Consequently, a new peg, cityl, is created and the concept for London is anchored
to this peg in accordance with the linguistic conceptual structure for went:
Chapter
(5.30)




























Anchoring thus involves an extension of the concept: minimumly, the id of the
concept is given a constant value; and, if the concept is unified with an existing
peg, then properties of the peg and concept are shared since they are both one
and the same dynamic partial concept. Further, as a consequence of anchoring
a concept, the discourse model is extended either through the addition of a new
peg or through the extension of an existing peg.
So far, the only restriction on anchoring is that the concept must be compat¬
ible with the peg: i.e. only compatible concepts can unify. However, this is not
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adequate. For, as we noted in section 5.3.3, the mode properties of a concept
provide further restrictions on anchoring. This is apparent with concepts refer¬
enced by pronouns such she, they, it or themselves. For example, if the discourse
in (5.22) to (5.25) were extended with (5.31):
(5.31) The travel agents congratulated themselves on the sale.
then, in principle, the reflexive pronoun themselves could be anchored to either
the peg for John and Mary, i.e. sentientl, or the peg for The travel agents,
travel-agentl, since both are specified for sets of entities. However, the concept for
themselves is specified for the mode property pronominal as shown in (5.32):
and the anchoring process is guided by this mode property such that the concept
must be anchored to an existing, compatible peg and this peg must be contained
within the anchored conceptual structure referenced by the current sentence.
Of course, not all concepts provide such specific restrictions on anchoring. For
example, if (5.25) were replace by (5.33):
(5.33) It was blue.
then the concept for It, i.e. a. concept of the type ENTITY, could be anchored
to any anchored concepts in the discourse model with a compatible type; e.g.
cityl, compariyl (for a travel agents in (5.23)), ticketl and city2. If the anchoring
were simply based upon recency, i.e. anchor to the most recent peg added to
the discourse model, then It would be incorrectly anchored to the peg city2 (cf.
Zernik and Brown 1988).
In the cognitive linguistic approach, anchoring is restricted by structuring






Chapter 5. Discourse Processes 174
through the discourse. The notion of structuring a discourse model in terms of do¬
mains derives from research which investigated the relation between an anaphoric
expression, such as a pronoun, in a sentence and its antecedent within the dis¬
course (cf. Grosz 1977; Sidner 1979; Grosz 1981; Grosz et al. 1983; Dale 1990).
For example, with the generation of anaphoric expressions in the EPICURE gener¬
ation system, the discourse model is organized into three domains: a local focus
domain which contains linguistic information about the current and previous ut¬
terances; a global focus domain which contains conceptual information, but not
lexical and syntactic information, about the remainder of the discourse; and a
discourse center, within the local focus domain, which contains the focus of at¬
tention in the discourse (cf. Dale 1990: 243-251). These domains are ordered in
terms of accessibility: i.e. how accessible the concepts within these domains are
for pronominalization. In particular, the discourse focus domain is more accessi¬
ble than other parts of the local focus domain, and the local focus domain is more
accessible than the global domain. Pronominalization is then determined on the
basis of whether the antecedent is located in an accessible domain; for example,
if the antecedent is the discourse centre, then the concept can be pronominalized
as with drain the carrots and rinse them (cf. Dale 1990: 244).
We adopt a similar, although simpler, approach to accessibility. The discourse
model is structured into four domains, ordered with respect to accessibility as il¬
lustrated in figure 5-510. The 'top' domain of the discourse model contains two
domains: a global domain and a local domain. The local domain in turn contains
two domains: a current utterance domain, which contains conceptual structure
10These domains can be further structured in terms of rhetorical relations be¬
tween conceptual structures, such as cause-consequence, condition-consequence and
argument-claim, where the appropriate set of relations may vary with the type of dis¬
course (cf. Mann and Thompson 1988; Caenepeel 1991).






Figure 5—5: Domains in the discourse model ordered with respect to accessibility
created during the interpretation of the current sentence11; and a previous utter¬
ance domain containing the conceptual structure for the previous sentence. The
global domain contains conceptual structures created from the interpretation of
sentences other than current and previous sentences. The structure of the dis¬
course model arising from the interpretation of the discourse in (5.22) to (5.25) is
illustrated in figure 5-6 where conceptual structures are given a schematic graph-
theoretic representation12. Anchoring a concept in the current domain involves
finding the most accessible peg where pegs in the current domain are more ac¬
cessible than those in the previous domain, and these in turn are more accessible
than pegs in the global domain. Of course, since anchoring can relate pegs in
different domains, a peg established in a less accessible domain can become more
accessible as the discourse progresses through anchoring; for example, sentient2
(the peg for John in (5.22)) is more accessible than other pegs in the global do¬
main since the same peg is used to anchor the concept John in (5.24). However,
even this restriction is insufficient. For if (5.25) is replaced by (5.33), then the
11 Utterances, of course, may not be sentences; for example, an appropriate answer
to the question Where do you want to fly? is Paris.
12This representation is equivalent to the attribute value representation (cf. Shieber
1986). However, many substructures have been omitted from the graph representations
for clarity.
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Figure 5—6: A discourse model structured in terms of accessible domains
concept for It could be anchored to any compatible peg in the previous utterance
domain: i.e. ticketl or cityl. Until the rest of the sentence is interpreted, It could
be anchored to either ticketl or cityl. When was blue is interpreted, It can only
be anchored to ticketl. For the elaboration of the BE concept involves applica¬
tion of a necessary constraint which equates the value of themel with the value of
some property of theme. That is, the ENTITY concept for It is augmented with a
colour property with the value blue. Given that the concept TICKET but not the
concept CITY is defined for a colour property, this concept can only be anchored
to ticketl. Consequently, we are faced with choice as to how the concept for It
is anchored before ivas blue is interpreted. One solution is to arbitrarily anchor
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it to a compatible peg, such as cityl, and revise the discourse model when the
incompatibility arises. An alternative solution is to create a new peg for It, wait
until the end of the current utterance domain and then attempt to find a com¬
patible peg in the preceding domain. Whatever solution is adopted, the notions
of revising a discourse model and delaying a choice until the end of the current
utterance domain are also pertinent to concept elaboration.
Before we consider elaboration, a further restriction on accessibility is neces¬
sary. This restriction concerns the accessibility of explicit and implicit concepts
within the same domain: i.e. concepts which are directly referenced by a lin¬
guistic expression and concepts created by the elaboration of explicit concepts.
Consider the following examples taken from Sanford and Garrod (1981):
(5.34) Mary put the baby's clothes on.
(5.35) Mary dressed the baby.
In (5.34), there are three ENTITY concepts corresponding to Mary, baby and
clothes. In (5.35), there are also three concepts: two concepts corresponding to
Mary and baby, and a third, implicit concept of the type CLOTHES which has
been created in the discourse model. Sanford and Garrod (1981: 104) argue that
the CLOTHES concept is created as soon as dressed is interpreted on account of a
minimal RT difference when these sentences are followed by (5.36):
(5.36) The clothes were made of pink wool.
The implication here is that the implicit concept is accessible when the clothes is
being anchored and, since they are compatible, the new concept is anchored to
implicit concept.
Implicit concepts, however, are not always so accessible. When (5.36) was
replaced by (5.37):
(5.37) They were made of pink wool.
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there was a significant difference in RT suggesting that implicit concepts are not
accessible to concepts referenced by pronominal expressions. Furthermore, im¬
plicit concepts contained within implicit concepts are less accessible than those
contained within concepts referenced in the discourse. For when (5.35) was fol¬
lowed by (5.38) and (5.39):
(5.38) The clothes were made of pink wool.
(5.39) The material was made of pink wool.







materiall is less accessible than clothesl since the latter is embedded within an
concept which is not referenced in discourse.
The final restriction on anchoring concerns cases where the linguistic concep¬
tual structure consists of more than one concept, as with the conceptual structure
of bat with ANIMAL-BAT and GAME-BAT concepts. This structure is anchored so
that if one of the concepts, but not the other, can be anchored to a peg in the
discourse model, then other concepts are discarded — they are neither anchored
nor elaborated in the discourse model. For example, when bat occurs in a biasing
context such as (5.3) given here as (5.41):
(5.41) I was in the pet shop yesterday. I bought a bat.
there is an accessible peg for the ANIMAL-BAT concept but not the GAME-BAT
concept. This peg arises from the elaboration of the concept of pet-shop which
creates an implicit concept of the type ANIMAL as shown in (5.42):
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(5.42)





Consequently, the concept ANIMAL-BAT can be anchored to ANIMAL 1 since the
type ANIMAL subsumes the type ANIMAL-BAT. Only this sense of bat is anchored
and elaborated in the discourse model — no new peg is created for the GAME-BAT
sense. However, bat can occur in contexts such as (5.2):
(5.43) I bought a bat. It is called Harry and eats mice.
where, when bat is interpreted, there are no (compatible) pegs in the discourse
model upon which one of its concepts can be anchored. Consequently, we are
faced with the same choices as when a concept could be anchored to more than
one peg. This time we could create a 'virtual' peg for each concept, as illustrated
in figure 5-7 where there are two incompatible values for the theme relation, and
wait until the end of the current utterance domain to see if either of these pegs
is used to anchor incoming concepts and, if neither do, then only the concept
corresponding to the typical sense is actually added to the discourse model. If
we adopted this approach, and GAME-BAT is the typical sense, then the discourse
model will need to be revised since the GAME-BAT concept is not compatible
with the extension which arises from interpretation of eats mice (EAT requires
an ANIMATE concept for the theme role). The same situation would result if
we adopted the alternative approach of anchoring the typical sense at the point
when bat is interpreted. The former approach, of course, has the advantage that
if the sense is selected within the current utterance domain, then no revision is
required:
(5.44) I bought a bat which eats mice.





Figure 5—7: A concept related to two 'virtual' pegs for bat
As we shall see, this approach is adopted towards the application of default
constraints during elaboration.
We can now define a simple anchoring principle:
Principle Of Anchoring
For each concept C in a linguistic conceptual structure anchor C to
a peg P in the discourse model M if:
1. P is the most accessible concept in M\
2. C unifies with P to give P'\
3. P' remains consistent throughout the discourse.
If there no such P, then create a peg for C in M with a constant
value for its id property.
This principle depends upon the following Accessibility Principle:
Principle of Accessibility
A peg P is the most accessible concept for a concept C in a discourse
model M iff:
1. Anchoring does not violates restrictions associated with the mode
properties of C;
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2. P is contained in a domain in which no other concept is more
accessible: i.e. an explicit concept is more accessible than an
implicit concept; and an implicit concept contained in an explicit
concept is more accessible than an implicit concept contained in
an implicit concept;
3. There is no other P' such that P' is contained in a more acces¬
sible domain for C: i.e. the current utterance domain is more
accessible than the previous utterance domain; and the previous
utterance domain is more accessible then global domain.
5.6 Elaborated Concepts
Concepts anchored in the discourse model are elaborated by theories. Theories are
background knowledge about a situation, or part of a situation. The motivation
for theories derives from the distinction within cognitive psychology between
concepts and theories (cf. Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976; Fillmore 1982; Murphy
and Medin 1985; Lakoff 1987):
Representations of concepts are best thought of as theoretical knowl¬
edge or, at least, as embedded in knowledge that embodies a theory
about the world. (Murphy and Medin 1985: 298)
This approach is neither reductionist nor circular. Concepts are not simply re¬
duced to theories, or vice versa, but can be seen as different parts of the same
knowledge structure relevant to different cognitive goals:
Concepts and theories must live in harmony in the same mental space:
they therefore constrain each other both in content and representa¬
tional format. (Murphy and Medin 1985: 313).
The part of this structure included in linguistic (or lexical) conceptual structure
contains information pertinent to linguistic combination; and the part included
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in theories contain information for motivating and defining the internal structure
of concepts. In particular, theories underlie the organization of the concepts,
such as the hierarchy in figure 5-3, the assignment of necessary and default
properties to individual concepts as well as relations, including explanatory and
causal relations, between concepts. For example, Cohen and Murphy (1984)
argue that our interpretation of compound concepts such as engine repair require
knowledge about the use of vehicles, their parts and functions, as well as what
can go wrong with them. Accordingly,
The interpretation of a compound concept may be thought of as a
hypothesis generated by background theories. (Murphy and Medin
1985: 306)
In this way, concepts and theories share the same ontology, although different
parts of this ontology are relevant to structures and theories. This contrasts with
the use of theories in the 'naive semantics' approach where concepts are reduced
to theories (cf. Dahlgren et al. 1989).
Theories have three important characteristics. Firstly, the theories are com-
monsense beliefs about the world, not scientific, 'objectively' true knowledge
about the world. As Murphy and Medin put it, a theory is
Any of a host of mental "explanations" rather than a complete scien¬
tific account. (Murphy and Medin 1985: 290).
Secondly, theories are part of our social knowledge about the world: commonsense
theories are established within a society and members of the society (implicitly)
accept these theories by using them to produce and comprehend language. This,
as well as their status as commonsense beliefs, aligns a theory-based approach
with the criteria! and symptomic evidence relations discussed in section 4.3.2.
Thirdly, theories underlie the specificity and coherence of concepts in the dis¬
course model. In particular, a theory specifies necessary and typical (or 'default')
relations between a concept and its properties, as well as relations between these
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properties. For example, the 'genetic mother' theory underlying some uses of the
expression mother may specify necessary relations between the concept 'mother'
and properties such as being female, and the existence of a child and a father,
as well as typical properties such as her age. This theory may also specify nec¬
essary and typical relations between the properties themselves; for example, the
mother may be married to the father and the mother and father may have caused
the birth of the child by sexual intercourse. These relations between a concept
and its properties can function in two ways. Firstly, if a concept is not already
specified for these properties, then elaboration with a theory may result in the
addition of new properties — the concept may be extended by a theory. Secondly,
while concepts may be specified for properties, the concept itself does not specify
whether these are necessary or typical properties of the concept. Consequently, a
theory underlies the coherence of a concept by confirming the properties specified
in a concept and motivating their existence in terms of necessary and typicality
relations with the concept itself.
In the cognitive linguistic approach, theories are characterized in terms of the
conceptual structures discussed in section 5.3. In particular, theories are defined
for a type and constraints. Thus theories share a type property with concepts and
this property is pivotal in determining which theory is used to elaborate con¬
cepts. In the simplest case, a theory with an identical value for type is used. For
example, the concept describing the 'plant-bed' sense of bed given in (5.9) can be
elaborated by the theory in (5.10) since they have an identical type value, namely
PLANT-BED. However, a concept can be elaborated by any theory whose value for
type is subsumed by the value of type in the concept. Thus a PLANT-BED concept
can be elaborated by a VEGETABLE-BED theory or a FLOWER-BED theory (see
section 5.8 for an example of this). Once a theory has been selected, the concept
is elaborated by the theory through application of its constraints: i.e. the con¬
straints define necessary and typical relations with properties for the concept. In
some cases, these properties will already be specified for the concept: elaboration
simply confirms the well-formedness of the concept. For example, the anchored
MOTHER concept lor female mother specifies the value female for the gender prop-
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erty and this property is confirmed by one of the necessary 'gender' constraints
defined for the GENETIC-MOTHER theory. In other cases, these properties are
not yet specified for the concept and application of the constraint results in the
addition of new properties. For example, elaboration of the concept associated
with my mother by the GENETIC-MOTHER theory involves the application of a
constraint which creates the property gender and assigns it the necessary value
female. Not all constraints are necessary constraints; for example, a necessary
constraint might create the property father whose value is a SENTIENT concept
with a gender property whose value is male, and a default constraint can then
create a marry property and assign both the core of MOTHER and the value of
father to roles within it. Likewise, the PLANT-BED concept of bed in (5.9) can be
elaborated by the theory in (5.10) so as to yield the extended concept in (5.11).
That is, it extends the PLANT-BED concept by adding a (necessary) property
location with the (necessary) value soil and a location property with the (default)
value garden.
The application of default constraints, however, are problematic in a similar
way to the anchoring of the default senses in ambiguous and polysemous expres¬
sions discussed in section 5.5. With a necessary constraint, application of the
constraint creates a property which, so long as the concept retains its identity,
should hold of the concept throughout the discourse. The same, however, is
not true of default constraints: if a default constraint applies to a concept, so
specifying a typical value for a property, then later in the discourse another com¬
patible concept may be anchored to this concept and assign the same property a
necessary value. Consider the following example:
(5.45) John bought an elephant which was pink.
When the concept associated with elephant is anchored and elaborated in the
discourse model, a typicality constraint can apply, creating a colour property
with the value grey, the typical colour of elephants:





colour : type : colour-property
value : grey
However, when the concept corresponding to pink is anchored to the peg colour-
propertyl, it specifies the value as pink, a value which is confirmed by a necessary
constraint of the PINK theory. Here then we have a conflict between a value
assigned by a default constraint in one theory and a value assigned by a necessary
constraint in another theory. This conflict can be avoided by defining a domain
for default constraint application: i.e. default constraints are only applied at
the closure of the domain. In particular, default constraints are only applied at
the closure of the current utterance domain. Thus the default value grey is not
assigned when elephant is anchored and, since the colour property is assigned the
value pink by the end of the sentence, the default constraint will not apply.
Even with this modification, however, not all elaborations of concepts will
involve the confirmation or addition of properties. For example, in
(5.47) John bought an elephant. The elephant was pink.
the default value for colour will be assigned by the ELEPHANT theory when the
current utterance domain is closed. However, when the second utterance is inter¬
preted, the concept for elephant will be anchored to elephantl and interpretation
of was pink will attempt, and fail, to apply a necessary constraint assigning the
value pink. This results in a a conflict between the necessary and typical values
for the colour property of elephant. As we shall see in section 5.7, this conflict
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underlies conceptual extensions which involve information correction rather than
information growth13.
We can now define a principle of elaboration:
Principle Of Elaboration
For each anchored concept C in the discourse model elaborate C with
respect to a theory T, where the type of T is subsumed by the type
of C, by applying the necessary constraints defined for T immedi¬
ately and applying default constraints at the closure of the current
utterance domain.
Of course, this principle of elaboration is too general: not only will constraints cre¬
ate implicit concepts within explicit concepts, and then implicit concepts within
these, but the process will keep on applying, creating more and more implicit
concepts in the discourse model. This seems counter-intuitive: interpretation in¬
volves the construction of shallow rather than deep conceptual structures in the
discourse model:
Subjects automatically infer only enough information to connect to¬
gether the concepts explicitly stated in the text, and only connect
together those concepts in relatively local proximity in the text. (cf.
McKoon and Ratcliff 1988: 343).
Consequently, we shall restrict elaboration to explicit concepts and implicit con¬
cepts within them.
Whereas the problem with (5.45) is exclusive to the dynamic incremental approach
to interpretation, the second example (5.47) is also a problem for 'batch' approaches
where the domain of interpretation is the sentence.
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5.7 Growth and Correction
In the anchoring and elaboration of concepts, two types of the extension have
been encountered (as suggested by the discussion of criterial and symptomic
evidence relations in section 4.3.2): information 'growth', the normal case, where
the extension of concept is monotonic; and information 'correction', the bizarre
case, where extension is non-monotonic (cf. Landman 1986; Rott 1990).
With information growth the extension of the discourse model M is monotonic
where monotonicity is defined as follows (where (= is a 'supports' relation):
(5.48) Mnew C Mold iff Vo{Mnew |= o Mold f= o)
Growth is thus an extension where all information (<j) supported by the resultant
state of the discourse model (Mnew) is supported by the previous state of the
discourse model (Mold). The growth of the discourse model may come about
through the addition of necessary and typical properties and relations to anchored
concepts or through the introduction of new concepts.
Information correction, on the other hand, involves not the addition of in¬
formation but its revision: some information is lost or changed in the discourse
model. Information correction arises from a conflict between properties either
when one concept is being anchored to an existing concept in the discourse model
or when a concept is elaborated through the application of constraints defined
by a theory. Two types of conflict can be identified: conflict between properties
assigned by necessary and default constraints; and conflict between properties
assigned by necessary constraints.
Examples (5.45) and (5.47) are conflicts of the first type since the conflict
arises between properties assigned by a necessary constraint of one theory and a
default constraint of another. This type of conflict need not arise within the same
sentence or even within successive sentences in a discourse: it can arise from the
interpretation of expression in sentences which are not adjacent. Consider the
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following sentences where (5.49) and (5.50) may be followed by (5.51) or (5.52)
(cf. Sanford and Garrod 1981: 10):
(5.49) John was on his way to school.
(5.50) He was terribly worried about the maths lesson.
(5.51) He thought he might not be able to control the class again today.
(5.52) It was not a normal part of a janitor's duties.
Sanford and Garrod found that when people were asked about John after reading
(5.49) and (5.50), most said he was a schoolboy. However, when (5.51) or (5.52)
was read, people found the continuations surprising; John is actually a teacher
or janitor. Experiments based upon similar material demonstrated that when
a concept like that referenced by John is compatible with interpretations made
in later sentences, there is a distinct advantage in terms of RT over those where
incompatible interpretations are made.
This finding can be accounted for in the cognitive linguistic approach by school
referencing a concept which is elaborated by a theory whose constraints construct
pupil, teacher and janitor roles. The concepts in each of these roles are related by
inequality relations (whoever is a teacher is not a pupil and so on), so only one
of these concepts can be anchored to the concept for John. A default constraint,
applied at the closure of (5.49), then allows the concept in the pupil role to be
anchored to the concept for John. This concept is then monotonically extended
by the concepts in (5.50). With (5.51) and (5.52), however, there is a conflict
between the properties of this anchored concept and properties of the concept
in the linguistic conceptual structures for these sentences: while their linguistic
structure requires the concept to be anchored to either the anchored concepts in
the teacher role or the janitor role, the concepts in these roles are incompatible
with the concept referenced by John on account of the inequality constraint. At
this point, the discourse model must be revised in order to maintain consistency:
information supplied by the default anchoring to the concept in the pupil role is
retracted and the concept for John (including information accrued in (5.50)) is
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now anchored to the concept in either the teacher or janitor roles. Thus, infor¬
mation correction can come about through the retraction of properties assigned
by default constraints when they conflict with properties assigned by necessary
constraints: necessary constraints have priority over default constraints.
A second type of information correction arises with conflicts between proper¬
ties assigned by necessary constraints. Such conflicts can be caused by conceptual
structures which, according to linguistic restrictions, must be unified, but are in¬
compatible with respect to properties assigned by necessary constraints. For
example, in stone soldiers there is a conflict between necessary constraints which
assign values to the material role: a theory constraint associated with stone as¬
signs it the value stone, while a theory constraint associated with soldiers assigns
it the value flesh. In this case, the conflict is resolved in favour of stone: stone
soldiers are made of stone. The result of this correction, however, is not simply
a revision of the discourse model: a new sense of soldiers has been created.
This ability to revise information and create new word senses can be seen as
an integral part of linguistic creativity. That is, linguistic creativity involves not
only the monotonic extension of concepts in linguistic conceptual structures, but
the creation of new conceptual structures which reflect new sense of expressions.
The tension between these aspects of creativity can be characterized in term of
the interaction between linguistic inertia and linguistic force:
Linguistic Inertia Two tokens of the same word have the same
meaning until something differentiates them.
Linguistic Force Words resist combining unacceptably in the lin¬
guistic environment, until forced to . . .grammatical strings will
not go together unacceptably ... if there is any step-wise adap¬
tion of word meanings (compared to their occurrences in the
corpus) which would result in an acceptable utterance and is
not prevented by the environment. And those step-wise adap¬
tions are ...specific kinds of differentiation. (Ross 1981 quoted
in Lycan 1988: 110)
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Linguistic force, then, can lead to the construction of new linguistic structures
through differentiation, or branching, within existing linguistic structures. How¬
ever, this does not account for why, in the case of stone soldiers, the 'step-wise
adaption' is performed on soldiers rather than stone: i.e. why the necessary
constraint associated with the later has priority over the former. We shall pursue
this point when we discuss linguistic information correction, or defeasibility, in
sections 6.6 and 7.4.
5.8 Discourse Sense Selection
In this section, we illustrate the cognitive linguistic approach to interpretation
through the analysis of sense selection which takes place in discourse rather than
linguistic processing; i.e. 'delayed' sense selection according to section 3.3. Again,
we shall use a highly schematic graph-theoretic notation for the representation
of concepts in the discourse model.
Discourse sense selection covers examples in which the contextually appropri¬
ate sense of ambiguous or polysemous expressions is selected when the expression
is anchored and elaborated in the discourse model. Consider the following exam¬
ples:
(5.53) The accountant decorated her new house. Then she bought a bed.
(5.54) The accountant went into the garden. She walked over a bed planted
with vegetables.
Examples (5.53) and (5.54) concern the selection of senses in the ambiguous noun
bed: in (5.53), the dominant sense, 'mattress bed', is selected when the linguistic
conceptual structure of bed is anchored in the discourse model; and in (5.54),
the subordinate sense is selected at this point. In neither case is the discourse
context exported to the linguistic processing module sufficient to constrain sense
selection at the linguistic level (see section 7.3).
Chapter 5. Discourse Processes 191
Interpretation of the first sentence of (5.53) results in the discourse model in
figure 5-8. The discourse model in figure 5-8 constitutes the previous utterance
DECORATE 1
Figure 5—8: Discourse model for The accountant decorated her new house
domain for the interpretation of the second sentence. There are three explicit
concepts in this domain: DECORATEl which has two roles, agent and theme;
ACCOUNTANT 1 which fulfills the agent role; and HOUSEl which fulfills the theme
role. Each of these concepts can be elaborated with constraints defined in their
respective theories. In figure 5-8, we have shown the elaboration of HOUSEl. Its





















(5.55) contains constraints which define four roles, three of which are concepts
subsumed by the type ROOM as shown in figure 5-914. The elaboration of HOUSEl
results in the creation of three implicit concepts: BEDROOM 1, KITCHEN 1, BATH¬
ROOM 1 and SENTIENT 1. As figure 5-9 shows, the first three can be elaborated so
as to create embedded implicit concepts; for example, BEDROOM 1 can be elabo¬
rated to created a concept BEDl in the role bed. As for the fourth, SENTIENTl, it
14We could use a. role rooms with a set value to indicate this: i.e. its value is a set
of concepts with a 'spanning' type (room) and with the three roles given above. This
treatment would be comparable to the treatment of conjunction in (5.29).
constraints :






bed: [type: mattress-bed] cooker:[type:cooker]
KITCHEN BATHROOM
bath:[type:bath]
Figure 5—9: Part of the ENTITY hierarchy with ROOM
has been anchored to ACCOUNTANT 1 since the later is compatible and accessible
in the discourse model.
Let us now step through crucial points in the interpretation of the second
sentence, Then she bought a bed. During the anchoring of Then she bought, the
concept for she in the agent role of BUYl is anchored to the concept in the agent
role of DECORATE 1. The linguistic concept structure for bed in this context is
given in (5.20) and reproduced here as (5.56):
where the top level disjunction describes the two generic senses of bed and the
second disjunct contains disjunctive concepts for two more specific senses; we
shall discuss them in relation to (5.54).
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With the linguistic structure in (5.56), the concept in the location role of BUY is
either of the type MATTRESS-BED or PLANT-BED. Rather than simply create two
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'virtual' extensions, the discourse model can be used to select between the senses.
In this state, the mattress-bed sense is selected: the location of MATTRESS-BED,
i.e. a concept of the type BEDROOM, can be anchored to the implicit concept
BEDROOM 1 and the implicit concept within BEDROOM 1, namely MATTRESS-BED
in the bed role can be the anchor point for the MATTRESS-BED concept referenced
by bed. The resultant discourse model is shown in figure 5-10. In this way, the
DECORATE1
Figure 5—10: Discourse model after Then she bought a bed.
contextually appropriate sense of bed is selected and anchored in the discourse
model.
Interpretation of the polysemous noun in (5.54) follows a similar pattern. The
linguistic concept structure for garden is elaborated by the theory in (5.59):












which defines gardens as typically having two regions, flower bed and a vegetable
bed. The discourse model which results from interpretation of the first sentence
is given in figure 5-11.
ACCOUNTANT 1 GARDEN 1
region 1 region2
VEGETABLE-BED 1 FLOWER-BED 1
THEORY-DRIVEN EXTENSION OE GARDEN1
Figure 5—11: Discourse model after The accountant went into the garden.
The interpretation of the second sentence She walked over to the bed planted
with vegetables is similar to the interpretation of the second sentence in (5.53) up
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to the point bed is encountered: i.e. she can be anchored to ACCOUNTANT 1 at
the linguistic level. When bed is encountered, its linguistic structure is as given
in (5.56). The disjunctive structures contained within the plant-bed sense can be























where (5.60) defines vegetable bed as containing vegetables and being located in a
garden; and (5.61) defines flower beds as containing flowers and also being located
in a garden. Since the linguistic structure for bed is disjunctive, the discourse
model is consulted so as to try to select a contextually appropriate sense. While
the typical top-level disjunct, MATTRESS-BED, cannot be anchored in this context,
Chapter 5. Discourse Processes 198
there are two possible pegs for PLANT-BED: VEGETABLE-BED 1 and FLOWER¬
BED 1 are both compatible and accessible. However, this disjunct can be further
expanded into VEGETABLE-BED and FLOWER-BED and both of these can be also
be anchored to these concepts. If the typicality constraint specified for (5.56) were
to apply now, the default sense VEGETABLE-BED would be selected, FLOWER-BED
discarded and VEGETABLE-BED anchored to VEGETABLE-BEDl15. However, as
we suggested in section 5.6, default constraints do not apply until the end of the
current utterance domain. Consequently, the linguistic structure is only refined
to PLANT-BED and the rest of the sentence is interpreted.
The rest of the sentence, planted with vegetables, is a complex modifier of bed





desc : location : id : A
theme : type : vegetable
There are two important points to note about this linguistic structure. Firstly,
the desc role: the value of this role is a modification which does not bind any
specific role of the root type PLANT-BED (cf. red in red apple binds to the colour
role of APPLE). Secondly, the root type must be identified with some concept
contained within the desc concept; in this case, the value of location as indicated
by shared variable A. When such structures are anchored, they are transformed
so that the root type of the desc role, here PLANT-EVENT becomes the root type
for the whole structure: i.e. (5.62) is transformed into (5.63):
15Typica.lity relations between the senses of polysemous and ambiguous expressions
are defined in the constraints of the sign for bed (see section 7.2.1).
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(5.63)
type : plant-event
location : id : A
theme : type : vegetable
In this case, PLANT-BED is specialized as VEGETABLE-BED since PLANT-EVENT






where the constraint gives the role contents in PLANT-BED 1 a concept of the
type VEGETABLE and this allows PLANT-BED 1 to be specialized as an concept of
the type VEGETABLE-BED. After this local interpretation, these concepts can be
anchored in the rest of the discourse model. This time, PLANT-BED 1 is anchored
to VEGETABLE-BED 1 as the resultant discourse model for (5.54) in figure 5-12
illustrates.
5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have described the cognitive linguistic approach to seman¬
tic interpretation. Interpretation was characterized as involving three levels of
conceptual structure related by two extensional processes, anchoring and elab¬
oration. Each of these levels of conceptual structure, as well as theories, share
the same ontology: they are constructed from the same set of basic elements.
The linguistic conceptual structure is a linguistically relevant description asso¬
ciated with an expression; expressions with multiple senses are characterized as
disjunctive conceptual structures. The concepts in this conceptual structure are






Figure 5—12: Discourse model after She walked across the bed planted with
vegetables
added to the discourse model by an anchoring process which attempts to find
compatible existing concepts in the current discourse model: if such a concept
is found, then the two concepts are unified; and if not, a new anchored concept,
or peg, is created in the discourse model. The concepts in the discourse model
are then elaborated by theories which describe necessary and typical relations
between a concept and its properties. As a result, anchored concepts are ex¬
tended into elaborated concepts. This approach to interpretation countenances
two sorts of extension in the discourse model: in the normal circumstances, con¬
cepts are monotonically extended; and in bizarre circumstances, their extension
is non-monotonic — the interpretation concepts may be revised. However, we
suggested that many cases of non-monotonic extension can be avoided through
judicious anchoring and elaboration. Finally, we demonstrated in detail how this
approach accounts for sense selection at the discourse level.
This approach to language comprehension, however, has not yet characterized
the relationship between lexical and linguistic conceptual structures. Such char-
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acterization is needed in order to account for how sense selection in the linguistic
processing module can be restricted by the discourse context. Furthermore, we
noted that in some cases of non-monotonic extension, we were unable to account
for why a necessary property of one concept has priority over a necessary property
of another concept. Consequently, we shall now consider the nature of linguistic
combination, as characterized in grammars, so as to address these issues.
Chapter 6
Principles of Linguistic Combination
6.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, we presented the architecture of the cognitive linguistic approach
to language comprehension. Two modules were posited: a linguistic processing
module which combines representations for lexical expressions to yield a linguistic
structure, including a conceptual structure, for the phrase; and a discourse pro¬
cessing module which interprets this conceptual structure in the discourse model
of a cognitive agent. Chapter 3 provided evidence for the interaction between
these modules: the discourse processing module exports a discourse context which
restricts the sense of ambiguous and polysemous expressions combined in the lin¬
guistic processing model. In chapters 4 and 5, we characterized the nature of
conceptual structures and the processes by which they are interpreted in the dis¬
course processing module. This approach was shown to account for cases where
the sense selection occurs at the discourse level. In this and the next chapter,
we focus on the linguistic processing module: in particular, the characterization
of linguistic structures, the process by which they combine and how a discourse
context allows us to account for sense selection at the linguistic level.
Two issues in linguistic combination are addressed in this chapter.
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The first issue concerns the nature of the relationship between lexical and
linguistic structures. In chapters 4 and 5, the relationship between linguistic con¬
ceptual structure and discourse conceptual structure was characterized in terms
of the extension of partial concepts: the anchoring process extended concepts
in the linguistic conceptual structure into anchored concepts in the discourse
model; and the elaboration process extended anchored concepts through appli¬
cation of constraints defined for theories. A uniform relationship between levels
of conceptual structures can be maintained if the relationship between linguistic
structures associated with lexical expressions and the linguistics structure associ¬
ated with their concatenation as a phrase is also characterized as an extensional
relationship. For example, the lexical structure for pink and the lexical struc¬
ture for elephants can be extended into a linguistic structure for the phrase pink
elephants: i.e. the linguistic structure for the phrase is compatible with, and
at least as specific as, the linguistic structures for the lexical expressions. Since
this extensional relationship between linguistic structure is maintained in gram¬
mars where combination is based upon the unification of linguistic structures,
the linguistic processing module will be characterized as a unification grammar.
The second issue concerns the fact that combination involves more than the
unification of linguistic structures. For combination is asymmetrical: one linguis¬
tic structure in a binary combination has priority over the other structure with
respect to combination. This priority is manifest in the syntactic type of phrasal
expressions; for example, pink is an adjective and elephants is a noun, yet the
syntactic type of pink elephants is a noun not an adjective. Consequently, we
shall consider the basis for this asymmetry. Two approaches will be discussed.
In one approach, adopted in categorial grammars such as Unification Categorial
Grammar, priority is based upon the functor argument distinction: linguistic
structures combine as functor and argument, and the functor has priority over
the argument. In another approach, adopted in dependency grammars, priority
is based upon the head modifier distinction: linguistic structures combine as head
and modifier, and the head has priority over the modifier. As we shall see not only
is the head modifier distinction superior with respect to serialization, category
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constancy and motivation, but when linguistic sense correction, or defeasibility,
is considered, correction systematically correlates with this distinction.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.2 we describe some prop¬
erties of unification grammar. In section 6.3, we describe in detail one unifica¬
tion grammar, Unification Categorial Grammar, where priority in combination
is based upon the functor argument distinction. In section 6.4, we introduce an
alternative basis for asymmetry in combination — the head modifier distinction.
In section 6.4.1 we discuss some of the potentially distinctive properties of heads
which might motivate this distinction, and in section 6.4.2 characterize their pri¬
ority in terms of their semantic type. In section 6.5 the functor argument and the
head modifier distinctions are compared and it is argued that the head modifier
distinction is superior on the grounds of descriptive economy. Finally, in sec¬
tion 6.6, we introduce evidence, defeasibility evidence, which not only reinforces
the claim made in section 5.7 that the extension of conceptual structures may
involve sense correction, but also supports the head modifier distinction: while
heads have priority with respect to combination, modifiers have priority with
respect to correction. Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Unification Grammar
A unification grammar is a grammar which represents the information associated
with linguistic expressions in terms of partial feature structures and combines
these structures through unification. Examples of unification grammars include
Functional Unification Grammar (cf. Kay 1979), Definite Clause Grammar (cf.
Pereira and Warren 1980), Lexical Functional Grammar (cf. Bresnan and Kaplan
1982), Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (cf. Gazdar et al. 1985), Head-
driven Phrase Structure Grammar (cf. Pollard 1985; Pollard and Sag 1987) and
Unification Categorial Grammar (cf. Calder et al. 1987; Zeevat et al. 1987;
Zeevat 1988; Andry et al. forthcoming).
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In unification grammars, feature structures are characterized as sets of prop¬
erties or attribute value pairs1. Since we have already discussed these structures
in chapters 4 and 5, we shall simply illustrate their use in unification grammar
to account for subject verb agreement in the phrase deer run.
Let us assume that there are substructures within the subject deer and the
verb run given in (6.1) and (6.2) respectively:
(6.1)
subject : agr : person : third
(6.2)
verb : agr : number : plural
Let us further assume that the rule of agreement is represented by the template
in (6.3)2.
(6.3)
verb : agr : X
subject : agr : X
This template imposes an equality relation between the value of the agreement
properties of subjects and verbs through the use of the shared variable X: i.e.
the value of agr in subjects and verbs must be identical. The unification process
attempts to induce a resultant structure by recursively substituting the substruc¬
tures mentioned in the template with their unifications. The structure in (6.3)
can be successfully unified with that in (6.1) and the structure in (6.4) is in¬
duced:
1 Attribute value pairs are also known as label-value pairs, feature-value pairs and
parameter-value pairs.
2An equivalent way of representing this rule is by the path equation Cverb agr>
== <subj a.gr>.
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(6.4)
verb : agr : person : third
subject : agr : person : third
where the substructure [person : third] is shared between the agr properties of
subject and verb on account of the shared variable X in (6.3).
Unification of (6.2) with (6.4) induces (6.5):
(6.5)
verb : agr :





where the value of the verb's agr property is further specified with pair [number :
plural] and, via the shared variable in the template, this pair is shared with the
subject's agr property. Thus unification of (6.1) and (6.2) with (6.3) required two
substitutions, one for <verb agr person> and one for <subject agr number>, and
through the shared variable their values are shared with <subject agr person>
and Cverb agr number> respectively. Furthermore, since unification is commu¬
tative, these substitutions also take place with the subject and verb structures
inducing the following structures respectively:
(6-6)




verb : agr :
person : third
number : plural
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The result of unifying structures then makes more determinate the linguistic
structures associated with lexical expressions: unifying the structures associated
with deer and run via the template in (6.3) results in a structure for a third
person plural expression.
This example illustrates two central properties of the unification process:
monotonicity and order-independent. It is monotonic since the information in
the input structures is always preserved in the resultant structure. Unification
can never lose or change information in the input structures; nor can it add in¬
formation not present in at least one of these structures. The resultant structure
in (6.5) accordingly contains all and only the information in the input structures,
(6.1), (6.2) and (6.3). Furthermore unification is order-independent: the result
of a series of unifications is independent of the actual order of these unifications.
This property is intimately connected with monotonicity: since unification can
only add, not change or lose, information in the initial structures, the order in
which they are unified will not affect the resultant structure. In the above exam¬
ple, (6.2) could have been unified with (6.3) and then (6.1) with the result of the
first unification and (6.5) would still have resulted.
Representing the information associated with lexical expressions with feature
structures and combining them through a unification process has three important
consequences for unification grammar.
Firstly, unification grammars are declarative since there is a straightforward,
systematic correlation between the unification process and the application of
identity constraints: unification involves the simultaneous satisfaction of identity
equations. The unification process is closely related to set-theoretic union: the
union of two sets is simply the addition of all their members; and a series of
unions is independent of the order in which sets are added together. As a conse¬
quence when combination rules are based solely upon unification, the grammar
is monotonic and order-independent. So although the unification process can be
specified as an algorithm, the properties of monotonicity and order-independence
ensure that how the process is computed does not affect what the result will be,
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given the same inputs3. The chief advantage of such grammars is that the struc¬
tures associated with lexical expressions can be treated as axioms in a logic and
combination rules as rules of inference. Treating grammar as logic gives gram¬
marians access to some powerful tools for analyzing grammars, including their
semantics.
Not all unification grammars are monotonic and order-independent, however.
For combination in unification grammar can be characterized in terms of processes
other than unification and these can be nonmonotonic and/or order-dependent.
When such processes are allowed in the grammar, the systematic correlations with
identity statements is lost. For example, the unification process will fail when its
input structures are incompatible. However, incompatibility can be resolved by
another process in the grammar which allows the values of one structure to have
priority over those of the other structure. For example, an 'overwriting' process
is used in PATR-II to resolve lexical conflicts:
Overwriting is a noncommutative operation akin to destructive uni¬
fication except that, in the case of unification "clashes", one of the
operands (say, the rightmost) is given precedence. Thus, unlike uni¬
fication, overwriting never fails, (cf. Shieber 1986: 60).
Combination then is non-monotonic and order-dependent: some information has
been lost in the course of combining the structures; and the overwriting process
is ordered after the unification process. In sum unification simply favours, as
opposed to requires, grammar to be monotonic and order-independent.
Secondly, unification favours lexicalist grammars: i.e. grammars in which
the burden of combinatorial information is associated with the structures in the
lexicon rather than associated with combination rules. As a result, although
lexical structures are highly complex, the combination rules are simple and few
3Accordingly, unification allows a free choice of processing strategy and control
structure in computational models of the grammar (cf. Karttunen 1986).
Chapter 6. Principles of Linguistic Combination 209
in number. Unification grammars tend to be lexicalist grammars for two rea¬
sons. Firstly, such structures provide a means of representing large quantities of
complex information. Secondly, since unification is monotonic, it prohibits many
traditional rules which lose or change information specified in lexical structures.
Note that this again is only a tendency: if rules are monotonic then derivational
grammars are still monotonic (cf. Anderson and Durand 1986; Kalman 1988).
Thirdly, unification favours surface-based grammars: i.e. grammars which de¬
rive representations for phrases and sentences without mediating levels of struc¬
ture. This contrasts with derivational grammars, such as Aspects, which are not
surface-based grammars since combination is characterized through the deriva¬
tion of a surface structure from an underlying level of representation, deep struc¬
ture, by transformational rules which create further mediating levels of structure
(cf. Chomsky 1965). Unification grammars tend to be surface-based because
combination can be characterized in terms of a combination principle which in¬
corporates more than one process. For example, the combination principle in
Unification Categorial Grammar, Functional Application, incorporates the pro¬
cesses of instantiation and stripping. With the application of a rule based upon
a single principle, there can be no mediating levels of representation.
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6.3 Unification Categorial Grammar
Unification Categorial Grammar (UCG) is a unification grammar whose combi¬
natorial principle is based upon the functor argument distinction in categorial
grammar (cf. Ajdukiewicz 1935; Montague 1974; Vennemann and Harlow 1977;
Flynn 1982). A categorial grammar is defined in terms of a set of linguistic
categories and a category-based combination principle. The set of permissible
categories is defined recursively starting with the basic categories, NP and S4.
1. NP and S are categories.
2. If A and B are categories, then A\B is a category.
3. Nothing else is a category.
The combination principle is functional application:
Functional Application (FA)
If X is an expression of category A\B and Y is an expression of cate¬
gory B, then the concatenation XY is an expression of the category
A.
An argument then is a simple category B. A functor is a complex category,
A\B, composed of three parts: '|' which denotes a function, the 'take' category
B denoting the input to the function and the 'make' category A denoting the
output of the function. In this way, functors denote functions over, or relations
between, 'take' and 'make' categories. A particular categorial grammar arises
when a list of lexical expressions are associated with one, or more, categories.
4Directionality in combination is ignored: '|' covers both forward and backward
functional application in categorial grammar.
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The set of expressions such a grammar generates is simply the closure of the list
of lexical expressions under functional application (cf. Zeevat 1988: 203).
In categorial grammar there is strict isomorphism between the syntactic and
semantic components: for each syntactic category there is a corresponding se¬
mantic category and for each syntactic rule a corresponding semantic rule5. Ac¬
cordingly, the basic syntactic categories s and np correspond to propositions and
individuals respectively, complex categories, A\B, to a function from semantic
objects of type B to semantic objects of type A and functional application to
application of the meaning of A\B to the meaning of B, resulting in a meaning
of type A.
The central insights of categorial grammar then are that semantic and syntac¬
tic categories are either basic or complex and categories combine as functors and
arguments. Whereas basic categories are defined intrinsically, complex categories
are defined extrinsically: i.e. purely in terms of the functional relation between
two other categories, categories which themselves may be basic or complex. For
example, both syntactic categories, s|np and s|(s|np), are complex categories:
the former is defined as a function from the basic category np to the basic cat¬
egory s and the later as a function from (s|np) — itself a function from np to
s — to the category s. Such categories combine asymmetrically as functor and
argument: a functor is a category of type A\B which takes, or consumes, a cate¬
gory of type B and makes, or yields, a category of the type A; and an argument
is a category of type B6.
5Categorial grammar embodies the rule-to-rule hypothesis (cf. Dowty et al. 1981;
Steedman 1986).
6It should be noted that argument- categories are not necessarily basic: although
the functor must be a complex category, the argument may also be a complex category.
For example, the syntactic categories s|(s|np) and s|np can combine as functor and
argument respectively.
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ucg extends categorial grammar by characterizing linguistic representations
as feature structures and functional application as, in part, a unification process.
In particular, grammatical representations are characterized as signs (cf. Pollard
1985; Pollard and Sag 1987). Signs provide a partial but unitary description of
phonological, syntactic and semantic level information associated with linguistic
expressions.
Two sorts of variables are used in the sign: cross-level variables and category
variables. With cross-level variables, the same variable occurs at different levels
of description. Since the same variable must be given the same instantiation,
this imposes restrictions between different levels of description, restrictions which
perform an analogous function to the rule-to-rule hypothesis in Combinatorial
Categorial Grammar (cf. Ades and Steedman 1982; Steedman 1984; Steedman
1985; Steedman 1986). In particular, while functional application combines signs
in terms of representations on the syntactic level, with the same variable on both
the syntactic and semantic levels, the semantic level of the sign can be specified
as a side-effect of combination. Category variables are variables which range
over syntactic categories. Although previous unification grammar approaches
have used variables which range over features within the syntactic level, ucg
is innovative in allowing variables to range over the category types themselves
(cf. Bouma 1988). One effect of this is that functors can be polymorphic: their
identity, in terms of what signs they take and make, is not determinately specified
but rather varies with the signs they combine with. Another effect is that ucg
can offer a uniform, extrinsic definition of parts of speech. For example, verbs
are signs whose categories are of the type s|AA, where X ranges over the set of
categories and thus the category verb includes s|np|np, s|np and so on. This
definition holds at each stage of combination: for example, in Prince loves Cat,
loves is characterized at each stage of extension as a sign whose syntactic category
is a verb.
Although grammatical representations in ucg are more complex than those
in other categorial grammars, functional application is not. The simplest com-
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bination rule would be straightforward unification: the result sign is merely the
(symmetrical) merging of the combining signs. This of course is not possible
since functional application is necessarily asymmetrical. UCG resolves this ten¬
sion between symmetrical unification and asymmetrical functional application by
limiting the scope of unification. While functional application combines signs in
terms of their syntactic level, only part of the functor sign, the syntactic speci¬
fication of what it takes, is unified with the whole of the argument sign. Since
unification is commutative, both these structures will become more determinate
through successful unification. Furthermore, with cross-level variables between
the syntactic level and the semantic level in the functor sign, the semantic level
will also become more determinate through combination. After unification has
taken place, a second, asymmetry, process takes effect: the result sign is con¬
structed by 'stripping' the functor sign. Thus functional application is a combi¬
natorial principle which induces a result sign by stripping the functor sign after
part of it has unified with the argument sign. The advantage of this characteriza¬
tion of functional application is that the combination involves the simultaneous
construction of different levels of linguistic description.
In UCG, the basic grammatical representation is a sign E. A sign is an struc¬
ture, which has four major properties: phonology (W), (syntactic) category (C),
semantics (S) and order (0). We shall consistently represent a UCG sign as a list
in either vertical or horizontal format; for example, W:C:S:0. We now consider
the value of each attribute in turn before describing and illustrating combination
in terms of functional application.
The value of the phonology property W is a phonological representation of
the expression. In standard treatments of UCG this is taken to be the standard
orthographic representation for convenience (cf. Calder et al. 1987: 9). We too
shall ignore it.
The value of the property category C is either atomic or complex as in cat-
egorial grammar. Unlike categorial grammar, however, there are three atomic
syntactic categories namely NP, SENT and NOUN. Two categories, SENT and NP,
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admit further morpho-syntactic feature specifications based on those employed
in GPSG (cf. Gazdar et al. 1985). This allows for the expression of distinctions
within the same 'major' category; for example, SENT[fin] for sentences with fi¬
nite verb forms and NP[nom] for noun phrases marked for nominative case. Of
course since values can be variables, the feature of such categories may be left
unspecified: SENT can be read as SENT[.F] where F is a variable ranging over
morpho-syntactic features.
The value of category is complex when it is additionally specified for the signs
with which they combine. Complex categories are of the form C\Sign, where C
is a category, atomic or complex, and Sign is the sign with which it can combine
(cf. A\B in standard categorial grammar). For example, the transitive verb visit
is associated with a sign whose category attribute has the value SENT[fin]|NP|NP.
Here Sign is a sign with the category value NP and C is a complex category
SENT[fin]|NP which is of the form C\Sign where Sign is a sign with the category
value NP and C the basic category SENT[fin], In other words, the sign for visit
says it is a finite verb form and that it combines with two other signs of the
category NP. Thus at each stage in the derivation of a sentence, the category
value of the sign will remain constant i.e. SENT[fin],
Categories are formally defined as follows (cf. Zeevat 1988: 204):
1. An atomic category (together with a syntactic feature specification) is a
category.
2. If A is a category, and B is a sign, then A\B is a category.
With complex categories, B is termed the active part of the category (cf. A), and
when A\B occurs as a category it is a functor sign (or active sign) and the sign
with which it combines can be termed the argument sign (or inert sign) Thus any
sign which has A\B as a category value combining with the sign B is a functor.
The value of the property semantics is a logical formula in an indexed language,
INL. Interpretation in INL is closely linked to that of Discourse Representation
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Theory (cf. Kamp 1981, Heim 1982). For example, the semantics representation
of Prince loves Cat is a formula where the arguments of the predicate have
constant values:
LOVE(PRINCE, CAT)
One of the crucial differences between INL and DRT is every formula has a special
(reserved) variable called an index7. The value of an index is a specification of the
type of entity described by the expression. Index variables form a subsumption
hierarchy as illustrated in figure 6-1. Finally, sort declaration can be made by a
mass(m) count (c) event (e) state (s ) process (p)
Figure 6—1: The semantic type hierarchy in UCG
predication outwith the body of the formula. Thus (6.3) and (6.3) are notationally
equivalent:
(state(a) [LOVE(a, PRINCE, CAT))
(LOVE(s, PRINCE, CAT))
where the index variable indicates that the formula describes the state of Prince
loving Cat.
' Other differences concern the use of polymorphic functors and the treatment of
modifiers (cf. Calder et al. 1987).
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The value of the property order is either pre or post. If a sign has an order value
pre and is an argument in functional application, then its functor sign precedes it.
On the other hand if it is an argument but has the value post, then its functor sign
follows it. In categorial grammar the linear ordering of functors and arguments
is represented in the directionality of the slash in the functor: i.e. a forward slash
functor corresponds to pre and a backward slash functor to post. This imposes
a strict locality constraint: only adjacent signs can combine. However, unlike
standard categorial grammar, the order property can be underspecified and so
the sign can combine with a preceding or following functor.
Signs are combined by functional application which relies upon two processes
— instantiation and stripping. These are defined as follows (cf. Zeevat 1988:
205):
Instantiation
S3 is the instantiation of Si with respect to S2 if it results from Si
by unifying Si's active part with S2.
Stripping
Given a sign Si with category A\B, the result of stripping Si is the
sign S2 just like Si except that its phonology is the concatenation of
Si's and B's phonology, and its category is stripped down to A.
The combination principle, functional application, is defined as follows:
Functional Application (fa)
Let Si and S2 be wellformed signs. Then stripping the instantiation
of Si with respect to S2 also results in a wellformed sign.
The set of well-formed expressions generated by UCG are defined as the phonolo¬
gies of well-formed signs. The set of well-formed signs is defined as the closure of
the lexicon under functional application.
We shall now illustrate how signs for the expressions Prince, loves, and Cat are
combined with functional application to yield a sign for the complex expression
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Both proper names Prince and Cat have the following values for their major
properties: W has the value of the standard orthographic representation; C has
the value of the primitive syntactic category NP; and S has the values PRINCE
and CAT respectively. The sign for loves is somewhat more complex. The value
of W is its standard orthographic representation. The value of C tells us it is a
complex category, C|5, where S is a sign E with the following attribute values:
C has the value NPfacc]; S has an indeterminate value y; 0 has the value sf
post — if E is an argument its functor follows it. The value of C is itself a
complex category, C|5, where C has the value of finite verb form and S is a
sign El with the following attribute value: C has the value NPfnom]; S has the
indeterminate value x; 0 has the value pre — if El is an argument its functor
precedes it. Crucially then the sign for loves imposes restrictions on its argument
signs. The value of loves semantic property S is a formula with the sortal variable
e and a two-place predicate where first variable, x, is shared with the value of the
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of the semantic attribute of the sign E. Thus loves denotes an event e which is
the event of x loving y. Finally, the value of its order property is not specified.
The combination of these signs begins with the combination of the sign for
loves and Cat. In this case, the SENT sign is the functor sign and the NP sign
is the argument sign E. The instantiation process unifies the active part of the














Although both signs are instantiated with this unification, the functional appli¬
cation is only concerned with the effects of unification on the functor sign. The

















The most important effect of instantiation on the functor sign arises as a result
of the cross-level variable y. Since the variable y is shared in both its category
and semantic attributes, instantiation at the syntactic level has a side-effect on
the semantic level: the semantics value of loves is now more determinate in that
it describes an event in which a specific individual Cat is loved.
The second process in functional application, stripping, takes the instanti¬







Apart from the concatenation of phonological values, the effect of the stripping
process has been the removal from the category value of the satisfied argument
sign. Of course in this case, the category value of loves has not been satiated: it
still has to satisfied by combining with the sign (partially) specified in its category
value.
The result sign in (6.16) is the sign which combines with the sign for Prince.






and stripping this sign induces (6.18), the result of functional application:




which is the sign from the complex expression Prince loves Cat.
This example illustrates five key properties of combination in UCG. Firstly,
it is surface-based: no underlying structures were invoked in the construction of
the result sign Prince loves Cat. Secondly, it is lexicalist: the burden of combina¬
torial information, such as subcategorization, is located in the signs themselves.
Thirdly, it is monotonic: information specified in combining signs is never lost
or changed, but only added. Fourthly, the semantic value of signs is not directly
affected by functional application, but rather emerges as a side-effect. Finally,
and most importantly, the functor sign is central to combination as befit a cat-
egorial grammar: it partially specifies the argument sign it combines with; and
it partially specifies the result sign of the combination. The result sign is thus
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6.4 The Head Modifier Distinction in Combi¬
nation
In UCG, not only is functor argument distinction central to the combination prin¬
ciple, functional application, but one of the signs, the functor sign, is prioritized
with respect to combination: the argument sign unifies with one part of the func¬
tor sign and, once stripped, the functor sign is the result sign. In the cognitive
linguistic approach, however, combination in the linguistic processing module is
based not upon the functor argument distinction but upon the head modifier dis¬
tinction: signs combine as head and modifier to yield a result sign for the phrase.
The head sign thus has priority in this combination process. Of course, this char¬
acterization of signs and their combination is similar to that in UCG. In fact, it
might appear that 'head' and 'functor' are interchangeable terms for the priori¬
tized sign in combination. However, this is not so. As we shall see in section 6.5,
they differ in which lexical expression in a phrase is assigned priority and, as
a consequence, the ease with which linguistic generalizations can be expressed.
Before we compare these distinctions, we shall motivate the head modifier as¬
signments in some simple phrases in terms of three combinatorial properties, and
characterize the priority of the head sign over the modifier sign on the basis of
their semantics.
6.4.1 Motivating the Priority of Heads
The head modifier assignments in the cognitive linguistic approach are based
upon traditional assignments where, for example, the noun is head of the NP and
verb the head of the VP (cf. Chomsky 1970: 210; Jackendoff 1977; Gazdar and
Pullum 1981). Table 6-1 shows head modifier assignments in a range of simple
phrases.
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phrase head modifier example
noun-verb verb noun elephants run
verb-noun verb noun saw elephants
adjective-noun noun adjective grey elephants
verb-adverb verb adverb run slowly
determiner-noun noun determiner the elephant
auxiliary-verb verb auxiliary may run
adverb-adjective adjective adverb very grey
Table 6—1: Traditional head modifier assignments
In motivating priority of heads in these phrases, our starting point is the set
of properties discussed in the 'Zwicky-Hudson' debate (cf. Zwicky 1985; Hud¬
son 1987; Corbett et al. forthcoming). They discuss the following potentially
distinctive properties of head signs or, more traditionally, head categories8:
governor the category which determines the morphological form of the other
category in the construction without showing any analogous variation itself.
determinant of concord the category which determines the morphological form
of the other category in the construction and does show analogous variation
itself.
morphosyntactic locus the potential inflectional locus, the category in the
construction on which inflectional features signalling syntactic relations be¬
tween constructions will be marked if the language has the appropriate
morphology.
8We ignore 'ruler' of dependency-based analyses.
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distributional equivalent the category with roughly the same distribution as
the whole construction.
subcategorizand the category which is subcategorized with respect to its ability
to occur with a particular set of categories.
semantic functor the category which determines the semantic type of the phrase.
obligatory category the category which must be present for construction to
be categorized as it is.
Zwicky's objective in discussing these properties is to find a notion of head useful
for morpho-syntactic feature percolation in the sense of the Head Feature Conven¬
tion in GPSG and HPSG (cf. Gazdar et al. 1985; Pollard and Sag 1987). The head
is identified as the category whose major morpho-syntactic features are passed up
to, and thereby identical with, those of the result category. Zwicky identifies the
head as the morphosyntactic locus: the head is identified as the category upon
which inflections relevant to the construction are (potentially) located. In partic¬
ular, he argues that only the morphosyntactic locus correctly identified the head:
categories identified by other properties fail to systematically identify the head
for feature percolation. The assignments for some constructions are illustrated
in table 6-2.
phrase head modifier example
determiner-noun noun determiner the elephant
noun-verb verb noun elephants run
verb-noun verb noun saw elephants
auxiliary-verb auxiliary verb may run
Table 6-2: Zwicky's head modifier assignments
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In a reply to Zwicky, Hudson argues that, with the exception of concord,
the head of a phrase possesses all of these properties: what one picks out as
head, each of the others also picks out as head (cf. Hudson 1987). Hudson's
head modifier assignments are illustrated in table 6-3. According to Hudson,
phrase head modifier example
determiner-noun determiner noun the elephant
noun-verb verb noun elephants run
verb-noun verb noun saw elephants
auxiliary-verb auxiliary verb may run
Table 6—3: Hudson's head modifier assignments
the head is a fundamental notion in linguistics since it represents the systematic
convergence of six independent properties. Furthermore, since both syntactic
and semantic properties are involved, the notion provides an important point
of contact and congruence between the syntactic and semantic structures of a
sentence (cf. Hudson 1987: 124).
While we agree with Hudson in treating the head as a fundamental linguistic
notion, we differ both in head modifier assignments and the distinctive proper¬
ties of heads. In the first place, a comparison of assignments given in table 6-1
and table 6-3 reveals that there is disagreement over which category is head in
determiner-noun and auxiliary-verb combinations: while we treat the noun and
verb as heads, Hudson treats the determiner and auxiliary as heads. In the sec¬
ond place, Hudson's assignments are inherently weak since he does not claim
that the head category necessarily possesses all of these properties. Rather he
makes the weaker claim that there is a tendency for heads to possess these prop¬
erties. As a result, a head category in a particular construction may not possess
these properties, or the same property may be possessed by both the head and
modifier category. Such an approach, however, is not adequate as a basis for a
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combination principle. That is, combination cannot be based upon a head mod¬
ifier distinction if the very properties upon which the distinction is founded are
not possessed by the head in a particular construction, or are possessed by both
categories. Accordingly, these properties will be considered from the perspective
of determining adequate properties for a head modifier combination principle.
Morpho-syntactic properties
The three morpho-syntactic properties are morpho-syntactic locus, governor and
concord determinant. Unfortunately, the morpho-syntactic locus property is inde¬
terminate and neither the government nor concord properties are systematically
present in constructions.
The morphosyntactic locus is indeterminate. For this property can be used
to argue that both categories in a phrase are heads, or that one or the other is
head, depending upon which morpho-syntactic features are treated as relevant.
Consider a noun-verb construction like girls kiss. Both categories are marked for
number and person, but only the verb is marked for tense. Consequently, if we
focus on the location of the tense feature, then the verb is identified as head.
Alternatively, we could focus on the location of number and person features, in
which case both categories are identified as head. Furthermore, in determiner-
noun constructions such as the boys, the noun is the morphosyntactic locus since
it, not the determiner, is marked for number. However, as Hudson himself points




Additionally, the determiner alone can be the morphosyntactic locus as with the
following examples where the noun is morphologically unmarked:
(6.21) this sheep
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(6.22) these sheep
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A similar situation occurs in French for gender where only the determiner is
marked for gender in la femme, but both are marked for plural number in les
femes.
Government is not manifest in all types of construction nor in all occurrences
of each type. According to Hudson, government is only manifest in three out of
the four construction types given in table 6-3. In both noun-verb, and verb-noun
constructions, the verb is the governor since it determines case-marking on the
nouns; for example, he kissed her. In auxiliary-verb constructions, the auxiliary
is the governor since it determines the morphological form of the verb:
(6.23) he will kiss her (infinitival)
(6.24) he is kissing her (present participal)
(6.25) he had kissed her (past participal)
Even within these constructions types, however, government is not manifest con¬
sistently. In the first two types of construction, for example, government is only
manifest on personal pronoun, not on proper names or common nouns. In other
constructions, such as adjective-noun, adverb-adjective and verb-adverb, there is
no manifestation of government, at least in English.
Concord, likewise, is not consistently manifest in English. In some construc¬
tions, such as adverb-adjective, verb-adverb and auxiliary-verb, there is no man¬
ifestation of concord. In the remaining constructions, concord may be mani¬
fest, as with number person agreement in noun-verb constructions, but is not
consistently manifest. For example, while (6.19) and (6.20) demonstrate the
possibility of number agreement in determiner-noun constructions, the lack of
morpho-syntactic co-variation in examples like the book demonstrate that it is
not systematic within the construction.
In sum, morpho-syntactic properties do not provide a suitable basis for head
assignments.
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Distributional Equivalent
The distributional equivalent is inadequate as an identification property for heads
since it is difficult to apply and indeterminate in some constructions.
The property is difficult to apply on account of its definition as 'the cate¬
gory which has roughly the same distribution as the whole construction'. The
difficulty stems from how to interpret 'roughly' and 'distribution'. It could be
argued that each construction type is associated with a distinct set of environ¬
ments; for example, a noun phrase occurs in pre and post verbal positions, post
prepositional positions and so on. 'Roughly' might then be taken to mean that
the distributional equivalent is the constituent which occurs in most, if not all,
of these environments. The difficulty with this interpretation is that there is
no established threshold for determining how many environments the category
needs to occur in, or whether some are more important than others. For example,
men but not fat can occur in environments where the construction fat men can
occur:
(6.26) the dietician spoke to fat men
(6.27) the dietician spoke to men
(6.28) 'the dietician spoke to fat
(6.29) fat men eat too much
(6.30) men eat too much
(6.31) 'fat eat too much
However, this clearly does not hold for all constructions as the following determiner-
noun constructions show:
(6.32) John read a book
(6.33) "John read book
(6.34) 'John read a
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This property suggests conflicting head assignments in auxiliary-verb con¬
structions, since either the auxiliary or the verb can be treated as distributional
equivalent:
(6.35) the goths will kill the barbarians.
(6.36) the goths kill the barbarians.
(6.37) "the goths will the barbarians.
(6.38) he will control these penguins
(6.39) *he control these penguins
(6.40) *he will these penguins
Zwicky argued that examples like (6.35) to (6.37) show that the verb is the
distributional equivalent. Hudson, on the hand, argues that examples such as
(6.38) to (6.40) demonstrate that the verb cannot consistently substitute for
the whole construction since they lack the appropriate morpho-syntactic form.
Further, he claims that the auxiliary can be substituted for the whole construction
in cases of VP ellipsis:
(6.41) why are you worrying?
(6.42) why are you?
Rather than simply admit that this property will pick out different categories as
head in different instances of the same construction, Hudson gives undue weight
to the elliptical examples and claims that the auxiliary is head.
Hudson adopts the same tack in another construction, the determiner-noun
constructions. On the basis of elliptical examples, determiners can be the distri¬
butional equivalent9:
9As Lyons points out, NPs with common nouns have a. distribution closer to that of
a. proper name or personal pronoun than to a common noun (cf. Lyons 1977b: 392).
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(6.43) John trimmed each carrot carefully
(6.44) John trimmed each carefully
(6.45) John trimmed the carrot carefully
(6.46) "John trimmed carrot carefully
Yet in other examples of such constructions, the reverse situation holds and the
noun cannot be elided:
(6.47) John trimmed the carrots carefully
(6.48) John trimmed carrots carefully
(6.49) "John trimmed the carefully
Again, rather than simply admit that the criterion is indeterminate, Hudson
maintains that the determiner, not the noun, is head in this construction.
Subcategorizand
Given that morpho-syntactic properties and the distributional equivalent are not
adequate to identify heads for the purposes of combination, three properties re¬
main: subcategorizand, semantic functor and obligatory category.
The traditional notion of subcategorization derives from transformational
grammar (cf. Chomsky 1965). While all lexical categories were assigned a major
syntactic type, some were also assigned a subcategory type. The function of this
latter type was to provide a number of subcategories of the major type. For ex¬
ample, lexical categories with the major type verb could be subcategorized into
intransitive, transitive and di-transitive verbs on the basis of their subcategoriza¬
tion type. An intransitive verb like run would be assigned the major syntactic
type verb and the subcategory NP. Both the category and sub-category type then
acted as restrictions on the phrase-marker into which they could be inserted. The
lexical category associated with run could only be inserted into a phrase-marker
with the type verb where one of its sister constituents was of the type NP.
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One of the consequences of the distinction between lexical and phrasal cat¬
egories is that only lexical categories can be subcategorizands. Accordingly,
Zwicky and Hudson agree that neither elephants nor run are subcategorizands
in noun-verb constructions like elephants run since neither are lexical categories:
they are treated as phrasal categories. They also agree that the auxiliary in
auxiliary-verb constructions and the verb in verb-noun constructions are subcat¬
egorizands since the other category is phrasal. It is arguable, however, that the
distinction between lexical and phrasal categories is irrelevant to the head mod¬
ifier distinction in combination: it is not the status of a category as lexical or
phrasal but the type and properties of combining categories which is pertinent
to combination.
The subcategorizand property can be refined on the assumption that the syn¬
tactic and semantic properties of categories are directly relevant to combination.
In particular, the subcategorizand property identifies as head the category which
is syntactically and semantically specified by the other category. As Jesperson
(1924: 96) says:
The chief word [head] is defined (qualified, modified) by another word,
which may be defined (qualified, modified) by a third word.
In other words, the head is the subcategorizand because it is specified by the
modifier: combination with a modifier category (potentially) results in a more
specific sort, or subcategory, of the head category. With large elephants, for ex¬
ample, the noun elephants is semantically specified by the adjective large: the
size of the elephants is specified as large. The modifier may also specify syntactic
properties of the head; in two elephants the quantifier two confirms the plural
number on the head elephants. These examples illustrate two effects of specifi-
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cation on the head: the addition of new properties; and confirmation of existing
properties.10
This property can be further illustrated with Vendler's classification of dy¬
namic verbs into activities, achievements and accomplishments (cf. Vendler
1967). A verb like paint has an accomplishment reading when its theme role
is specified. As an accomplishment, it is grammatical in durative and telic con¬
texts:
(6.50) Picasso painted a picture
(6.51) Picasso painted a picture for three days (durative)
(6.52) It took Picasso three days to paint a picture (telic)
When theme is not specified, paint has an activity reading and is ungrammatical
in telic contexts:
(6.53) Picasso painted
(6.54) Picasso painted for three days
(6.55) *It took Picasso to paint a picture
Likewise, stative or dynamic readings of some verbs are dependent upon the
semantics of the specifying category. With runs, for example, the verb only
occurs as a present participle when its theme role is specified as ANIMATE:
(6.56) the seagull runs along the beach
(6.57) the seagull is running along the beach
(6.58) the seashore runs along the beach
(6.59) The seashore is running along the beach
10There is a third effect, namely changing properties of the head. This is discussed
in section 6.6.
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Finally, a verb like opened only has an 'agentive' reading when its theme role is
specified as SENTIENT:
(6.60) the sailor opened the door
(6.61) the sailor opened the door in order to see the seagull
(6.62) the wind opened the door
(6.63) *the wind opened the door in order to see the seagull
Thus only with an agentive reading can it grammatically occur with purposive
clauses.
Semantic Functor
Identifying which category in a phrase is the functor and which is the argument
is not a straightforward task. As Zwicky (1985: 4) observed, either category can,
in principle, be assigned the status of functor with sufficient ingenuity. Although
we will return to the question of the distinctive properties of the functor in
section 6.5, we will adopt as a second distinctive property of heads Hudson's
notion of 'kind of' which he sees as a 'sharpening' of the semantic functor property.
The 'kind of' property identifies the head as the category which provides the
semantic 'kind' of the result category. In fact, this notion can be generalized into
a category determinant property: the head is the category which determines,
or provides, the syntactic and semantic kind, or type, of the result category (cf.
Hjelmslev 1939). This ensures a systematic relationship between the semantic and
syntactic behaviour of combining categories: whatever category contributes the
semantic type also contributes the syntactic type (cf. Hudson 1987). This is also
consistent with the head as subcategorizand: the head provides the syntactic and
semantic type and the modifier specifies, or specializes, its syntactic and semantic
properties. These properties, subca.tegoriza.nd and category determinant, thus
converge to identify as head the category which determines the syntactic and
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semantic type of the result category whereas the other category, the modifier,
specifies properties of this category.
In noun-verb and verb-noun constructions, the verb contributes the syntactic
type, a kind of verb, and the semantic type, a kind of event. The noun specializes
these types by specifying one of its linguistically relevant roles. In John laughs,
for example, the verb determines that the result category is a kind of verb and
a kind of event, and the noun specializes this category as an intransitive verb
and as an event with a participant called John. Thus the construction is kind
of event rather than a kind of person. Likewise control these penguins describes
a kind of controlling event rather than a kind of penguins. In auxiliary-verb
constructions, the verb also contributes the syntactic and semantic type to the
result category; in John may control the penguins the result category is a kind
of verb, not auxiliary, and a kind of event, not possibility11. Likewise, in a
determiner-noun construction, such as the penguins, the result category is a kind
of noun, not determiner, and a kind of entity, not definiteness12.
Obligatory Category
The obligatoriness property also converges with the subcategorization and cate¬
gory determinant (or 'kind of') properties. The obligatory category is identified
as the head of the phrase (cf. Hjelmslev 1939; Miller 1985: 27; Anderson 1986:
55). The notion of obligatoriness, however, must be approached with caution
since the absence of a category can indicate either optional or elliptical status
(cf. Zwicky 1985: 13). Head categories are obligatory since they provide the
syntactic and semantic types of the result category; without these, the result
11 See Hudson (1987: 115) for an alternative treatment where the auxiliary provides
the semantic type; for example, may like describes a kind of possibility rather than a
kind of liking.
12See Radford (forthcoming) for an alternative treatment.
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category would not be defined. Consequently, when the head category is ab¬
sent, it must be elliptical rather than optional: it is implicit in the discourse and
when re-constructed from context provides the syntactic and semantic types of
the phrase (cf. Matthews 1981: 38-45). For example, in the context of talking
about two films, the head noun (film) can be elided as in I didn't see either (cf.
Nichols forthcoming). Modifier categories, on the other hand, are not obliga¬
tory in this sense. In phrases where they are obligatory, it is the head category
which provides the types; for example, the result category in the auxiliary-verb
phrase the elephant may like hay is syntactically a kind of verb and semantically
a kind of event. Modifier categories are obligatory in such constructions in order
to provide properties necessary for the result category, properties which are not
provided by the head itself. For example, the result of combining a verb with an
auxiliary verb must be specified for tense and if this is not inherent in the verb
(like), then it must be provided by the auxiliary verb modifier (may).
In sum, the subcategorizand, category determinant and obligatory category
properties are all properties of the same category and this category is the head
of a phrase. These properties support, or at least coincide with, the traditional
assignments given in table 6-1. Furthermore, these three properties underpin
combination in the cognitive linguistic approach: phrases are characterized as
the sign which results from the extension of a head sign through specification
by a modifier sign. The head sign thus provides the'syntactic and semantic
type of the result sign so long as the modifier sign does not specify properties
incompatible with those of the head.13 The head sign is also obligatory since it is
necessary for specification by the modifier sign and for the existence of the result
14
sign.
13This limit on specification is one way in which head signs have priority over modifier
signs: category determination, a combinatorial effect associated with head signs, has
priority over specification, a combinatorial effect associated with modifier signs.
14Since head signs are lexical signs and result signs are identical to head signs after
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6.4.2 Characterizing the Priority of Heads
In the cognitive linguistic approach to combination, the systematic priority of a
head sign over the modifier sign is primarily characterized in terms of their se¬
mantic types: the semantic type of a head sign outranks the semantic type of the
modifier sign. Characterizing the priority of heads in the ranking of elements is
well-established in dependency grammar. The fundamental notion in dependency
grammar is that expressions are related by a systematic, asymmetrical 'depen¬
dency' relationship where the head has priority over the modifier expression. This
notion is well-established in linguistic theory and predates modern linguistics (cf.
Owens 1988). In this century, the notion has been developed informally by Jes-
person and Hjelmslev to name but two (cf. Jesperson 1924; Hjelmslev 1939).
The head modifier relation has been employed in formal grammars as the fun¬
damental relation between categories within a construction (cf. Tesniere 1959;
Hays 1964; Robinson 1970a.; Robinson 1970b; Anderson 1971; Anderson 1977;
Anderson 1979; Hudson 1984; Hudson 1990). In the dependency case grammar
developed by John Anderson, expressions are ranked on the basis of their 'greater
strength in some substantive property' (cf. Anderson 1971; Anderson 1977; An¬
derson 1989). Anderson identifies two types of substantive properties: phonetic
and semantic. Syntactic categories are constructed out of a subset of semantic
features, features which are related by dependency and association. Thus the
internal structure of words determines their external structure: word combina¬
tion is determined by the internal structure of words. Words are structured in
terms of two categorial features: N (potentially referential) and P (potentially
predicative). Each word category is defined on the basis of categorial features
and subcategoria.1 features, such as abs and erg, which are related by association
(","), dependency (";") and mutual dependency (":"). This gives rise to the
extension, result categories are merely extended lexical categories. As in dependency
grammar, the head modifier relation is treated as a basic relation between lexical signs,
and constituency as a derived relation (cf. Anderson and Durand 1986: 2).
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ranking of syntactic categories shown in table 6-4 (cf. Anderson 1989). This
category Verb (fin) Verb (inf) Adj (attr) Noun Name
features P P ; N (P :) N
abl
(N ;) P N
Table 6—4: Ranking of Syntactic Categories in Anderson's Case Grammar
ranking correlates with the behavioural properties of syntactic categories; cate¬
gories with P are allowed predicative positions while those with N are allowed in
argument positions. The complexity of representations is intended to reflect uni¬
versality: simple representations, such as those for proper names and finite verb,
are universal categories, while those with more complex representations, such as
adjectives, are not necessarily universal. Augmenting the internal structure of
attributive adjectives with the subcategorial feature abl is intended to capture
the notion that they introduce a subset of the set denoted by the noun: they
take an argument specifying the source from which the subset is extracted. In
dependency case grammar, this ranking gives rise to the analysis of white horses
given in figure 6-3 where since the adjective white outranks the common noun
horses, the adjective rather than the noun is head of the noun phrase.
Anderson's approach to parts of speech is notional: syntactic categories are
'defined' or reduced to semantic categories and features. In such approaches, the
syntactic category provides schematic semantic properties which are further spec¬
ified within the semantic level proper (cf. Langacker 1987: 54). Furthermore, like
the notional approaches of Langacker (1987) and Hopper and Thompson (1984),
syntactic categories are 'defined' in terms of prototype semantic categories: nouns
tend to refer a concrete objects and verbs to concrete actions (cf. Anderson 1989).
The cognitive linguistic approach differs in both respects. Syntactic cate¬
gories and semantic categories are independent but related categorizations of ex¬
pressions. They are independent since they are motivated on different grounds:
syntactic categories are discerned on the basis of morpho-syntactic behaviour;







Figure 6—3: A dependency analysis of white horses
and semantic categories on the basis of their function in discourse (cf. Hopper
and Thompson 1984). These independent categorizations are, however, systemat¬
ically related; nouns are necessarily associated with concepts of the type ENTITY,
verbs with concepts of the t}'pe EVENT, adjectives and auxiliaries with concepts
of the type PROPERTY and determiners and adverbs with concepts of the type
PRE-PROPERTY (cf. Bates and MacWhinney 1982: 216; Bach 1986). As we saw
in section 5.3.2, these semantic types constitute the major types in the ontological
hierarchy given in figure 5-3. Furthermore, these semantic types can be ranked
as follows (where >- signifies outranking):
(6.64) EVENT >- ENTITY )>- PROPERTY >- PRE-PROPERTY
These types are then correlated with, rather than reduced to, syntactic types.
The simplest correlations are given in table 6-5. The priority of a head sign over
a modifier sign in a construction is thus sourced in the ranking in (6.64) and
the correlations in table 6-5. It follows that a noun, for example, is the head in
constructions with determiners and adjectives. Since this ordering is transitive,
the verb is the head in constructions with nouns, auxiliaries and adverbs.
As might be expected from such a straightforward approach, there are some
problems in applying it to constructions other than those mentioned in table 6-
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Table 6—5: Simple correlations between semantics and syntactic types
1. In particular, the approach fails to characterize the priority of heads in the
following constructions:
(6.65) John's kissing Mary was a happy sight.
(6.66) To see the world is my goal.
(6.67) The man who died was a linguist.
(6.68) What time does the last train leave?
(6.69) A penguin limping home is a sad sight.
One problem is that both signs in construction may have the same semantic type:
in (6.65).both kissing and was have the type EVENT; and in (6.66), the infinitival
verb to see the world has the same type, EVENT, as the finite verb is. A second
problem is that the sign which 'should' be the head is not since it is outranked
by the modifier; in (6.67), if who is simply treated as a relative marker, then man
has the type ENTITY which is outranked by died (which has the type EVENT);
likewise, in (6.68), time has the type ENTITY which is outranked with leave with
the type EVENT; and in (6.69), penguin has the type ENTITY which is outranked
by the gerund limping home which has the type EVENT.
Some of these problems can be solved by simply elaborating the ranking so
that semantic properties, as well as types are taken into account. For example,
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infinitives and finite verbs can be differentiated on the basis of the value of the
semantic mode property tense: finite verbs have the value positive while non-finite
verbs the value negative. Signs of the type EVENT with a positive value outranking
those with a negative value. The other problems are more tricky. Interrogative
and relative markers can be treated as case markers which are modifiers of the
head noun: they specify the desc role on objects, a role which permits any type
but that type does not outrank the root type (see section 5.8). This would take
care of (6.67) and (6.68). (6.69) can be treated in an analogous manner, although
there is no linguistic marker that the desc role is required (cf. what and who).
6.5 Heads and Functors
Adopting a functor argument distinction rather than head modifier distinction
as the basis for a principle of combination in the linguistic processing module is
problematic in that an extra principle is required to account for generalizations
in serialization and category constancy. In addition, as we noted in section 6.4.1,
the functor sign is difficult to identify. In fact, one allegedly distinctive prop¬
erty of functors — that the interpretation of functors, but not arguments, varies
semantically with the interpretation of the other category — is actually indeter¬
minate.
The functor argument assignments in categorial grammar, broadly in accord
with Keenan (1979), are given in table 6-615. Comparison with the assignments
15Since Keenan makes no assignments in auxiliary-verb, verb-adverb and adverb-
adjective constructions, we have given the analyses which Hawkins takes as character¬
istic of categorial grammar (cf. Hawkins 1984: 113-114). While these assignments are
generally respected in Unification Category Grammar, it can treat the noun as functor
in noun-verb and verb-noun constructions. The reason for this is that noun phrases
can be 'type-raised': they are treated as polymorphic functors seeking an argument








adverb-adject ive adverb adjective
verb-adverb adverb verb
Table 6—6: Functor argument assignments in categorial grammar
in table 6-1 demonstrates that the prioritized categories, functors and heads re¬
spectively, are not identical. In particular, functor categories differ from head
categories in adjective-noun, verb-adverb, determiner-noun, auxiliary-verb and
adverb-adjective phrases. Even if the correlation between the functor argument
distinction and the head modifier distinction were inverted so that argument cate¬
gories were correlated with head categories, the problem would still persist: argu¬
ments do not correspond to heads in noun-verb and verb-noun phrases. However,
a relation can be established between these assignments through an additional
principle — the Endotypic Principle (cf. Vennemann and Harlow 1977; Bouma
1988).
The Endotypic Principle is based upon the distinction between endotypic and
exotypic functors. An endotypic functor is a functor of the form X\X: i.e. its
take and make categories are identical. As a corollary, exotypic functors are
functors of the form X \ V.
which is itself looking for a. noun phrase (syntactically, A|(A"|NP)). (cf. Calder et al.
1987: 24-26).
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The Endotypic Principle
In a construction consisting of a functor F and an argument A, F is
the head, unless it is endotypic in which case A is the head.
A functor which is not a head is a specifier (attribute).
An argument which is not a head is a specifier (complement).
Of the functors given in table 6-6, only verbs in verb-noun and noun-verb phrases
are exotypic: as functors they correspond to heads with their arguments as (com¬
plement) specifiers. The remaining functors are endotypic. For example, in
adjective-noun phrases the adjective is a functor which, syntactically, takes a
category of the type noun and makes a category of the type noun (noun|noun)
and semantically it specifies a function mapping from the set of entities into the
set of entities (<e>|<e>). And similarly in verb-adverb phrases, the adverb is
a functor which takes a syntactic category of the type verb|noun (i.e. a verb
category which itself takes a noun category) and makes a category of the same
type. Thus in categorial grammar an additional principle is required to relate the
functor argument distinction to the head modifier distinction. The problem with
this, however, is that generalizations in serialization and category constancy are
couched in terms of the head modifier distinction not the more 'basic' functor
argument distinction.
Greenberg's implicational serialization universals captured cross-language sta¬
tistical regularities in the linear order of categories within phrases (cf. Greenberg
1966). For example, if in a. language, such as Japanese, the direct object pre¬
cedes the verb, then, typically, the adjective will precede the noun and the noun
the adposition. Such apparent regularities can be accounted for in a systematic
manner with the following principle based upon the head modifier distinction (cf.
Anderson 1979: 7):
Head Modifier Serialization Principle
Serialization in a phrase tends to follow systematically from the rela-
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tion between heads and modifiers: either modifiers precede heads or
heads precede modifiers.
Hawkins (1984) provides further support for the HMP in relation to language
type frequency16. He formulates a principle which predicts the relative number
of language types on the basis of serialization of heads and modifiers within
phrases (cf. Hawkins 1984: 130-1):
Cross Category Harmony Principle
The more similar the cross-category positioning of head, the more
languages; the less similar, the fewer languages.
In both cases then, the head modifier distinction in conjunction with serializa¬
tion principles appear to provide a straightforward account of word order gener¬
alizations. However, as Dryer (1988) has shown, there are other factors at play
in determining serialization. These include dominance and harmony principles,
areal influence, as well as the direction of branching in branching as opposed to
non-branching constructions. One effect of this is that serialization principles
based upon the head modifier distinction cannot be seen in isolation from other
principles: serialization is determined by the interaction of a number of ordering
principles and cannot be reduced to a single universal principle. Principles such
as those above, then, do not provide a complete account of serialization: they
simply provide a category-based restriction on serialization.
Accounts of serialization based upon the functor argument distinction, how¬
ever, require an additional principle to provide these restrictions on serialization.
For example, Vennemann appeals to the Endotypic Principle and is able to pro¬
vide a general account of serialization in terms of functors and arguments in
categorial grammar (cf. Vennemann 1976; Vennemann and Harlow 1977; Ven¬
nemann 1984). Such an account, however, relies upon a derived distinction -
16But note that Hawkins has subsequently abandoned the head modifier distinction
(cf. Hawkins forthcoming).
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that between heads and modifiers (or specifiers) - and it is the latter distinction
which captures category restrictions on serialization. On the grounds of descrip¬
tive economy, the head modifier distinction provides a better account since it is
the head modifier (or specifier) distinction which underlies these restrictions.
The functor argument distinction also requires these additional principles to
account for the semantic 'kind of' relationship discussed in section 6.4.1. For
neither the functor nor the argument consistently provides the semantic type of
the result category. In phrases with exotypic functors, the functor provides the
semantic type. For example, in elephants run, the functor run is, semantically, a
function from entities to truth values, a function which can be assigned the type
EVENT. The argument restricts the domain of this function to entities of the type
ELEPHANT. The result type is a more specific event: i.e. the event of elephants
running. In phrases with endotypic functors, it is the argument which provides
the type of the result category. For example, in adjective-noun phrases like pink
elephants, the functor describes a mapping from the set of entities onto the set of
entities with the property PINK (<e>|<e>), but the argument provides the type
of the set, i.e. ELEPHANT. While functor provides a restriction on the type of
the set of entities, i.e. entities with the property PINK, it is the argument which
provides the type itself — entities of the type ELEPHANT with the colour PINK.
Consequent^, on the grounds of descriptive economy, it would be preferable if
the grammar were able to directly provide the basic head modifier distinction
rather than a derived distinction.
Finally, categorial grammar does not provide explicit motivation for the sys¬
tematic priority of functors. One possible motivation is due to Keenan's (1979)
observations on the correlation between surface form and logical form. Keenan
claims that the directionalit}' of agreement relations between expressions is sys¬
tematically based upon the directionality of semantic variation. This is captured
in the following principle:
Meaning-Form Dependency Principle
Given A and B distinct constituents of a syntactic structure E, A
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may agree with B iff the semantic interpretation of expressions of
A varies with the semantic interpretation of expressions of B in the
interpretation of E. (cf. Keenan 1979: 168)
Pursuing the question of whether 'there [is] any correlation between what varies
in meaning with what and the logical structures assigned to agreement pairs' (cf.
Keenan 1979: 170), Keenan develops a second principle:
The Functional Dependency Principle
Given A and B distinct constituents of a SF [surface form] E, A
may agree with B iff in the LF [logical form] of expressions of E,
the LFs of expressions of A are interpreted as functions taking the
interpretations of expressions of B as arguments, (cf. Keenan 1979:
172)
Taking these principles together, one interpretation of Keenan's position is that
semantic variation is a property of functors but not arguments: i.e. the semantic
interpretation of a functor varies with that of the argument, but not vice versa
(cf. Hudson 1987: 115). For example, Keenan argues that the interpretation of a
transitive verb varies with the interpretation of its direct object as he shows for
cut:
(6.70) a. cut finger ('to make an incision on the surface of')
b. cut cake ('to cut all the way through'; 'to divide into portions for the
purpose of serving')
c. cut lawn ('trim')
d. cut heroin ('diminish the potency of by adding a physically comparable
substance')
Likewise, in noun phrases the interpretation of adjectives, such as flat, varies
with the interpretation of nouns as shown in (6.71):
(6.71) a. flat beer ('lacking normal taste')
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b. flat road ('without bumps or depressions')
c. flat voice ('too low in pitch')
On the basis of semantic variation then, verbs can be treated as functors with
nouns as their arguments and adjectives as functors with noun arguments.
The problem here, however, is that variation in semantic interpretation is not
simply uni-directional. For just as the argument can affect the interpretation of
the functor, so the functor can affect the interpretation of the argument. Con¬
sider, for example, the interpretation of verbs and adjectives. As functors, their
interpretation can vary with the interpretation of their noun arguments as illus¬
trated in (6.70) and (6.71). Psycho-linguistic evidence supports not only variation
in this direction, but also in the opposite direction. Murphy (1988) found that
the interpretation of adjectives can systematically vary with the interpretation
of nouns (see also Cruse 1986: 152). For example, long has the interpretation
'great length', or a simple elaboration of this, in combination with word and life,
but substantially different interpretations in combinations with nouns like hand
('expressed in complete sentences and without abbreviations'), eye ('towards the
future') and year ('seeming to pass slowly'). Moreover, he also found that the
interpretation of nouns varied with that of adjectives (see also Lakoff 1987: 83-
4). In some cases, the interpretation highlighted different senses of noun; hand,
for example, took on interpretations which varied from 'side' as in right hand
to 'anatomical hand' in bleeding hand. In others, variation highlighted different
aspects of the same sense.
Anderson and Ortony (1975) report similar bi-directional variation in the in¬
terpretation of nouns and verbs. For example, the nouns steak and soup lead to
different interpretations of eat : the act of eating is associated with different uten¬
sils as well as actions of the lips, teeth and tongue. Conversely, the interpretation
of piano can vary in different verb contexts:
(6.72) Pianos can be pleasing to listen to.
(6.73) Pianos can be difficult to move.
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In (6.72) the sound, but not the weight, of the piano is relevant, whereas in (6.73)
the opposite is true. As Anderson and Ortony put it 'in one context piano is a
member of the same category as, say, harmonica, while in another it is certainly
not. In the latter case, perhaps sofa would be a cohyponym' (cf. Anderson and
Ortony 1975: 169).
In sum, not only does the functor argument distinction require an additional
principle, the Endotypic Principle, to yield analyses which accord with serializa¬
tion and semantic constancy requirements, but this evidence suggests semantic
variation cannot distinguish functors from arguments. Our approach to combi¬
nation, on the other hand, provides a distinction between heads and modifiers
which can directly account for these requirements, a distinction which is moti¬
vated in terms of three distinctive properties of heads, and characterized, at least
informally, in terms of the priority of the head's semantic type.
6.6 Defeasibility
Defeasibility is a linguistic phenomena which challenges the notions that modi¬
fiers simply specify heads by adding or confirming properties (heads qua subcat-
egorizands). The phenomenon is manifest in phrases where there is a conflict,
usually a semantic conflict, between properties of the combining signs. The con¬
flict is systematically resolved through the 'defeat' of one sign by the other: the
result sign no longer has the property of the 'defeated' sign since the property is
replaced by one appropriate to the 'defeated' sign.
Four types of semantic defeasibility will be briefly described: typicality de¬
feat, intrinsic defeat, sortal defeat and general defeat. In these types, defeat
can vary along a number of dimensions. One of these is dependence upon lex¬
ical semantics: i.e. whether or not the occurrence of defeat is dependent upon
specific semantics properties of the defeated sign. Another is the nature of the
defeated property: defeat can involve necessary properties or default properties of
a concept (cf. Murphy 1988). Since properties can also be related to each other,
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these relationships can in turn affect defeat. For example, given a correlation
between the sweetness of food and its calorific-value — the sweeter food is, the
more calories it typically contains — defeat of the sweetness property will also
affect calorific-value such that we can no longer infer that it has a high value (cf.
Franks et al. 1988).
6.6.1 Typicality Defeat
The first type of defeat, typicality defeat, affects default properties and is lexically
dependent. In an adjective-noun phrase like grey elephants, the value of the colour
property specified by the modifier sign is compatible with the default value grey
of elephants. With pink elephants, however, the properties are incompatible
and the default value specified by the head is defeated by the necessary value
specified in the modifier sign: while elephants are grey, pink elephants are pink.
Psycholinguistic experiments also suggest that conflicts over default properties
are systematically resolved in favour of the modifier sign. When the properties of
concepts such as games and sports are rated for typicality, the (indirect) modifier
games consistently plays a greater role in determining the typicality rating of
properties in sports that are also games than the head sports (Hampton 1987).
6.6.2 Intrinsic Defeat
With the second type, intrinsic defeat, semantic properties of the defeated sign are
overridden independently of its lexical semantics. In noun phrases with privative
adjectives such as fake, former and false, the adjective modifier consistently
defeats the existence of the semantic type of the noun (Kamp 1975); for example,
while the concept underlying Renoirs asserts the existence of paintings by Renoir,
fake Renoirs denies their existence. Likewise, modifiers of verbs such as never
and not undermine the existence of a state or event; in John never crossed the
road, there is a denial that a 'crossing' event took place. With this type of defeat
then, there is a. conflict between the value of a mode property of the signs which
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is resolved in favour of the modifier sign; for example, with fake elephants the
modifier's value negative for polarity defeats the head's value positive. This makes
problematic the category determinant property of heads: while pink elephants
are clearly a 'kind of' elephants, false beards are not obviously 'kinds of' beards.
In particular, the result sign no longer contains necessary semantic properties of
the head sign; false beards, for example, do not grown on chins. Many of their
default properties, especially those which play a diagnostic role, are preserved in
the result sign; with fake Renoir, for example, a sufficient number of diagnostic
properties must be preserved so as to maintain the contrast with fake Picasso —
a fake Renoir must at least appear more like a real Renoir than a fake Picasso.
6.6.3 Sortal Defeat
The third type of defeat, sortal defeat, is similar to intrinsic defeat in that neces¬
sary semantic properties of the head sign are lost, and this stems from the defeat
of the head by the modifier (cf. Franks et al. 1988; Franks 1989). It differs from
intrinsic defeat in three ways.
Firstly, the semantics of the head sign is defeated as a consequence of the
defeat of a necessary core property. For example, in chocolate elephants the
value of the material property chocolate of the adjective modifier defeats the flesh
value of the noun head. Since this property is necessary for the concept, its defeat
entails that the category determinant property is no longer obvious — chocolate
elephants are not real elephants. It does, however, retain default properties such
as 'elephant shape' which differentiate chocolate elephants from chocolate mice.
Furthermore, the head concepts is elaborated as a. result of defeat: chocolate
elephants contains the default values sweet and brown which are not part of
the concept of 'elephants'. Center (1981) provides psycholinguistic evidence to
demonstrate that a noun modifier can defeat a verb head in a similar manner.
For example, when subjects paraphrased sentences such as the lizards worshiped
the sun, they tended to produce paraphrases such as 'the small grey reptile lay
on the hot rock and stared unblinkingly at the sun' (cf. Gentner 1981: 165).
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Here there is a conflict between the value of the agent role in the semantics of the
verb head and the modifier's semantics: SENTIENT is incompatible with LIZARD.
Rather than simply replace the type of agent with LIZARD, the type of this role
in the head concept is 'elaborated' into ANIMATE.
A second difference is that sortal defeat is lexically dependent. For example,
stone is a modifier capable of giving rise to sortal defeat. In stone bridge, however,
there is no defeat since the values of the material property specified in each sign
are compatible.
The third difference is that the discourse situation may play a greater role in
determining which sign has priority rather than the head modifier distinction.17
For example, if the sunflower kissed the wall were said in the context of a fancy-
dress party, the most likely interpretation would be a metaphorical one in which
semantic properties of the noun modifier were defeated: it would describe a person
dressed as a sunflower rather than a real flower.
6.6.4 General Defeat
The fourth type of defeat, general defeat, offers the strongest violation of com¬
patibility and category determination. The result sign has neither the general
semantic or syntactic type of the head sign. With other sorts of defeat, only the
semantic type is undermined, and undermined to a limited extent. For example,
with sortal defeat in chocolate elephants, while the semantic type of the head is
undermined through loss of necessary properties, the result sign clearly preserves
its general semantic type (ENTITY) as well as the syntactic type (noun) of the
head elephants.
Denominal verbs illustrate general defeat (cf. Clark 1983). In (6.74) porch is
a noun with the general semantic type ENTITY.
17This is also a. characteristic of general defeat described in section 6.6.4.
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(6.74) Newspaper boys put the newspapers in the porch.
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In (6.75), however, the result sign is a verb with the general semantic type
EVENT.
(6.75) Newspaper boys porch the newspapers.
This change in syntactic type and type can be seen as a manifestation of general
defeat. In (6.75), the signs for porch, the newspaper boys and the papers are unable
to combine since none can act as a head sign. They can combine, however, if porch
is selected as the head sign and its syntactic and semantic types are systematically
changed in order to accommodate the requirements of the modifier signs.
6.6.5 Significance of Defeat
These types of semantic defeasibility demonstrate that signs with incompatible
properties can combine successfully, although not all properties of the 'defeated'
sign are preserved in the result sign. With typicality defeat, a default value in the
'defeated' sign is overridden by a necessary value specified in the 'defeating' sign
and the default value is not preserved in the result sign. With intrinsic defeat,
the value of a mode property in the 'defeated' sign is overridden by a necessary
value in the 'defeating' sign and, as a result, necessary core properties are lost.
With sortal defeat, the value of a necessary core property in the 'defeated' sign is
overridden by a necessary value in the 'defeating' sign. And with general defeat,
the semantic and syntactic types are replaced with those required by the 'de¬
feating' sign. As a consequence, the subcategorization and category determinant
properties of heads seem difficult to maintain: modifiers may not simply specify
properties of the head sign; and the result sign may not transparently have the
syntactic and semantic types of the head sign.
Two aspects of defeasibility, however, reinforce the head modifier distinction
rather than the functor argument distinction. The first is that modifiers, in
general, have systematic priority in defeat: where there is a conflict, the modifier
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sign is the 'defeating' sign and the head the 'defeated' sign. For the utility
of the semantic type ranking given in (6.64) is that manifestations of priority
either systematically follow from the ranking or go against it. With defeasibility,
priority systematically goes against ranking: signs with semantic types of a lower
rank can override properties of those with higher types18. This is illustrated in
figure 6-4. The second aspect is that when defeat occurs, the head sign still
event entity property pre-property
increasing resistence to defeat
increasing combinatorial potential
Figure 6—4: Combinatorial potential and resistance to defeat
provides the basis for the construction of the result sign. As Gentner says of
noun-verb combinations:
The verb meanings were not simply ignored. Other evidence from
this study indicates that the verb preserved as much of its meaning
as possible ...given an incompatible noun, the verb was typically
extended until it fit. (cf. Gentner 1981: 165-6)
Since the cognitive linguistic approach identifies the result sign as the head sign
after combination with the modifier sign, it is the nature of combination, and
in particular, its relationship with semantic interpretation, which needs to be
addressed in the characterization of the linguistic processing module.
18In this way, the semantic type ranking bears comparison with the sonority hierarchy
in phonology (cf. Anderson and Durand 1986: 16).
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6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed the nature of linguistic combination with respect
to the cognitive linguistic approach to language comprehension. If linguistic
combination is to maintain the same relationship between levels of conceptual
structure as we posited between linguistic and discourse conceptual structure,
then the relationship between lexical and linguistic structure must be extensional.
Such a relationship is maintained in unification grammars where combination
is based, in part, on the extension through unification of linguistic categories.
However, combination is not simply symmetrical: one category has priority over
the other category. In one unification grammar, Unification Categorial Grammar,
combination is based upon the functor argument distinction where an argument
sign unifies with part of the functor sign.
Our approach differs from Unification Categorial Grammar in that the combi¬
nation is based upon the head modifier distinction. This distinction is motivated
on the basis of three distinctive properties of head signs: subcategorization (or
specification), category determination and obligatoriness. In particular: the head
sign is syntactically and semantically specified by the modifier sign; the result
sign has the syntactic and semantic types of the head sign; and the head sign is
obligatory for both specification and category determination. Furthermore, the
priority of the head sign over the modifier sign is informally characterized in terms
of their semantic type: the semantic type of the head outranks the semantic type
of the modifier. Comparison with the functor argument distinction demonstrated
that linguistic regularities such as serialization and semantic category constancy
can be more economically described with the head modifier distinction. We also
showed that one potentially distinctive property of functors — semantic variation
— was no less manifest in argument's.
Finally, we introduced evidence, defeasibility evidence, which both challenged
and supported the head modifier distinction. The challenge arose from combina-
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tions where the combining signs possess incompatible semantic properties, and
from combinations where not all the semantic properties of the head sign were
preserved in the result sign and some new properties were introduced. On the
other hand, the defeasibility evidence supports combination on the basis of the
head modifier distinction in that the modifier sign, rather than the head sign, sys¬
tematically had priority in defeat, and the head sign still provided the basis for
construction of the result sign. Consequently, the cognitive linguistic approach to
combination based upon the head modifier distinction must address the issue of
how the contextually appropriate sense of ambiguous and polysemous expressions




In this chapter we describe how the cognitive linguistic approach characterizes lin¬
guistic combination. In accord with the architecture presented in section 2.3.2,
language comprehension is characterized in terms of two modules: a discourse
processing module, described in chapter 5, where linguistic conceptual structures
are anchored and elaborated in the cognitive agent's discourse model, and a lin¬
guistic processing module, described in this chapter, where linguistic structures
for lexical expressions are combined into linguistic structures for phrasal expres¬
sions. In chapter 6, we discussed the nature of linguistic combination and argued
for an extensional approach to combination on the grounds of uniformity with
discourse processes: just as anchoring and elaboration extend conceptual struc¬
tures, so linguistic combination extends the linguistic structures. Since an exten¬
sional approach to combination is offered by unification grammar, the linguistic
processing module can be characterized as a unification grammar. However, com¬
bination in a unification grammar is asymmetrical: the linguistic structure of one
expression in a binary combination has priority over the linguistic structure of the
other. In one unification grammar, Unification Categorial Grammar, the com¬
bination principle is based upon the priority of functor sign over the argument
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sign as in categorial grammar. We, however, argued that a combination principle
based upon the head modifier distinction, as in dependency grammar, could pro¬
vide a more economical account of linguistic generalizations in serialization and
semantic category constancy. Consequently, we shall characterize the linguis¬
tic processing module as Unification Dependency Grammar (udg), where the
combination principle is based upon a unification process and the head modifier
distinction. In udg, the head modifier assignments coincide with the traditional
head modifier assignments given in table 6-1, the priority of the head is mo¬
tivated in terms of three combinatorial properties (subcategorization, category
determinant and obligatoriness) and their priority is characterized in terms of
the ranking of semantic types associated with the head and modifier signs.
This characterization of linguistic processing needs to address two issues in
the processing of conceptual structure. The first issue is that the contextually
appropriate sense of polysemous and ambiguous expressions can be selected im¬
mediately as shown in section 3.3. In the cognitive linguistic approach this issue
is addressed through the interaction between discourse and linguistic processing
modules: while the linguistic processing module exports a linguistic structure
for expressions to the discourse processing module, the latter exports a discourse
context to the linguistic processing module. This discourse context, consisting of
simplified descriptions of concepts in a portion of the discourse model, is used
to select the contextually appropriate sense of upcoming expressions. The sec¬
ond issue concerns the defeasibility phenomena, discussed in section 6.6, which
show that, in some combinations, there can be a conflict between the combin¬
ing conceptual structures, a conflict which is systematically resolved in favour
of the modifier sign. Both linguistic and discourse processes are needed to ac¬
count for these cases. In particular, while some of these conflicts can be avoided
through the judicious application of default constraints in the anchoring process,
as suggested in sections 5.5 and 5.7, other conflicts are resolved through an in¬
teraction between these processes: the discourse processing module 'transforms'
the conceptual structure of the head into a structure which can combine with
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the conceptual structure of the modifier. In this way, the cognitive linguistic
approach can account for defeasibility and immediate sense selection.
The chapter is structured as follows. Since the unification and dependency
background have already been discussed in chapter 6, section 7.2 simply presents
the basics of UDG: section 7.2.1 describes the structure of signs; and section 7.2.2
their combination on the basis of the head modifier distinction. We then consider
how UDG interacts with the discourse processing module. In section 7.3 we
characterize linguistic sense selection using a discourse context and in section 7.4,
we describe the characterization the three types of defeat, typicality, intrinsic and
sortal defeat. Section 7.5 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Basics of UDG
In this section, we describe and illustrate the structure of signs in UDG as well
the principle of combination. Before we do so, a few general remarks about UDG
are in order.
Like UCG, linguistic information about expressions is characterized as signs:
i.e. partial objects with properties which can be extended into potentially less
partial objects through unification with other objects. These signs can, of course,
vary in specificity. Traditionally, the arguments, or modifiers, of lexical signs are
specified at a general level; for example, kicked would be specified to combine
with an argument sign whose semantic type is ENTITY and syntactic type NOUN.
UDG extend this approach so as to represent fixed and partially fixed phrases in
the lexicon. For example, a stock phrase like kick the bucket can be specified
so that the subject argument is underspecified but the object argument is fully
specified: i.e. while the subject argument is specified for syntactic and semantic
properties, the object argument is also specified for its phonological form. In
this way, the lexicon in UDG can be taken as a phrasal lexicon (cf. Becker 1975;
Zernik and Dyer 1986; Zernik and Dyer 1987).
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Furthermore, the lexicon can be conceived of in two ways: as a 'proto-lexicon'
where different syntactic and/or syntactic properties of a lexical expression are
described by a single, non-disjunctive sign; and an 'expanded' lexicon where these
non-disjunctive signs can be optimized so as to specify in a disjunctive sign shared
properties of the non-disjunctive signs (cf. Andry et al. forthcoming). With the
proto-lexicon perspective, signs are not biased toward the interpretation or pro¬
duction of utterances. With the expanded lexicon, however, signs are optimized
for language production or comprehension. Signs in the protolexion are optimized
for production by a non-disjunctive semantic specification (the shared property)
but disjunctive (or underspecified) syntactic and phonological specifications (cf.
Youd and McGlashan 1992). In comprehension, signs are optimized through dis¬
junctive specifications for syntactic and semantic properties. For example, an
ambiguous expression like bat is associated with two distinct senses, a 'game-bat'
sense and an 'animal-bat' sense. This is characterized in UDG as a sign with a
disjunctive conceptual structure with a disjunct containing a GAME-BAT concepts
and another containing a ANIMAL-BAT sense. When signs with disjunctive con¬
ceptual structures unify, the conceptual structure in the result sign may either
preserve the disjunction or preserve only one disjunct (cf. Kasper 1987; Pollard
and Sag 1987; Wedekind 1990). The first is appropriate in cases where sense
selection does not take place at linguistic level and the second in cases where it
does.
This disjunctive approach to signs is enhanced in UDG by the indicating the
typicality of disjuncts in conceptual structure. This is motivated on the basis of
the empirical evidence in chapter 3; for example, the concept duck subsumes robin
and chicken where robin is more typical than chicken. Thus with polysemous and
ambiguous expressions such as bird, bed and bat, the concepts in the conceptual
structure are ordered in terms of typicality. Furthermore, with these expressions
the different senses are not associated with different syntactic properties; for
example, bat in either its 'game-bat' or 'animal-bat' interpretation is a noun. The
senses of other expressions, however, can be associated with different syntactic
properties; for example, sink has two senses, characterized by the concepts SINK-
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ENTITY and SINK-EVENT, and these are associated with syntactic structures of
the type NOUN and VERB respectively:
(7.1) The sink is shiny.
(7.2) The ships sink in the storm.
The lexical sign for sink thus has both disjunctive conceptual and syntactic struc¬
tures. Consequently, a second enhancement of signs offered by UDG is to 'synchro¬
nize' these disjunctions so that the selection of a pair of synchronized disjuncts
can lead to the other pair being discarded. As we shall see, this selection can take
place on the basis of either syntactic or conceptual restrictions on combination.
Finally, combination of signs in UDG is based upon the head modifier distinc¬
tion: signs for lexical expressions combine as head and modifier to yield a result
sign for the phrase. In particular, the combination principle is based upon two
extensional processes, specification and linking. Specification is characterized as
the unification of part of the head sign with all of the modifier sign (cf. instantia¬
tion in UCG). Linking is characterized in terms of the application of constraints in
the head sign. These constraints, like the constraints described in sections 5.3.5
and 5.6, describe relations between substructures. Where they differ is that con¬
straints are associated with signs, not theories, and their primary purpose is to
guide the flow of information in a sign when it combines. For example, constraints
can link the semantic part of the head sign specified by the modifier sign, with
the semantics of the head sign itself. In this way, the head sign, like the functor
sign in UCG plays a pivotal role combination: the result sign is the head sign after
specification and linking. This is illustrated in figure 7-1. UDG also differs from
UCG in its incremental approach to combination: combination takes place on a
word-by-word basis from left to right. In many categorial grammars, including
UCG, the order of combination can follow the opposite order. For example, in
Prince loves Cat, the argument sign for Cat is first combined with the functor
sign for loves and then the result sign for loves Cat is combined as functor with
the argument sign for Prince. In the derivation of the result sign for the whole




Head Sign ^ Modifier Sign
Specification
Figure 7—1: The pivotal role of the head sign in UDG
construction then, there is an intermediate sign representing the construction
loves Cat (see section 6.3 especially example (6.16)). In UDG, on the other hand,
signs are incrementally combined in accordance with linear order: the modifier
sign Prince is combined with the head sign loves yielding an intermediate sign
for Prince loves and then this sign is combined with the modifier sign Cat.
7.2.1 Sign Structure
Signs in UDG are defined for four major properties as shown in (7.3):
(7.3) sign = phonology A syntax A semantics A constraints
A UDG sign then consists of phonology, syntax, semantics and constraints proper¬
ties. The value of the semantics property is a linguistic conceptual structure and
its nature and structure have been described in section 5.4. Nor shall we discuss
the value of phonology property; like UCG, we will simply give its value as the
orthographic representation of the expression.
The value of the syntax property is complex: it consists of a head property
and a modifier property as shown in (7.4) (cf. McGlashan forthcoming):
(7.4) syntax = head A modifier
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head = type A form A order
type = noun V verb V adjective V auxiliary
V determiner V adverb V part
form = agr A nform A vform A tense
A aspect A comp
agr = count A number A person
count = count V mass
number = sg V pi
person = first V second V third
nform = nom V acc V gen V dat V abl V voc
vform = fin V bse V prp V psp
tense = pres V past
aspect = prog V pref V simple
comp = wh V that V if
order = directionality A adjacency A optionality
directionality = pre V post
adjacency = next V nonnext
optionality = optional V obligatory
modifier = set-of(sign)
The head property specifies the syntactic type of the expression together with
morpho-syntactic form and order information. For example, the sign for run, as
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agr :
form :
that is, run is a finite, simple aspect, present tense verb with an agreement
properties of countable, plural number and first person.
Of course, the description of head in (7.4) is under-constrained: it allows









where a sign of the type NOUN has morpho-syntactic properties which should
only be given in VERB and AUXILIARY signs. Further restrictions on signs can be
defined using feature co-occurrence rules which specify restrictions between the
syntactic type of a sign and its morpho-syntactic form properties (cf. Gazdar et al.
1985). In (7.7), co-occurrence rules are given for nouns, determiners, auxiliaries
and verbs (where P —> S indicates that the set of properties in S is defined if
the path P is defined):
(7.7) 1.
( /•"»>)\ < head syntax form agr > /
9
< head syntax type noun >-
< head syntax type determiner >—■> / < head syntax form agr >
< head syntax type verb >-
< head syntax form vform >
< head syntax form agr >
< head syntax form tense >
< head syntax form aspect >
< head syntax form comp >
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4.
< head syntax type auxiliary >-
< head syntax form vform >
< head syntax form tense >
< head syntax form aspect >
so, for example, a sign with the syntactic type NOUN is only defined for agr
and nform properties — it is not defined for properties such as vform and tense.
Of course, different languages may use different sets of morpho-syntactic form
properties and provide different category-based restrictions on their occurrence;
for example, gender may be defined in French for determiners, adjectives and
nouns.
The other property of syntax is the modifier property. The value of this prop¬
erty is a set of 'subcategorized' signs: i.e. a set of modifier signs which can specify
the head sign. For example, the value of modifier in the sign for run is a set of
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Thus run is subcategorized to be specified by two modifier signs which are re¬
stricted in both their syntactic and semantic properties. In particular, the first
sign, given in (7.8) has its syntactic restrictions given in <syntax head>: it is
a NOUN with morpho-syntactic form properties of nominative case, countable,
plural number and third person. Its relative ordering and optionality is speci¬
fied in <syntax head order>: the sign is obligatory (obligatory) and precedes the
verb (pre), although they are not necessarily adjacent since no value is specified
for the attribute adjacency. Its semantic type is specified in <semantics>: it is
restricted to be a concept of the type ENTITY. The second modifier sign,given in
(7.9), is similarly restricted syntactically and semantically: it must be a NOUN
with a form property of dative case, is optional and occurs after the verb; and it
is a concept of the type LOCATION.
In this way, the syntax property of signs is broadly analogous with the category
property of signs in UCG (see section 6.3): modifier describes the signs it can
combine with (cf. 'take' signs); and the head property describes some of the
syntactic properties of the result sign (cf. 'make' category). Furthermore, it is
also comparable with traditional dependency grammars since the head modifier
distinction has been 'pushed' inside the sign itself: properties of the head category
are given as the value of head; and properties of the modifier categories are given
as the (set) value of the modifier property. The key difference with traditional
dependency grammars is that combinatorial information given in dependency
rules is specified in the signs themselves, thereby reducing both the number and
complexity of rules. For example, a verb such as run in the elephants run to
London, would be characterized by the dependency rule V (N1 * N2 (P *)):
i.e. with V as head with two modifiers TV1 and N2 (which has P as a modifier)
(cf. Robinson 1970b: 262). In UDG, the general combinatorial information in
this dependency rule is captured with a general principle for combining head and
modifier signs — the Head Modifier Principle discussed in section 7.2.2 — and
specific combinatorial information is given in the sign. For example, in the sign
for run the value of phonology is run, the value for < syntax head> is given in
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That is, run can combine with two NOUN modifiers where the first is nominative
and occurs to its left, and the second is dative and occurs to its right. Combina¬
tion itself involves the unification of a modifier sign with one of the signs in (7.10
b). What is missing from this sign, however, is a means of linking the syntactic
and semantic information given by modifier signs with the syntactic and semantic
information of the head.
The main function of constraints is to provide the means of linking this in¬
formation in a sign. The constraints property of a sign specifies a set of relations
between sub-structures in the sign. The format of sign constraints is the same
as that of theory constraints given in section 5.3.5: i.e. they have a name which
describes the relation, such as 'equality', a type for the relation — necessary or
typical, possibly conditions on the relation, and specify sub-structures in terms of
paths. Two of the major constraints concern the relationship between the value
of <syntax head form agr> and <semantics> on a sign. For in a combination like
elephants run, the result sign has syntactic and semantic properties which derive
from not only the sign for run, but also the sign for elephants. Since combination
involves unification of one of the modifiers in <syntax modifier> of the head sign
with the modifier sign itself, the syntactic and semantic properties of the mod¬
ifier are thus specified within this substructure in the head sign. Consequently,
if constraints are defined on the sign for run which relate the syntactic and se¬
mantic properties of its modifiers to its syntactic and semantic properties, then
application of these constraints by the linking process will result in the head's
syntax and semantics being appropriately extended. For example, when the sign
for run is specified by elephant, given in (7.15) below, the first modifier in (7.10
b) is instantiated as shown in (7.11):
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(7.11)












The main effect of combination is that the semantic type of the first modifier has
been made more specific: i.e. in <syntax modifier first semantics> the original
ENTITY concept restriction on the first modifier in the set has been specialized as
ELEPHANT (cf. (7.10 c) above). However, we need to relate this concept to the
RUN concept in <semantics>. In particular, we need to equate the ELEPHANT
concept with the value of the theme: i.e. the subject of run is the theme of a RUN








path 1 :<syntax modifier second semantics>
path2 :<semantics goal>
Accordingly, when the sign for run combines with the sign for elephants, the
subject's semantics are equated with the value of <semantics theme> in the sign
for runs.
While the constraints in (7.12) are appropriate for complement modifiers,
they are inappropriate for attribute modifiers partly due to their optionality and
constraints :
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potential for iteration. In X theory, head categories need to subcategorize for
each and every modifier (cf. Jackendoff 1977); for example, nouns may need to
subcategorize for determiners, quantifiers, numerals, and adjectives, and verbs for
adverbs and auxiliaries. In approaches, such as UCG, the optionality and iteration
of these modifiers is neatly captured by treating them as exotypic functors (cf.
section 6.5). In UDG, their status as optional or obligatory is captured by the value
of the optionality property; for example, elephants subcategories for a modifier
with the syntactic type DETERMINER and an optional value for optionality — the
corresponding modifier for elephant is specified with an obligatory value. What
is not captured is the potential iteration of attribute modifiers like determiners,
adjectives, auxiliaries and adverbs. Moreover, constraints, like that in (7.12),
would have to be defined for each and every attribute modifier so as to link the(r
semantics with the semantics of the head sign.
These problems can be addressed through underspecification in the modifier
and constraints properties of a sign. Attribute modifiers can be divided into two
types: mode modifiers, such as determiners, auxiliaries and adverbs, which mod¬
ify mode properties of the head and are subsumed by the general semantic type
PRE-PROPERTY; and core modifiers, such as adjectives and adverbs, which mod¬
ify its core properties and are subsumed by the type PROPERTY. Consequently,
a head sign need only specify the general type of its attribute modifiers and pro¬
vide constraints which link the semantics of any of these modifiers to some role
in their semantics1. Consider the (simplified) signs for the, pink and elephants
given in (7.13), (7.14) and (7.15) respectively. In (7.15), the value of phonology
is shown in (7.15a), the value of <syntax head> in (7.15b), the value of <syntax
modifier> in (7.15c), the value of semantics in (7.15d), and the value of constraints
in (7.15e).
1This assumes that the modifiers also share the same form and order properties. If
they do not, then each modifier will have to be specified in modifiers.





syntax : head :
type : determiner
semantics :





















form : agr :
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type : elephant
definite : type : definite
polarity : type : polarity
colour : type : colour-property
name : equality
type : necessary




pathl :<syntax modifier NUMBER syntax head form agr>
path2 :<syntax head form agr>
The sign for elephants given in (7.15), contains two underspecified equality con¬
straints. In the first constraint, which relates to the semantics of a modifier to the
value of a role in its semantics, neither the number of the modifier nor the role
in its semantics are explicitly specified: NUMBER is a variable which ranges
over the modifiers in modifier just as ROLE ranges over the role properties in
semantics. The second constraint performs an analogous function with respect
to the syntactic head property agr: it relates the value for agr in the <syntax
head form> of any modifier to the value for agr in <syntax head form agr>.
When the mode modifier the in (7.13) combines with the sign for elephants, it
unifies with the first modifier (DEFINITE is subsumed by PRE-PROPERTY) and
application of the first constraint then equates its semantics with the definite role
contained in the head category's semantics attribute. Likewise, the core modifier
pink in (7.14) unifies with the second modifier (COLOUR-PROPERTY is subsumed
by PROPERTY) and the same constraint equates its semantics with the colour
property in the head's semantics. Since the semantic constraint does not specify
which role the modifier's semantics is to be equated with, different occurrences of
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attribute modifiers can be equated with different roles in the head's semantics2.
The only restriction is that the properties must be compatible; this rules out
phrases like * black pink elephants where incompatible colour properties are spec¬
ified. Thus, using underspecified constraints, UDG can overcome the iteration
problem traditionally associated with frameworks which treat attribute modifiers
as arguments rather than functors.
Constraints perform two other functions. The first of these is to specify typ¬
icality relations in disjunctive conceptual structures. For example, the concep¬
tual structure for bed consists of two top-level disjuncts, which characterize the
'mattress-bed' and 'plant-bed' senses, and nested within the later disjunct, two
further disjuncts which characterize the 'vegetable-bed' and 'flower-bed' senses
(cf. (5.56) in section 5.8). The typicality of these senses is indicated by con¬
straints in the sign for bed as illustrated in (7.16):
2Note that when a sign subcategorizes for both complement and attribute modifiers,
specified constraints take precedence over underspecified constraints. For example, the
set of modifiers for run given in (7.10 b) can be augmented to take mode modifiers,
such as the auxiliary will in the elephants will run, the semantics of the NOUN modifier
is related to the theme role by a specified equality constraint while the AUXILIARY is
related to a aspect (mode) property by means of an underspecified constraint.















pathl :<semantics second first>
path2 :<semantics second second>
A gtypicality constraint describes a relation of 'greater typicality' between the
values of its paths. Thus the MATTRESS-BED concept is more typical than the
PLANT-BED concept, and VEGETABLE-BED is more typical than FLOWER-BED.
The second function performed by constraints is to 'synchronize' semantic
and syntactic disjunctions within a sign. As we saw in (7.1) and (7.2), sink
can be associated with two distinct senses, the 'kitchen-sink' sense and the 'boat-
sinking' sense, and each of these is associated with distinct syntactic descriptions:
the 'kitchen-sink' sense is associated with a syntactic description whose type is
NOUN; and the 'boat-sink' sense is associated with a syntactic description whose
type is VERB. In UDG the value of both semantics and syntax are disjunctive
structures and the relationship between these syntactic and semantic disjuncts is
described by synchronization constraints (cf. YVedekind 1990). This is illustrated
for sink in (7.17), where the value of < syntax head> is shown in (7.17 a), the
value for <synta.x modifier> in (7.17 b), the value for semantics in (7.17 c) and
the value for constraints in (7.17 d):
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type : sink-entity
definite: type : definite
type : sink-event
theme : type : entity









where the first constraint synchronizes the first syntactic disjunct with the first
semantic disjunct; the second constraint does likewise with second disjunct. The
utility of synchronization constraints is two-fold in UDG. Firstly, if the com¬
bining sign imposes syntactic and/or semantic restrictions which select one of
the synchronized disjuncts, then the corresponding disjunct is selected too. The
other pair of synchronized disjuncts can be discarded at this stage. Secondly, if
the discourse context restricts the semantics of the sign so that either the SINK-
ENTITY or SINK-EVENT are selected, then not only is the other semantic disjunct
discarded, but so too is its corresponding syntactic disjunct.
7.2.2 Sign Combination
Combination in UDG is characterized in terms of the head modifier distinction: in
a binary construction, one sign is the head sign and the other the modifier sign.
This distinction was motivated in section 6.4.1 in terms of subcategorization (or
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specification), category constancy and obligatoriness properties. In section 6.4.2,
the distinction was informally characterized in terms of a head sign's priority with
respect to semantic type: a head sign has a semantic type which outranks the type
of the modifier sign in the ranking given in (6.64). The head modifier assignments
in this framework are thus the traditional assignments given in table 6-1 and
reproduced here as table 7-1 with their syntactic and semantic types.
phrase head modifier
noun-verb verb, EVENT noun, ENTITY
verb-noun verb, EVENT noun, ENTITY
adjective-noun noun, ENTITY adjective, PROPERTY
verb-adverb verb, EVENT adverb, PROPERTY
determiner-noun noun, ENTITY determiner, PRE-PROPERTY
auxiliary-verb verb, EVENT auxiliary, PRE-PROPERTY
adverb-adject ive adjective, PROPERTY adverb, PRE-PROPERTY
Table 7—1: Head modifier assignments in Unification Dependency Grammar
Combination is more formally characterized in terms of the Head Modifier
Principle below:
Head Modifier Principle (HMP)
1. Signs in a binary construction combine as head sign SH and
modifier sign SM to yield a result sign SR.
2. SR = SH after specification and linking.
3. Specification: SH is specified by SM iff there exists 5 such that
5 .S'Toyntax modifier> and S U SM.
4. Linking: SH is linked to SR iff the equality constraints specified
in 5^:<constraints> are applied.
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The head modifier distinction in the HMP is ground out in terms of the structure of
signs: i.e. a sign is the head if there is a sign in the set value of its modifier property
which can unify with the other sign. Combination itself is characterized in terms
of two processes which extend the head sign into the result sign. Specification
extends the head sign through unification of a modifier in its modifier property
with the modifier sign. Linking extends the head sign by equality substructures
within the head sign: in particular, by equating the semantics of the modifier in
the modifier property with some role in the head's semantics. In this way, the
conceptual structure of a modifier sign is used to extend the semantics of the
head sign.
Note that, unlike UCG, a stripping process is not necessary in UDG. In UCG
stripping is necessary because a functor only combines with an argument sign
which matches the Sign in E|Sign. The order in which argument signs are com¬
bined is determined by the complex value of the category property in the functor
sign; for example, with the value S INP^NP2, the functor sign first combines
with NP2 and then combines with NP1. Thus to combine with NP1, NP2 must be
stripped from the value of category. This is unnecessary in UDG since modifiers
are represented as a set where members of the set are specified for obligatori¬
ness, order and adjacency3. With these specifications, while combination itself
is constrained, the order of combination is not. The main advantage of this is
that combination can take place incrementally and linearly; the combination pro¬
cess does not have to wait until a direct object is available before combining a
transitive verb with its subject.
We shall now illustrate combination in UDG. We begin with a simple, non-
disjunctive example:
(7.18) The pink elephants run to London.
Tn ucg, stripping also accounts for the concatenation of phonology. Thus could be
accounted for in udg in terms of constraints.
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Since the signs for the and pink, given in (7.13) and (7.14) above, are unable to
combine, the first combination is of the sign for the and elephants . According
to the HMP, these sign can combine if one of the modifiers in <syntax modifier>
of (7.15) can be specified by the sign in (7.13). Of these modifiers, the second is
clearly incompatible: the signs have conflicting values for <syntax head type>.
The modifier sign can specify the first modifier in <syntax modifier>, however,
since not only are all their syntactic and semantic properties compatible, but the
precedes elephants as required by the value of the directionality in <first syntax
















where the modifier has been given specific values for phonology and semantics.
According to the HMP, combination now involves a linking processes whereby
the constraints defined in (7.15 e) are applied. Concentrating on the semantics
constraint given in (7.15), this constraint equates the value of semantics in (7.19)
with some role in the semantics of (7.15). Of the three possible roles, two have
incompatible types: DEFINITE is incompatible with POLARITY and COLOUR-
PROPERTY. Since <modifier semantics type> is compatible with <semantics
4This order of combination is arbitrary: if the sign for pink combined with the sign
for elephants first, the series of combination would yield the same result sign for the
pink elephants.
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definite type>, the semantics of the modifier is unified with the value of <semantic











In the second combination, the sign for the elephants combines with the sign
for pink given in (7.14). Of the the two modifiers in <syntax modifier> of (7.15),










The second process, linking, then equates the value of semantics in (7.21) with the
value of some role in the (7.20): COLOUR-PROPERTY is incompatible with DEF¬
INITE and POLARITY, but compatible with COLOUR-PROPERTY, so the concept
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In the third combination, the result sign for the pink elephant combines with
the sign for runs given in (7.10) together with the constraints in (7.12). This
time the either sign could be the head sign since both are specified for <syntax
modifier>. However, the sign in (7.10) is neither compatible with any of the
modifiers of (7.15) nor does it respect their ordering requirements. The sign
for (7.15), however, can specify the first modifier of (7.15): their properties are
compatible and the ordering requirements are met (cf. the second modifier where
the value of directionality is post). Specification results in the modifier sign given
in (7.23) (the value of modifier is omitted for clarity):
(7.23)





















The linking process, in accordance with the second constraint in (7.12), unifies the
value of semantics with the value of the theme role, yielding the result semantics
in (7.24):













goal : type : location
In the fourth and final combination, the sign for the pink elephants run is
combined with the sign for to London. For the pink elephants run cannot directly
combine with the sign for to since it lacks a modifier in its modifier property with
the type PART (for particle). However, to can combine with London since the
sign for the latter, as with all NOUN signs, has the appropriate modifier slot. In
addition, the sign for London is defined for a constraint which equates the value of
the path <syntax head form nform> with its own nform property. Consequently,
the sign for to London can specify the second modifier of modifier in the sign for

















In this series of combinations, no sign contained disjunctive structures. As
we mentioned in section 7.2.1 disjuncts in syntactic and conceptual structure
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can be synchronized so that the selection of one disjunct in a pair leads to the
other pair being discarded. Signs with disjuncts can unify if at least one of the
disjuncts is compatible with the other sign: if both disjuncts are compatible,
then both are unified; and if one is incompatible, it is discarded (cf. Kasper
1987). Consider again the examples given in (7.1) and (7.2). In (7.1), the sign
for the in (7.13) combines with the sign for sink given in (7.17). According to
the HMP, the head sign is specified by the modifier sign. Since the sign for the
has no modifier property, sink is the head sign and the the modifier sign. Of the
modifier properties in the syntactic disjuncts, the sign for the is only compatible
with the modifier is the first disjunct. Furthermore, since this disjunct is part of a
synchronized pair, as indicated by the synchronize constraint, the linking process
only attempts to equate the modifier's semantics to a role in the synchronized
semantics of the head. The result sign's semantics are given in (7.26) where the






In the second example, (7.2), the other pair of disjuncts are discarded. For
this time, the sign for the ships combines as a preceding NOUN modifier of sink
and the semantics of the specified modifier is linked with the theme role in the




type : definitetileme :
definite
value : positive
place : type : location
What these disjunctive examples illustrate is that the appropriate sense of
ambiguous expressions can be immediately selected on the basis of local syntactic
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context. With polysemous expressions, however, the different senses share the
same syntactic structure. For example, in
(7.28) The bat eats mice.
the sign for bat has only a disjunctive conceptual structure: i.e. one disjunct con¬
tains the GAME-BAT concept and the other the ANIMATE-BAT concept. However,
in (7.28) the appropriate sense is selected on the basis of semantic compatibility
with one of combining signs. In the first combination, the sign for the com¬












In the second combination, the sign for the bat combines as a modifier of eats.
This time the disjunction is resolved in favour of the ANIMAL-BAT concept: the
modifier sign specifies a modifier slot with the semantic type animate, a type
which subsumes ANIMAL-BAT but not GAME-BAT. Consequently, the result sign
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Let us now consider how the appropriate sense of ambiguous and polysemous
expressions can be selected on the basis of the discourse context imported from
the discourse processing module.
7.3 Linguistic Sense Selection
In the cognitive linguistic approach, linguistic combination and discourse inter¬
pretation are interactive rather than autonomous. Two types of interaction have
been identified. With the first type, the linguistic process requests the transfor¬
mation of conceptual structure, a request which is occasioned by a unification
failure. This type of interaction is used to account for sortal defeat, as we will
see in section 7.4. The second type of interaction occurs after each sign is sent
to the discourse processing module for interpretation: the later module returns
a discourse context. These interactions between the linguistic processing and
discourse processing modules are illustrated in figure 7-2. In this section, we
Figure 7—2: Interactions between linguistic and discourse processing modules
discuss and illustrate the second type of interaction and its contribution to lin¬
guistic sense selection: i.e. the selection of the contextually appropriate sense of
ambiguous and polysemous expressions prior to combination.
The function of the discourse context is to contextually restrict upcoming
signs; in particular, to resolve disjunctions in its conceptual structure. The dis¬
course context is a set of 'simplified' descriptions of concepts anchored in the
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discourse model. The set consists of all the explicit concepts in the local domain
together with implicit concepts which are (immediately) embedded in explicit
concepts; implicit concepts embedded within implicit concepts are not included.
Each of these concepts is simply described using its id and type. For example,
the discourse context after the interpretation of The boy walked into the shop is
given in (7.31):
(7.31)
id : sentient 1
type : sentient
id : go 1
type : go
j id : shop1 \
\ type : shop /
id : window 1
type : window
id : door 1
type : door
This discourse context contains only the anchored concepts referenced by the
boy, walked into and the shop, but also implicit concepts, window 1 and doorl
created by the shop theory.
With linguistic sense selection, the linguistic processing module attempts to
recursively reduce disjunctive conceptual structure in the upcoming sign using
the current discourse context. Disjuncts in conceptual structure are reduced by
checking each disjunct against the concepts in the discourse context. If one,
but not the other, disjunct is compatible with one of these concepts, then this
disjunct is unified with the concept in the discourse context (its id is given the
same constant value) and the other disjunct discarded. If both disjunctions are
compatible, or neither are compatible, then the disjuncts are preserved and other
concepts in the discourse context are checked for compatibility. If no reduction
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takes place, then the discourse context is not sufficiently constraining to select
the contextually appropriate sense at the linguistic level.
This approach to linguistic sense selection, however, is too simple since it fails
to acknowledge the role of typicality, or dominance, in sense selection. For we shall
follow Tabossi (1988b) (see section 3.3.4) and require that context and dominance
restrictions converge for sense selection on the basis of discourse context:
Discourse Context Restriction (dcr)
If there is a concept C in the discourse context which is compatible
with the disjunct D1, but not the disjunct D2, in the semantics of the
upcoming sign, and Dl is more typical than D2, then unify C and
D1, and discard D2 and any disjunct in syntax synchronized with it.
With the dcr, the linguistic processing module can select the appropriate sense
of polysemous and ambiguous expression prior to combination. Furthermore,
where semantic and syntactic disjunction are correlated with synchronization
constraints, a secondary effect of the dcr is that the corresponding syntactic
disjuncts may be selected or discarded.
We shall first illustrate the dcr with the examples given in section 5.8 where
selection takes place in the discourse rather than the linguistic process. In such
cases, the discourse context is not sufficient to select between the alternative
senses of an expression. Consider examples (5.53) and (5.54) here given as (7.32)
and (7.33):
(7.32) The accountant decorated her new house. Then she bought a bed.
(7.33) The accountant went into the garden. She walked over a bed planted
with vegetables.
Again, we shall locus on the interpretation of bed whose sign is given in (7.16).
With (7.32), the discourse model immediately prior to the interpretation of
bed is given in figure 7-3. The discourse context for this state of the discourse
model is given in (7.34):

















Figure 7—3: Discourse model after interpretation of The accountant decorated






id : house 1
j type : house






where the implicit objects, MATTRESS-BEDl, COOKER 1 and BATH 1 created through
elaboration of the explicit HOUSE concepts, are not included since they are im-
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plicit concepts embedded within the implicit concepts BEDROOM 1, KITCHEN 1 and
BATHROOM 1 respectively. When the sign for bed is retrieved from the lexicon, the
DCR is applied. Neither of the concepts in its top-level disjuncts, MATTRESS-BED
and PLANT-BED, are compatible with any of the concepts in (7.34): neither are
compatible with ACCOUNTANT 1 since ACCOUNTANT is subsumed by ANIMATE,
and both MATTRESS-BED and PLANT-BED are subsumed by INANIMATE; neither
are compatible with DECORATEl since it is subsumed by EVENT and MATTRESS-
BED and PLANT-BED are subsumed by ENTITY; and neither are compatible with
HOUSEl, BEDROOMl, KITCHEN 1 and BATHROOM 1 since although they are all
subsumed by INANIMATE, there is no type which subsumes any of these types
as well as MATTRESS-BED or PLANT-BED. Consequently, the conceptual disjunc¬
tions in the sign for bed are not resolved.







/ id : garden1
\ type : garden
id : vegetable-bedl
type : vegetable-bed
id : flower-bed 1
type : flower-bed
where ACCOUNTANTl, GOl and GARDEN 1 are explicit concepts and VEGETABLE-
BED 1 and FLOWER-BED 1 are implicit concepts created through elaboration of
GARDEN 1 (see (5.59)). This time, there are conceptual disjuncts in (7.16) which
are compatible with concepts in the discourse context in (7.35). In particular,
PLANT-BED but not MATTRESS-BED is compatible with both FLOWER-BED 1 and
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VEGETABLE-BED 1: PLANT-BED subsumes FLOWER-BED and VEGETABLE-BED.
Furthermore, since both disjuncts embedded within PLANT-BED in (7.16) are also
compatible with concepts in this discourse context, the disjunction could only be
reduced to PLANT-BED: reduction cannot go any deeper since the DCR requires
that one disjunct in a disjunction is incompatible for reduction to take place.
However, no reduction takes place since, according to the gtypicality constraint in
(7.16), PLANT-BED is the subordinate rather than dominant sense, and reduction
only takes place when contextual restrictions and typicality coincide. Here they
diverge. Consequently, the disjunctive conceptual structure for bed is not resolved
at the linguistic level.
Let us now consider a case where sense selection does take place at the lin¬
guistic level on the basis of the discourse context.
(7.36) The accountant decorated her bedroom. Then she bought a bed.
In (7.36) context and typicality converge to select the MATTRESS-BED concept of
bed. The state of the discourse model immediately prior to the interpretation of
bed is given in figure 7-4. In figure 7-4 there are three explicit concepts, ACCOUN-
Figure 7—4: Discourse model after interpretation of The accountant decorated
her bedroom. Then she bought
DECORATE 1




TANTl, DECORATEl and BEDROOM 1, and one implicit concept MATTRESS-BEDl,
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created by the theory for BEDROOM and immediately embedded in BEDROOM 1.
This time all these concepts are exported as the discourse context to the lin¬
guistic processing module. Application of the DCR reveals that only one of the
disjuncts in bed is compatible with one of the concepts in the discourse context:
MATTRESS-BED in the first disjunct is compatible with MATTRESS-BED 1 in the
discourse context. Furthermore, according to the constraints in (7.16), this con¬
cept is more typical than the other disjunct. Since both context and typicality
converge, the top-level conceptual disjunction is resolved in favour of MATTRESS-
BED prior to combination. As a result, the linguistic conceptual structure for
she bought a bed is as given in (7.37) where the value for the id of MATRESS-









When the value of theme is interpreted, the anchoring process need only unify the
concept with the MATTRESS-BED 1 peg in the discourse model: it does not have
look for an accessible peg since this has already been determined by application
of DCR in the linguistic processing module.
Finally, linguistic sense selection with a discourse context can lead to the
resolution of syntactic disjunctions through synchronization constraints in the
sign. Consider the interpretation of count in (7.38) (cf. (3.13) and (3.14) in
section 3.3.2):
(7.38) The children were learning arithmetic. The teacher told them to count
the blocks.
According to Simpson (1981), the 'enumerate' senses of count is more typical
than the 'nobility' sense and each sense is associated with different syntactic
Chapter 7. Linguistic Processes 289
properties. Consequently, its sign, like the sign for sink in (7.17), has disjunc¬
tive conceptual and syntactic structures, and its constraints indicate that the
disjunct with the ADD concept is more typical than the disjunct with the NO¬
BLE concept, and that these disjunctions are synchronized with disjuncts in the
syntactic structure. Prior to the interpretation of count in (7.38), the discourse
context is as illustrated in figure 7-5. In figure 7-5, the ARITHMETIC concept has
Figure 7—5: Discourse model after interpretation of The children were learning
arithmetic. The teacher told them
been elaborated by a theory which creates four implicit concepts — ADDl, SUB-
TRACT1, DIVIDEl, MULTIPLY 1 — which describe the basic arithmetic operations.
Since these implicit concepts are immediately embedded in an explicit context,
they are included in the discourse context exported to the linguistic processing
module. Application of the DCR with the upcoming sign for count results in the
selection of the ADD disjunct: ADD is compatible with ADDl while NOBLE is not;
and ADD is the more typical according to the typicality constraint. Furthermore,
since these conceptual disjuncts are synchronized with syntactic disjuncts, the
VERB disjunct is selected and the NOUN disjunct discarded. Consequently, prior
to combination, the sign lor count is refined so as to have the value for semantics
Chapter 7. Linguistic Processes 290
in (7.39) and the value for syntax in (7.40) respectively (order and form properties
are not shown for the sake of clarity):
(7.39)
type : add
agent : type : sentient
theme : type : entity
(7.40)
head : type : verb
syntax :
modifier :
head : type : noun
semantics : type : sentient
syntax : head : type : noun
semantics : type : entity
Thus by using a discourse context exported from the discourse processing module
and the Discourse Context Restriction Principle, not only can the contextually
appropriate sense of ambiguous and polysemous expressions be selected in the
linguistic processing module prior to combination, but through synchronization
with the different syntactic structures, the appropriate syntactic structure can
also be selected.
7.4 Coping with Defeat
As we have seen in section 6.6, expressions can successfully combine even if they
are incompatible. Typicality defeat in section 6.6.1 involves a conflict between
necessary and default core semantic properties, as in pink elephants. Intrinsic
defeat in section 6.6.2 involves a conflict between necessary and default mode
semantic properties as with fake elephants. On the other hand, sortal defeat in
section 6.6.3 involves a conflict between necessary core properties, as in chocolate
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elephants, and general defeat in section 6.6.4 involves a conflict between necessary
semantic and syntactic properties. Furthermore, it is the modifier rather than
the head which has priority in defeat: unless the discourse situation suggests
otherwise, the result expression has the properties assigned, or required by, the
modifier. In section 6.4.2, this priority of modifier with respect to defeat was
systematically related to the ranking of their semantic types in (6.64). In this
section, we shall extend the account of sense correction, given in section 5.7, so as
to characterize typicality, intrinsic and sortal defeat; space prohibits an adequate
treatment of general defeat.
Typicality and intrinsic defeat can be accounted for without recourse to an
interaction between the linguistic and discourse processing modules: default an¬
choring and elaboration can account for them on the assumption that default
values for mode and core properties are not given in lexical and linguistic struc¬
ture. Thus with the signs for pink and elephants, while the necessary value pink
for COLOUR-PROPERTY is given in (7.14), the default value grey is not given in
(7.15 d). According to the HMP, their signs combine as modifier and head to












5The material and shape properties are necessary properties of ELEPHANT. They
will discussed in relation to intrinsic and sortal defeat.
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The 'conflict' arises when this conceptual structure is elaborated with the theory























condition :<material value flesh>
path :<taste va.lue>
value : 'elephant-flesh-taste'
The 'conflict' between pink and elephants then stems from a conflict between the
necessary value of colour assigned by pink and the default value specified in a
constraint in the ELEPHANT theory. However, as discussed in sections 5.3.5 and
5.7, while necessary constraints must hold, default constraints need not hold for
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a concept to be well-defined. Consequently, since colour is already specified for a
value, the default colour constraints does not apply, and application of the other


















A similar sort of account can be given for the intrinsic defeat in fake ele¬
phants. Again, the signs for fake and elephants combine as modifier and head
to yield a result sign with semantics similar to that given in (7.41); they differ
in that the colour property is replaced with a polarity property with the value
negative. The linguistic conceptual structure is then anchored and elaborated in
the discourse model. However, the elaboration process assumes that concepts
will have a positive value for their polarity property: i.e. this value is a default
within the elaboration process. When concepts lack a positive value, necessary
constraints are undermined: i.e. the relationship between the concept and neces¬
sary properties is thrown into doubt. Consequently, while the default constraints
can apply — there are no values already specified for the default properties of
ELEPHANT — necessary ones are suspended pending further positive information
about the concept. Thus unlike default constraints, which apply in the absence
of information at the closure of the current utterance domain (see section 5.7),
these necessary constraints are only applied when information is provided which
Chapter 7. Linguistic Processes 294
confirms, for example, that ELEPHANT should have the value flesh for its material
property. Consequently, the elaborated concept for fake elephants has, by de¬
fault, the colour and size of 'real' elephants, but not necessarily their material or
shape. In fact, it also lacks their taste: although the value 'elephant-flesh-taste'
is assigned by a default constraint in the ELEPHANT theory in (7.42) it does not
apply since its condition — that the concept has the value flesh for its material
property does not hold.
Sortal defeat is somewhat more complex since it requires the transformation
of the head's semantics. With the sortal defeat in chocolate elephants, the signs
for chocolate and elephants are unable to combine since their linguistic conceptual
structures have incompatible values for material. The sign for elephants is given









where the concept in the first disjunct is subsumed by PROPERTY and the concept
in the second disjunct is subsumed by ENTITY. Note that these senses are related:
the first concept is contained in the second as the value for its material property.
These disjuncts are synchronized with disjuncts in the syntax: i.e. the first is
associated with the type ADJECTIVE, appropriate for combination in chocolate
sweets and the second with the type NOUN, appropriate for combination in some
chocolate. With chocolate elephant, combination is initially successful: the sign
for chocolate can syntactically and semantically specify the sign for elephants as
an adjectival modifiers where its type, MATERIAL, is subsumed by PROPERTY.
However, combination fails during the linking process: while MATERIAL is com¬
patible with the type of the material property in the semantics of the sign'for
elephant, its value is not — chocolate and flesh are incompatible values.
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This conflict is resolved in UDG through the transformation of the head sign
semantics in the discourse processing module. For with this combination failure,
the value of semantics in one of these signs needs to be transformed into a structure
compatible with the semantics of the other. Once it has been transformed, it's
semantics are returned to the linguistic processing module and combination should
then succeed. Which sign is transformed is determined by the following principle
based upon the head modifier distinction:
The Transformation Principle
In a binary combination, when there is a conflict in linking the se¬
mantics of the modifier sign to a role in the semantics of the head sign,
transform the semantics of the head sign with respect to the semantics
of the modifier sign.
Accordingly, the semantics of the both head and modifier signs are exported for
transformation of the head's semantics.
In the discourse processing module, the concept referenced by elephants is
transformed in three phases. Firstly^, a new peg is created for the concept in
the discourse model, say CHOCOLATE-ELEPHANT 1, and it is assigned a type, say
CHOCOLATE-ELEPHANT, which is subsumed by ELEPHANT. Secondly, a theory
for this concept must be created. This theory must not only assign the material
property the value chocolate, but must also be a theory for concepts subsumed
by ENTITY as CHOCOLATE-ELEPHANT is. Such a theory can be created by inher¬
iting constraints from two theories subsumed by ENTITY, namely the ELEPHANT
theory given in (7.42) and the CHOCOLATE-ENTITY theory, which elaborates the
CHOCOLATE-ENTITY concept in the second disjunct in the semantics of chocolate,
given in (7.45)6:
6With other cases of sorta.1 defeat, the modifier may not have another sense asso¬
ciated with a. suitable theory. Consequently, the conceptual hierarchy will need to be
























The theory for CHOCOLATE-ELEPHANT 1 is created from these theories by inher¬
iting constraints on the basis of the Property Assignment Principle which always
succeeds in determining which of the two theories constraints are inherited from:
The Property Assignment Principle (PAP)
When a concept is assigned properties from two sources, one of these
search for a theory which assigns the same value to the conflicting property as given in
the modifier's semantics.
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is a prioritized source (PS) and the other is a non-prioritized source
(NPS).
Theories associated with concepts in a head modifier relationship are
prioritized: the theory associated with a concept in the head sign is
the NPS; the other theory, which may be associated with a concept in
the modifier sign, is the PS.
A property Pl assigned by a constraint in PS has priority over the
property P2 assigned by a constraint in NPS unless P1 is assigned
a value by a default constraint in PS and P2 is assigned a value by
necessary constraint in NPS.
Since the ELEPHANT theory is associated with the concept in the head sign ele¬
phants it is the non-prioritized source; the CHOCOLATE-ENTITY theory is the
prioritized source. Application of PAP results in the theory for CHOCOLATE-
ELEPHANT given in (7.46):

























where the default constraints for taste, size, colour and taste have been inherited
from the CHOCOLATE-ENTITY theory, i.e. the prioritized source, since none of
these properties are assigned by necessary constraints in ELEPHANT theory, the
non-prioritized source. The necessary constraint for material is likewise inherited
from the CHOCOLATE-ENTITY theory since it is the prioritized source and the
constraint is not a default constraint in this theory. The necessary constraint for
shape, however, is inherited from the non-prioritized source: since the property
is assigned by a default constraint in CHOCOLATE-ENTITY, but by a necessary
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constraint in ELEPHANT, the non-prioritized source supplies the shape constraint.
Consequently, CHOCOLATE-ELEPHANT 1 has all the properties of CHOCOLATE-
ENTITY with exception of SHAPE -— chocolate elephants are chocolate things
which look like elephants.
Finally, the third phase of transformation is that this new concept, with

















when this conceptual structure is returned to the linguistic processing module,
it replaces the semantics in the sign for elephant. Combination can now succeed
since the semantics of chocolate can be linked to a. role within the CHOCOLATE-
ELEPHANT concept in the second disjunct of elephants. Furthermore, this new
concept can be retained as part of the lexical sign for elephants. In this way, the
UDG treatment of sortal defeat is an example of information correction with its
tension between linguistic inertia and linguistic force (see section 5.7).
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7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have characterized the linguistic processing module in the
cognitive linguistic approach as Unification Dependency Grammar. UDG is based
upon the two aspects of combination discussed in chapter 6: the conceptual struc¬
ture associated with linguistic expressions can be extended through combination
in a unification grammar; and combination is characterized in terms of the head
modifier distinction, as in dependency grammar. In UDG expressions are char¬
acterized as signs whose syntax property consists of a head, which describes its
syntactic properties, and a modifier property, which describes the set of signs
with which it can combine. The semantics property is a linguistic conceptual
structure as discussed in section 5.4, and its constraints property describes rela¬
tions between substructures, such as equality, typicality and synchronicity, and
have the same format as the constraints discussed in section 5.3.5. Combination
itself is characterized in terms of two processes: a specification process in which
a modifier sign is unified with a modifier in the modifier of the head sign; and
a linking process which applies the constraints associated with the head sign so
that, for example, the conceptual structure of the modifier sign extends the con¬
ceptual structure of the head sign. The result sign can thus be defined as the
head sign after specification and linking. These processes were illustrated with
combinations where the expressions were associated with disjunctive values for
their semantics; and with examples where the combination process could not only
resolve these disjunctions, but resolve disjunctions in syntax (and vice versa) by
means of synchronization constraints.
Furthermore, we demonstrated how this approach to combination can account
for the immediate selection of the appropriate sense of ambiguous and polysemous
expressions as discussed in section 3.3, and some of the sorts of defeasibility dis¬
cussed in section 6.6. The account of linguistic sense selection relied upon the
discourse module exporting a discourse context — a set of concepts anchored
in the discourse model — and a principle which compared these concepts with
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concepts in the disjunctive conceptual structure of an upcoming sign. If a con¬
cept in one of these disjuncts was compatible with a concept in the discourse
context, and it was the more typical concept according to a typicality constraint
in the sign, then this concept is selected and the concept in the other disjunct
discarded. Cases of defeasibility were accounted for in two ways. With typicality
and intrinsic defeat, there was no conflict between the concepts in the head and
modifier signs since linguistic concepts do not contain default values for core and
mode properties: they only arise when the concept is anchored and elaborated in
the discourse model. As discussed in sections 5.6 and 5.7, these 'conflicts' are re¬
solved through necessary constraints having priority over default constraints. The
account of sortal defeat, however, required an interaction between the linguistic
processing and discourse processing modules. For combination fails in examples
of sortal defeat: in particular, the linking process fails through an incompatibil¬
ity between necessary properties of the concepts in the head and modifier signs.
This conflict is resolved by the discourse processing module transforming the
conceptual structure of the head sign into a structure which can be specified by
the modifier. The transformation itself involved creating a new type of concept
whose properties were supported by a theory created, in part, from the theory
associated with concept in the head sign. However, this theory supports the nec¬
essary property associated with the modifier concept, not the head concept. With
defeat then, while the resolution of 'conflict' in typicality and intrinsic defeat is
merely consistent with the priority of the modifier in defeat as discussed in sec¬
tion 6.6.5, the modifier's priority here is essential to our account of sortal defeat
since it is the head concept, rather than the modifier concept, which undergoes
transformation. This gives modifiers a more influential role in combination than
simply specification — specification by a modifier can lead to a change in the
conceptual structure of the head, although this conceptual structure still provides
the basis for the semantics of the result sign.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Consequences
In this short chapter, we summarize the conclusions which have emerged from
the cognitive linguistic approach to language comprehension, and briefly consider
some of the consequences of the approach for future work.
8.1 Summary of Conclusions
In chapter 1 we differentiated the cognitive linguistic approach from the tradi¬
tional linguistic approach on the grounds that linguistic description is an integral
part of the description of cognition, and that its focus is not the grammaticality
of sentences, but the nature of conceptual structure, the processes which relate
different levels of concept structure and the effects of context on these processes.
In chapter 2 two issues pertinent to this approach were addressed. The first
issue was methodology: i.e. the methods we might employ to support, test or
validate whether a description of linguistic behaviour is a characterization of
cognitive representations and processes. For while the traditional linguistic ap¬
proach claims that it is a description of our cognitive abilities, the methods it
employs, especially testing by example, contrasts with the methods employed by
other disciplines, such as cognitive psychology, which also claim to offer cognitive
descriptions. Consequently, we advocated a hybrid approach where both in¬
formal and experimental observation provide complementary perspectives. The
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second issue concerned the manner in which cognition is to be described. We
adopted the computational theory of mind which claims that cognition is de¬
scribed in computational terms: i.e. both humans and computers are described
as 'cognitive agents' capable of processing information. The cognitive linguistic
approach was characterized as a functional computational description with two
modules, a linguistic processing module and a discourse processing modules. The
relationship between these modules was viewed as bi-directional: the linguistic
processing module exports a linguistic description of expressions to the discourse
model, and the later module exports a portion of the discourse model to the
former module. The notion of symbol processing in these modules was given
an information-theoretic characterization: rules express global invariance while
constraints within symbols express local invariance. Furthermore, we made two
claims about the effects of context on language comprehension. Firstly, it was
claimed that semantic interpretation in the discourse module can be affected by
the discourse context so that contextually inappropriate senses of ambiguous and
polysemous expressions are not integrated and elaborated as concepts in the cog¬
nitive agent's model of the discourse. Secondly, it was claimed that the discourse
context can affect linguistic symbols in the linguistic processing module such that
contextually inappropriate senses of ambiguous and polysemous expressions can
be discarded prior to combination.
In chapter 3 we discussed two conceptual approaches to categorization, the
classical and prototype approaches. Both approaches were shown to be problem¬
atic, especially with respect to context effects on categorization. However, the
evidence did emphasize the importance of typicality in conceptual structure. For
not only do concepts contain characteristic or typical features, but concepts, and
levels of concepts, are also related by typicality. Such a treatment is compatible
with organizing concepts in terms of the subset relations as we observed in the
classical approach. In other words, concepts can be internally and externally
organized by necessary relations, such as the subset relation between concepts,
and typicality relations, such as the typicality relation between a concept and
one of its features. We then discussed lexical access, evidence pertinent to our
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claim that context can affect the construction of conceptual structure in the dis¬
course processing module as well as the construction of conceptual structure in
the linguistic processing module. The evidence was interpreted as supporting
these claims. In the case of expressions with multiple senses described in their
lexical conceptual structure, a discourse context which is sufficiently specific to
discriminate between these senses can lead to the selection of the contextually
appropriate and the discarding of inappropriate senses. Contexts which lack this
degree of specificity can still play a role in sense selection but only when concep¬
tual structure is processed in the discourse module.
In chapter 4, we developed the cognitive linguistic approach by addressing
two related issues: the nature of the relation between conceptual structures,
and the motivation for necessary and typicality relations within these structures.
We rejected the characterization of the relation between semantic representation
and semantic interpretation, as a correspondence between independent levels of
conceptual structure partly on the grounds that the approach is positively non-
cognitive and partly because of problems with realism. Instead, the relationship
was characterized in terms of the extension of dynamic, partial structures. In
interpretation, conceptual structure is extended into a conceptual structure which
then becomes part of a dynamic model of discourse available to cognitive agents.
Furthermore, we motivated necessary and typical relations within conceptual
structures on the basis of criteria! necessity and symptomic evidence relations.
The interpretation of linguistic expressions involves background knowledge, or
theories, and this background knowledge supports necessary and typical relations
within and between conceptual structures. One important aspect of this criterial
motivation is that interpretations are revisable: our interpretation of linguistic
expressions needs to be revised in light of further information incompatible with
current background knowledge.
In chapter 5 interpretation in the discourse processing module was charac¬
terized. Interpretation involved the extension of linguistic conceptual structure
into anchored conceptual structure by an anchoring process, and the extension of
Chapter 8. Conclusions and Consequences 305
anchored conceptual structure into elaborated conceptual structure by an elabo¬
ration process. Each of these levels of conceptual structure, as well as theories,
share the same ontology: they are constructed from the same set of basic ele¬
ments. The linguistic conceptual structure is a linguistically relevant description
associated with an expression; expressions with multiple senses are characterized
as disjunctive linguistic conceptual structures. The concepts in this conceptual
structure are added to the discourse model by an anchoring process which at¬
tempts to find compatible existing concepts in the current discourse model: if
such a concept is found, then the two concepts are unified; and if not, a new an¬
chored concept is created in the discourse model. The concepts in the discourse
model are then elaborated by theories whose constraints describe necessary and
typical relations between a concept and its properties. As a result, anchored
concepts are extended into elaborated concepts. This approach to interpretation
countenanced two sorts of extension in the discourse model: in the normal cir¬
cumstances, concepts are montonically extended; and in bizarre circumstances,
their extension is non-monotonic — the interpretation of concepts may be re¬
vised. However, we suggested that many cases of non-monotonic extension can
be avoided through judicious anchoring and elaboration. Finally, we demon¬
strated in detail how this approach accounts for sense selection at the discourse
level.
In chapter 6 we established that an extensional relation between the concep¬
tual structure associated with lexical expressions, and the conceptual structure
associated with phrases can be maintained in a unification grammar. However,
the process of combination is not simply symmetrical: one expression has prior¬
ity over the other. In one unification grammar, Unification Categorial Grammar,
combination is based upon the functor argument distinction, as in categorial
grammar: expressions are characterized as signs, with phonological, syntactic
and semantic properties, and combination involves the unification of an argu¬
ment sign with part of the functor sign to yield a result sign for the phrase. Our
approach differed in that the combination is based upon the head modifier dis¬
tinction, as in dependency grammar. This distinction was motivated on the basis
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of three distinctive properties of head signs: subcategorization (or specification),
category determination and obligatoriness. In particular: the head sign is syn¬
tactically and semantically specified by the modifier sign; the result sign has the
syntactic and semantic types of the head sign; and the head sign is obligatory
for both specification and category determination. Furthermore, the priority of
the head sign over the modifier sign is informally characterized in terms of their
semantic type: the semantic type of the head outranks the semantic type of the
modifier. Comparison with the functor argument distinction demonstrated that
linguistic regularities such as serialization and semantic category constancy can
be more economically described with the head modifier distinction. Finally, we
introduced evidence, defeasibility evidence, which both challenged and supported
the head modifier distinction. The challenge arose from combinations where the
combining signs possess incompatible semantic properties, and from combina¬
tions where not all the semantic properties of the head sign were preserved in the
result sign, and some new properties were introduced. On the other hand, the
defeasibility evidence supports combination on the basis of the head modifier dis¬
tinction in that the modifier sign, rather than the head sign, systematically had
priority in defeat, although the head sign still provided the basis for construction
of the result sign.
In chapter 7, the linguistic processing module in the cognitive linguistic ap¬
proach was characterized as Unification Dependency Grammar. Linguistic ex¬
pressions were characterized as signs with constraints which express, for example,
equality, typicality and synchronization relations between substructures in a sign.
Combination was characterized in terms of two processes: a specification process
in which a modifier sign is unified with part of the head sign; and a linking process
which applies constraints associated with the head sign so that, for example, the
conceptual structure of the modifier sign extends the conceptual structure of the
head sign. The result sign can thus be defined as the head sign after specifica¬
tion and linking. These processes were illustrated with combinations where the
expressions were associated with disjunctive conceptual structures; and with ex¬
amples where combination could not only resolve these disjunctions, but resolve
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syntactic disjunctions by means of synchronization constraints. Furthermore, we
demonstrated how this approach to combination can account for the immediate
selection of the appropriate sense of ambiguous and polysemous expressions as
well as some types of defeat. The account of linguistic sense selection relied upon
the discourse module exporting a discourse context — a set of concepts anchored
in the discourse model — and a principle which compared these concepts with
concepts in disjunctive conceptual structures in upcoming signs. The account of
defeat also required an interaction between the linguistic processing and discourse
processing modules. For combination fails in some cases of defeat due to incom¬
patibility between necessary properties of the concepts in the head and modifier
sign. This conflict is resolved by the discourse processing module transforming
the conceptual structure of the head sign into a structure which then allows it to
combine with the modifier sign.
8.2 Consequences for Future Work
One of the attractive features of the cognitive linguistic approach to language
comprehension is its uniform treatment of conceptual structures and processes:
conceptual structures are consistently characterized as partial objects; and con¬
ceptual processes — specification, linking, anchoring and elaboration — are char¬
acterized as processes which extend these partial objects into (potentially) less
partial objects. This treatment facilitates the construction of a level 1 compu¬
tational model in prolog; for example, modules can be implemented as prolog
modules, conceptual structures as incomplete lists of attribute value pairs, and
processes as prolog predicates which map these lists into (potentially) more com¬
plete lists. The development of this model can address some of the less attractive
features of this approach; namely, that it is incomplete — hence the title Towards
a Cognitive Linguistic Approach to Language Comprehension; and that while it
has been supported with plentiful examples, it has not been supported with ex¬
amples of 'everyday language' as suggested in chapters 1 and 2. Consequently,
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the approach will be extended by building a computational model capable of
combining and interpreting all expressions in passages from the corpus given in
appendix A. This will make the approach more concrete in at least three ways:
the conceptual hierarchy, outlined in figure 5-3, will be extended to include the
concepts and theories required for interpretation within the gardening domain;
likewise, the lexicon will be extended to include all the signs required for com¬
bination of linguistic expressions within this domain; and the processes will be
augmented so as to account for the instances of combination and interpreta¬
tion within this domain. Finally, as mentioned in section 5.5, the approach can
be further augmented by analyzing the discourse relations between conceptual
structures in this domain. This raises the possibility that these relations can be
characterized in terms of constraints defined for discourse theories, rather than




This appendix contains a transcription of the radio programme Gardener's Ques¬
tion Time. The programme was broadcast on the 31st of March 1991 from 1400
to 1430 on radio four. A short pause is indicated by a comma, and a longer pause
by'()'•
1 CJ: you are welcome to join us in the village hall
2 in aberporth in Cardiganshire once a fishing
3 village and now a popular holiday resort with
* visitors from home and abroad () here we are
3 guests of the local flower arrangers club ()
« aberporth has two lovely sandy beaches that are
i amongst the cleanest in the country and from the
» village there is a winding cliff path that takes you
s over to the adjoining village resort of tresaith ()
10 team, the soil varies a great deal from light and
11 sandy to heavy stony clay () frost is not generally a
12 problem but salt laden winds can be, that's it ()
13 ladies and gentlemen your gardeners' question
ii time team doctor stefan buczacki of Stratford
i3 upon avon sue philips of chichester and fred
is downham of lancaster
309
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is (applause)
19
20 thank you very much, and we are ready from the
21 first question please
22
23 JR: jo richards () as flower arrangers past retiring
24 age they are often forced to exchange their large
25 gardens for a tiny plot, due to the work load, to
26 avoid this I have started using permeable plastic
27 mulch with bark or pebble covering in certain
28 areas of my country garden () what other modern
29 devices would the team advise to avoid this heart
30 breaking situation
31
32 CJ: so, yes, jo richard you are looking forward to
33 the day you retire
34
35 JR: i am retired
36
37 CJ: are you, oh, i'm surprised () so really it is a
38 question of weed control, i take it, in a large
39 garden
40




45 JR: mainly yes
46
47 CJ: mainly that so what else can jo richards do
48 fred
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FD: i would grow ground cover plants which you
could also use for floral art () not just any kind of
ground cover plant but something you could put
there you could use, and i would not bother with
fiddlely little things where you have gotta put a lot
of plants in, because you'll be causing a lot more
work i would go for things which use the clime ()
things like clemitis, ivies, the large leaf ivies, you
know, silver-heart all those sort of things one
plant will cover yards () so get those going, and
leave them covered with your permeable mulch,
chippings and bark if you wish () but also do that
and plant that upon that () it'll cover it all green
you have plenty to cut at () no weedings () it'll be
lovely
CJ: err sue
SP: well i think it is very tempting to tell you to re¬
arrange your garden so as to get rid of the all
things that are gonna cause you any work but you
in the process also be getting rid of some of those
things you most like arranging with, and, from my
knowledge of flower arranging, a lot of people
like to use things like green nicosheanna and
heally crison and other annual plants () and if you
cannot live without them, then i would suggest
that you make yourself a raised bed, perhaps
eighteen inches high which is a convenient height
you can sit on the edge of it and work from a
Appendix A. Gardener's Question Time
so comfortable seated position () and grow them very
81 intensively, fill the bed with a very good quality
82 compost and grow the plants reasonably close
83 together, because they have got a deep root run in
si good compost, and i would install one of these
83 irrigation systems, that trickles water onto the bed
ss and you can either connect this up to a fiddlely or,
s? if you are likely to run out of water in the summer,
ss you could go to the luxury of getting one of these
89 gadgets that you can fit into the down pipe from
90 your bath, so that you can pipe your bath water
91 straight out onto your flower bed, because that
92 way you can grow the plants you without it taking
93 you a lot of effort
94
ss JR: that's a good idea thank you
96
97 CJ: thank you very much
98
99 SP: thank you
100
101 CJ: and the next please
102
103 JR: jill reece () in centrally heated homes is there
104 really a dormant period for house plants or should
105 they be feed through the year
106
107 CJ: thank you jill reece sue the question is () do all
los house plants retire for the winter
109
no SP: well i think the answer is simply no all house
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in plants do not retire for the winter but in deciding
112 how to look after them we really need to know
113 what kind of house plants you have got, what do
in you grow
115
us JR: erm i have geraniums, erm shrimp plants, erm,
117 swiss cheese plant, rubber plants and all these
us seem to sprout forth right throughout the winter
119
120 SP: well i think all the ones you describe certainly
121 will do, because the tropical plants, the foliage
122 plants, erhm, the things that come from warmer
123 countries, including the semi-tropical things like
124 geraniums () they will all keep going during the
125 winter () in case of the semi-tropical ones so long
126 as there is enough light and warmth () they will
127 tend to go a bit dormant if you keep them cooler
128 for the winter and certainly you should continue
129 watering them and feeding them () you will find
130 that they will, perhaps, grow slightly less
131 vigorously in the winter, erm, but the amount you
132 are feeding them is going to be based on the
133 amount you are watering them () you know, the
134 less water they need the less feed they need so
135 there is quite a simple ratio there, and the only
136 thing to do is check by sticking your finger into the
137 compost, a lot of people don't like sticking their
138 fmger into the compost i don't know if they expect
139 something to come out and bite them or
no something, but that really is the very best water
i4i meter you've got and it is already installed all
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142 ready to use no batteries or anything () so use your
143 finger () there are some plants, like some bulbs,
144 that will go dormant at various times of year
145 depending upon what sort of bulb it is () cacti and
146 succulents usually go dormant for the winter cacti
147 invariably and some kinds of succulents do and
lis some don't it is a question of knowing what you
149 have got
150
151 CJ: erm, stefan
152
153 SB: the general maxim that i follow is that if you
154 are providing plenty of heat and the plant
155 obviously is still growing, is that if it is a foliage
156 plant, or if it is a plant that flowers during our
157 summer and does flower indoors in the winter
138 then i would certainly keep it watered, not
159 soddened but watered on a reasonably regular
160 basis during the winter () erm every two or three
161 weeks perhaps depending on how warm the house
162 is () but if it is a flowering house plant if it is one
163 that is actually in flower during the winter then i
164 would give it feed as well, and, erm () the ones
165 that are not in flower in the winter start feeding
lee them again, well within a month or so from now
is? when they are looking forward to summer if you
168 like, they can sense spring is in the air and their
169 natural flowering period is ahead of them, then
170 start feeding () erm but certainly a plant that is in
171 growth should be given at least some water
>72 during the winter, the possible exception being
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173 cacti and succulents which as sue has said really
174 do go, go into a pretty dormant state
175
176 CJ: but it is surprising i think, mrs reece, that the
177 number of plants that, because they don't grow
178 very much in the winter because they don't flower
179 in the winter, you can almost dry them right off,
i«o and certainly cacti you can () i suppose that as a
181 general rule let the plant tell you () if it is
182 flowering and looks good then it obviously needs
183 water () and feeding thank you
184
i8s JR: thank you
186
187 CJ: another one
188
189 VW: vivene watson my garden consists mainly of
loo flag stones and gravel () can the team recommend
191 some trees and shrubs that can be grown in tubs to
192 use for flower arranging () also what size of tubs
193 do you recommend
194
195 CJ: how big is the garden
196




201 VW: yards () yes it is a very large courtyard
202
203 CJ: so it is enclosed as well
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204
20s VW: enclosed as well, wall all round
206
207 CJ: right () we have the picture mrs watson and
208 you are seeking advice on what trees and shrubs
209 you can grow in tubs for flower arranging () erm
210 () quite a few stefan
211
212 SB: oh yes, more than quite a few, many, dozens ()
213 rather than give a whole long list of names i am
214 just going to make one or two general points ()
215 one being clearly if the plants are being grown
216 primarily for use in flower arranging they have
217 got to stand have lumps chopped off them at
218 regular intervals they should therefore be pretty
219 vigorous, pretty tough and relatively fast growing
220 it is no point having something that is slow
221 growing and going to take ten years to replace
222 what you have taken off for one week's worth of
223 flower arranging () so those are the criteria for
224 the plants, for the container in which they grow ()
225 these plants by their very nature are going to have
226 to be fairly large otherwise one week's cutting will
227 get them down to ground level () and therefore
228 the container should also be large and i would
229 suggest that the best containers to use are going
230 to be wooden half barrels () err drill some holes in
231 the bottom () i used to paint them inside with
232 preservative what i now do' and find better in fact
233 () is to line them with plastic sheet () so the
234 compost that they are filled with doesn't in fact
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235 come into contact with the wood itself and that
236 prolongs the life of them enormously () so my
237 general advice is grow whatever you like () and
238 whatever you think you can adapt to a flower
239 arrangement, but make sure it's vigorous, make
240 sure it is tough and will stand being chopped
241 around, grow it in a half-barrel with a good
242 compost in it
243
244 CJ: right () eh coming to you fred () a few things
245 that can be grown once you've lined this tub
246
247 FD: you've got a choice of growing the acid
248 lovers, and the lime lovers, the alkaline lovers,
249 because you can change the compost in the tubs ()
250 and i think that is a very good idea because you,
251 you known, you could grow heathers and
252 comileans and things like that in one and switch
253 other to things like vermums in another () and a
254 lot of the plants that quite often down here, i
255 would imagine, that get hit with wind burn from
256 the salt air () a lot of plants with soft foliage like
257 grislinea, that some of thing, which burn () i think
258 in this situation you would be able to grow them
259 in a tub () and being enclosed all round the side it
260 would protect them () so i would be looking at
261 things that none of the other floral art people
262 have got in their garden, so the ones that they
263 can't grow
264
265 CJ: now then, vivenne watson, can i ask you what
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266 you would like to grow particularly, anything
267
268 VW: yes () i am particularly fond of variegated
269 things
270
271 CJ: ahh right
272
273 VW: yes they're more difficult erh () but
274
275 CJ: well () i don't think they need be sue need they
276 variegated plants are easy in tubs
277
278 SP: well yes and if you are growing the plant
279 primarily to decorate your courtyard i think you
280 have got to think of the effect that they are going
281 to create there too () so you have got to balance
282 out, you know, how you are going to chop for
283 flower arranging and how much you are going to
284 leave the things looking presentable for
285 appearances sake () but having said that i think
286 there are a few things that will give you what you
287 want () bamboo for instance always makes a
288 smashing plant for a tub, it is not one that is
289 widely promoted as a tub plant but it's good and
290 of course you can cut it down, you known, you can
291 cut some of it down quite regularly () eucalyptus, a
292 lot of eucalyptus will stand being pollarded () one
293 that i particularly like to cut and bring indoors is
294 the spinning gun which us eucalyptus perennia ()
295 now it is not terribly hardy and i don't honestly
296 know whether you would get away with it outside
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297 in winter even here () but in a tub you could
298 always just, erm, quietly put it in a porch or
299 somewhere where it has got a bit of shelter () petis
300 sporum () now there are a number of quite
301 attractively variegated petis sporum, they are
302 going to grow a bit slower than the plain green
303 one () but in a sheltered courtyard in this part of
304 the country i think petis sporum would be very
305 nice () and formeum, they are some absolutely
306 sensational beautifully variegated formeums
307 around now () salmon pink and cream and green
308 variegated ones () and you could easily pinch a
309 leaf off there from time to time
310
3u CJ: i jotted down one or two fortinia () you know
312 fortinia with its wine coloured young leaves and
313 peeris because there you have got the lovely young
314 foliage and you have also got the lily of the valley
315 centred flowers as well () erm holly I think you
316 could in a tub () and rubennia () i know that we
317 think of rubennia as a tree but if you are
sis continually hacking at it () it makes a nice bush
319 and you have got that () yes don't you you do
320 flower arrangers you hack at the things (laughter)
321 this lovely golden foliage you see () how about
322 that
323
324 VW: well that's given me ( )
325
326 CJ: a few ( )
327
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328 VH: ( )
329
330 CJ: something to think about
331
332 VW: thank you very much indeed
333
334 CJ: thank you madam () and next please
335
336 MG: moreen gittings () i want to make a labenum
337 covered archway over a three foot path about
338 fifteen feet long () can the team tell me how to
339 start off, number of trees and how to train
340
341 CJ: thank you for the question because i am
342 reminded of that superb labullum arch in bobmin




347 CJ: ahh well you don't know what you missed ()
348 its a long long arch, and in may when they are in
349 bloom () you just walk through a haze of golden
350 yellow as the rashes hang down () ah it's
351 indescribable () anyway, that's beside the point,
352 how should mrs gittings begin fred
353
354 FD: well I don't think you'll need to go to bodmin
355 because you'll have your own in a few years time
356 aren't you () people will be coming to visit your
357 garden and walk through your labullum archway
358 () when you do anything like this i think you got to
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359 remember you to have something for them to
360 hang onto so you want some sort of support and i
361 would suggest that you had made some metal
362 supports, hoop shaped, so you have got their
363 shape of the arch to start with () and then what
364 you is what we call labullum whips, which are one
365 year old plants just like a fishing rod just one
see straight stem, and you plant those, one at the
367 bottom of each of these hoop, and i suggest that
368 you plant six each side () so you have got them
369 almost three feet apart () so you want six hoops,
370 twelve labullum plants and that's where you start
371 () and you prune them, whenever they want
372 pruning () let the leaders grow, let them meet over
373 the top and when they do meet graft these two
374 together almost, plaid them together and they
375 almost join () and then of course you take the ends
376 out because they have gone far enough () they will
377 also start to produce side growths () and again
378 these side growths will want pruning you can spur
379 prune these, that is any growth that comes off
380 these side growths should be shortened back and it
381 is normally done straight away after they have
382 flowered () but of course in the first few years
383 when yours are growing () then they may not
384 flower so i would say you do these around the end
385 of june beginning of july and you start off from
see there () and really when you get into it, it's quite
387 easy and i would suggest that you use the variety
388 bossi because you got the loveliest colour and the
389 longest ( ) of flowers () it'll be absolutely beautiful
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390
391 CJ: how tall should the archway be in the centre
392
393 FD: well it wants to be, i would say, at least about
394 eight foot if you can manage it so you know you
395 got a three foot pathway () but as long as it has
396 got plenty room each side, i mean, you can go
397 much further out than that () so you want to be
398 eight or nine foot in the middle really, or you'll be
399 dangling them on the top of your head
400
401 CJ: yes, and certainly needs to be more than three
402 feet wide you see
403
404 MG: oh yes
405
406 CJ: can you make it, say, ten feet wide or
407 something
408
409 MG: well i make it, yes probably
410
-Hi CJ: good, good, excellent () you'll enjoy it once it
412 starts blooming you really will () thank you very
413 much
414
415 VW: thank you
416
417 CJ: yes madam
418
419 BR: betty rooten () i have an eight year old
420 mulberry tree, or bush, it is five foot high () how
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*21 long will it be before it bears fruit and does it need
<22 a partner
423
<24 cJ: thank you () now then betty rooten, Stefan, has
425 a eight year old mulberry, morus nigra () it will go
<26 to twenty feet won't it () so when indeed will it
<27 fruit () if it remains celibate
428
<29 SB: erm, yes, it will grow to twenty feet or more
<30 in the fullness of time () now you said, clay, it's
<3i morus nigra () is it in fact morus nigra, is it the
<32 black mulberry
433
434 BR: i don't know () i've lost the label
435
<36 SB: ahh () and it's not easy to tell without a label
<37 () and with no fruit () but i hope, i hope you have
<38 morus nigra because morus nigra, the black
<39 mulberry, is certainly the one to grow for the
«o delicious mulberry fruit () the white mulberry will
«i also produce fruit but not as dark coloured and
«2 not as tasty () but most nurseries when they sell
«3 them () for for, as fruit trees in fact do sell the
<<< black ones so i hope that is what you have () not a
«5 lot to do with a mulberry () except buy yourself a
446 bench () put it underneath it () put your feet, up, sit
447 back and wait () and wait, it'll take a time () what
<48 did you say it was, how old now, eight years old
449
4so BR: about eight years
451
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452 SB: i would have said () if i was going to snatch a
453 figure out of the air i would have said ten years
454 for a mulberry to produce its first fruit so i don't
455 fact think you have a long time to wait () doesn't
456 need a partner no they're self-fertile () but the one
457 thing i would is that once your mulberry does start
458 to fruit, as it well do most assuredly, then is the
459 time to more your bench away from the mulberry
460 tree, because the mulberry fruit stain clothing like
461 nothing else () and if the fruit fall onto the bench
462 and you then sit on them, then you'll wish hadn't
463
464 BR: thank you
465
466 CJ: fred, any more advice on mulberries
467
468 FD: the whole art of growing mulberries is that
469 the fruit almost fall off when ready () shake the
470 tree and they'll drop down () so what i would do
471 as well as buying the bench () i would think about
472 some net hammocks or something like that to
473 catch the fruit on because if they drop on the
474 ground, of course, they are damaged and they
475 aren't that good, they don't keep very well () i
476 think you'll find that () they will manage all by
477 themselves because there are male and female
478 flowers on the one tree () the male flowers, i'm
479 afraid, are very small little slender things, and the
480 big ones, almost like catkins, are the females and
481 those are the one of course that you eat () of
482 course they are the most delicious () like all
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483 females i suppose
484
485 CJ: ahh ladies men () sue do you like mulberries
486
487 SP: well i never actually tasted mulberries to be
488 honest, but, the tree, whether it is fruiting or not,
489 makes a very attractive shape () they tend to look
490 sort of old and gnarled even when they are quite
491 young () but i would expect that a mulberry tree
492 has got to be about fifteen years old before it
493 actually starts, fruiting, so i think that you have
494 got a bit of a wait yet () but for anybody thinking
495 of getting a mulberry tree, who doesn't want to
496 wait fifteen years, there is a variety called chelsea
497 which will start fruiting when it is as young as
498 two or three years old, and you can even grow it
499 in a pot if you like, so you could move it under
500 glass and get early mulberries
501
802 cJ: erhm in the old gardening books the advice
503 was that on the ground below the mulberry tree
504 you spread a very soft cloth, and then you shook
505 the tree () and they dropped and that's the way
506 you harvested mulberry, be patient and try not to
507 lose labels either () thank you very much
508
509 BR: ( ) thank you
510
511 CJ: thank you () and the next please
512
513 GW: geoffrey waters () i would like to start
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growing orchids () can the team please give me
515 some advice on the species best suited for a
516 beginner bearing in mind that i don't wish to use
517 too much heat () i have a eight feet by six feet
sis greenhouse that's keep just frost free
519
520 CJ: right sir () fred what can he start with
521
522 FD: i would go for the pleonis () these are all little
523 tiny orchids () grow them in bowls or in pots ()
524 erhm they are very short but they do grow great
525 big flowers on them there are several varieties
526 available () the only trouble is that they flower
527 during the spring and early summer, and during
528 the winter they do die down as nothing left, but
529 that is the time of course when you start to pot
530 them up so you work on them at that time, and
531 you think about the lovely show they are going to
532 give you during the spring, and of course they
533 grow outside or in a frame during the summer
534 when other things are in the greenhouse () so
535 beautiful things, and those are the ones i would
536 recommend you started with and once you have
537 started you'll be hooked, and you'll carry on
538 growing them
539
540 CJ: so fred's choice is pleonis, which is a short
541 little thing, but, you know, you have them in a
542 half, half pot or a pan they look very very pretty ()
543 sue our choice
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545 SP: yes if you want to grow orchids in a cool or
546 cold greenhouse i think pleonis are definitely your
547 best bet () but erm, do you have to grow these
548 orchids in the green house, what about having a
549 few indoors () the ones i would go for for house
550 plants, are the moth orchids, phallanopsis, which
551 are quite small plants, you usually get about three
552 or four leaves on a plant at any one time, and they
553 are quite large boat shaped leaves with a keel
554 down the middle, perhaps about nine inches long,
555 so they fit quite happily into a six inch half pot,
556 and the flowers are magnificent they mostly
557 flower during the winter, but you can get odd
558 flower at all sorts of times, you get a great big
559 arching spray of what look like, coloured moths
560 hovering above the plants, you get a spray about
561 perhaps eighteen inches long, with perhaps dozen
562 or more flowers and they come in white and pink
563 and all sorts of strips and spots and blotches most
564 attractive, and very easy to grow if you can grow
565 african violet you can grow phalanopsis () the
see great trick though is to, stand them on a tray of
567 gravel so that there is plenty of humidity around
568 them all the time they actually want air
569 movement, so it is no good sticking them in a
570 dingely little corner () they don't want to be in
571 bright sunlight, but they do want reasonably good
572 light () i grow mine on a coffee table inside the
573 room where they are out of direct sun, but they
574 have got moving air round them and they do very
575 well indeed they're beautiful
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576
577 cJ: if i could just say mr waiters that i think sue is
578 absolutely right and best of luck with them () thank
579 you sir
580
581 GW: thank you very much
582
583 CJ: thank you () now then madam
584
sss JD: joy dawson () sadly my greenhouse is very ill
586 with dry rot and this year it will be pulled down
ss? and re-built () my problem is that i have two black
sss hamburger grape vines inside () they have been
589 pruned and bark stripped () is it possible to keep
590 them in a state of dormancy this year by continual
591 pruning of new growth () obviously i don't want
592 them damaged when work commences on the new
593 house which is to be built around them
594
595 CJ: thank you () now then team, mrs dawson's
596 greenhouse is dying of dry rot () its got to go, and
597 hopefully a new one will rise like a phoenix from
598 the ashes () but the point is what happens to the
599 black hamburger vines in the meantime fred
600
eol FD: well i don't think you are going to keep them
602 dormant whatever you do because these things
603 will want to burst into growth () but what i do
604 suggest you do is keep them tightly pruned () i
605 think you can keep grape vines happy, living and
606 well-being, just by having almost one or two
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eor leaves at every joint and nothing else, maybe even
60s take some of the shoots off as they arise, and
609 maybe space them two feet apart as long as you
610 have got some growth there that grape vine will
en stay alive () it will stay happy, you can then
612 protect it with hessian when the builders are there
613 putting the greenhouse up and it be quite happy ()
614 don't feed it, keep it watered, and i'm sure it'll be
sis there and it'll be happy again next year but don't
616 let it go ( ) dormant whatever you do () in fact
617 you won't be able to stop it
618
619 CJ: in fact i think fred has said it all () have not
620 worries () thank you very much
621
622 JD: thank you
623
624 CJ: do we have another one
625
626 IS: iris saunders () i bought some gerburghs plants
627 last summer which flowered to late autumn and
628 they have been dried off from winter () what
629 treatment is required to start them into growth
630 and how soon should i start
631
632 CJ: oh you've mentioned one of my favour flowers
633 iris saunders, the gerburghs, gerburgh jamesoni
634 and there are new varieties now happy pot is one,
635 lovely house plant, lovely also in window boxes i
636 think () so what now stefan
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638 SB: not any problem at all i don't think, yes clay's
639 right there are a number of new gerburghs come
640 on the market in recent years and they are
641 beautiful for anyone not familiar with them they
642 are, the characteristic shape of a south african
643 daisy and this is basically what they are a genus of
644 daisy-like plants from south africa and jamesoni,
645 the one that was grown traditionally for many
646 years has a lovely rich orange colour but there are
647 others now these compact ones like happy pot,
648 and ones that are routinely grown as annuals
649 from seed () yours, erm, i think it is simply a
650 matter of potting it up, anytime now () in fact i
651 would pot it up in a soil base not peat base
652 compost, use a john innes number one compost,
653 pot it up start watering keep it warm erh
654 temperature if you can manage it reasonably
655 constant temperature of round about fifty () begin
ese to water, begin, to feed when it is in growth
657 again and off you go and i agree with clay i think
658 they are absolutely superb () lovely lovely things
659
ceo CJ : f red
661
662 FD: in the spring, around about the beginning of
663 march, i take all the dead leaves off , pull them all
664 off, and what i have got left is almost a dry root it
665 looks as if its almost dead, knock it out of the pot,
see shake that old compost off, give it some new
667 compost start them off again, water them, and
ees then when you have used that, about eight weeks
Appendix A. Gardener's Question Time 331
669 after they have been repotted then start to feed,
670 don't get them too wet, and in the summer they'll
671 be full of flowers again and they go and go on
672 every year get bigger and bigger, more and more
673 flowers, i would do without them
674
675 CJ: they are superb aren't they () who named them
676 the thing, that variety happy pot i'll never know ()
677 sounds more like a baby's toilet doesn't it () it
678 really does
679
680 (that's a nappy)
681
682 has that answered the question
683
684 IS: yes thank you very much
685
see CJ: oh good thank you () and we have time for just
687 one more question please
688
689 BD: betty davis () i have a problem with my red
690 current bushes () i just get no fruit in them at all
691 i've had them, this'll be the third year () they are
692 very healthy looking () last year i had one string of
693 red current and that was all what am i doing
694 wrong
695
696 CJ: a lot () must be
697
698 BD: must be
699
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700 CJ: eh any idea what the variety is
701
702 BD: i think it's a dutch name, is it john her
703 venmets, or a name like that
704
70s CJ: do you know that one f red
706
707 FD: yes () have you done any pruning at all
708
709 BD: i haven't pruned it at all ( ) i'm not quite
710 sure how to prune it
711
712 FD: well i'm glad that you haven't because i don't
713 think you should have done () but i think you are
714 being a bit impatient and i think this year you will
715 get a good crop of red currents, because red
716 currents fruit on two year old wood () they don't
717 fruit like black currents on the first year's wood,
718 they fruit on two year wood () and what you have
719 to do is let the plants grow their ordinary stems
720 then what they do they start to grow laterals, out
721 from those main stems, and it is on those side
722 branches, where your fruit will occur, but these
723 side branches have got to be one year old before
724 they will grow fruit () i would say this year, you
725 are going to enjoy your first red current pie () not
726 all crust like it was last year with two or three
727 berries () but big, thick, red current pies and they
728 are absolutely beautiful, and if you don't want to
729 leave them until they go red you try having green
730 red current pie, it is absolutely delicious () the juice
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735 BD: thank you
736
737 CJ: so you have done nothing wrong it is just a
738 question of waiting until they are ready hmm
739 thank you for that question () well as we come to
740 the end of the programme team, as usual, i ask
741 you for your topical tips please, starting with you
742 stefan
743
744 SB: over the next few weeks we shall be planting
745 a great deal of plants and sowing a great many
746 seeds outdoor in the vegetable garden so what
747 you have to do is have the soil warmed before you
748 do that and the way to warm the soil, is to lay
749 plastic sheet over it and if any of you know any
750 physics at all you'll realize it should be black
73i plastic because that absorbs heat, not white plastic
752 which reflects it, and certainly not clear plastic
753 which just encourages weeds to grow underneath
754
755 CJ: thank you stefan () sue
756
757 SP: if your lawn has any broken edges now is a
758 very good time to repair them, and you can do
759 that easily by cutting out a square of turf round
760 the broken part, lifting it, turning it round, and
761 replacing it the same spot, because now the
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762 broken bit is inside the lawn and you can simply
763 fill the hole in with a bit of soil, and sprinkle some
764 new grass seed over the top () in next to no time
765 you won't even know that it was there
766
767 CJ: thank you sue () and finally fred
768
769 FD: i like to have flowering pot plants right
770 through the summer () and one of my favorites
771 have become the ( ) petunias, sow a few seeds
772 now () prick them out when they are large enough
773 () pot eventually three into a six inch pot, and you
774 will have potfuls of colour right through the
775 summer months
776
777 CJ: thank you fred and that's it () we have been
778 the guest of the aberporth flower arrangers club in
779 Cardiganshire () please join us again next week,
780 and until then it is good bye, good gardening and
781 a very happy easter to you all, from doctor Stefan
782 buczacki, fred downham, sue philips and from me
783 clay jones () a very good day to you
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